

FBI

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TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
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PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
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CLASSIFICATION:

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Date 3/9/81

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 ATTENTION: ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES DIVISION
 PERSONNEL SECTION

FROM: SAC, CHARLOTTE (67-131)

GREENKIL
 CIVIL RIGHTS
 (OO: CHARLOTTE)

RECOMMENDATION FOR COMMENDATIONS

Re Charlotte letter to Bureau, 1/13/81.

Referenced Charlotte letter made recommendations for special recognition for 25 employees in the form of individual letters of commendation from the Director. These commendation letters were received on 3/8/81, and it was discovered at that time that three Special Agents were inadvertently omitted from paragraph 2, page 2, of relet.

SAs [redacted] and [redacted]
 [redacted] are to be commended for their outstanding performance in conducting interviews of armed hostile members of the CWP, KKK and American Nazi Party and for their courageous and exemplary performance on 11/11/79, as participants in a surveillance of a march by the CWP in Greensboro, N. C. These Agents were exposed to high risk of bodily harm but nonetheless performed without regard to their own personal safety and provided up-to-the-minute intelligence information which was used by field command personnel to prevent violence and potential death and injury to many persons.

② - Bureau
 1 - Charlotte

RLP:jms
 (3)

Approved: 64 APR 15 1981

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Date _____

CE 67-131

Additional background information concerning the GREENKIL operation can be found in an FD-255, dated 12/23/80, containing recommendations for incentive awards for ASAC CECIL E. MOSES, SA [] and Clerk-Typist []

It should be noted that the above employees were included in the original rough draft and were accidentally left off in a retype. Since their fellow employees have already been commended by the Director, I recommend that, if possible, FBIHQ expedite letters of commendation for these Special Agents.

*ASB Commended
2-11-81
JW*

appropriate letters
prepared 3-13-81 []

2

Approved: _____

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FBI

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Date 6/30/81

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (44-81521)
 FROM: *[Signature]* SAC, CHARLOTTE (44-3527) (P)
 GREENKIL
 CIVIL RIGHTS (A)
 OO: CHARLOTTE

Enclosed for the Bureau are 5 copies of letterhead memorandum captioned "WORKERS VIEWPOINT ORGANIZATION, Also Known As Communist Workers Party; KU KLUX KLAN; AMERICAN NAZI PARTY; SHOOTING INCIDENT, GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, NOVEMBER 3, 1979".

② - Bureau (Enc. 5)
 2 - Charlotte

RGS:jnr
 (4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6-11-84 BY SP2
 TAP/JAC

44-81521-195
 16 JUL 2 1981

Approved: _____

Transmitted _____

(Number)

(Time)

Per _____



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Charlotte, North Carolina

June 30, 1981

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WORKERS VIEWPOINT ORGANIZATION,
Also Known As Communist Workers Party;
KU KLUX KLAN;
AMERICAN NAZI PARTY;
SHOOTING INCIDENT, GREENSBORO,
NORTH CAROLINA, NOVEMBER 3, 1979

Attached hereto are copies of articles appearing in issues of the following newspapers reporting remarks made by H. M. MICHAUX, the former United States Attorney, Middle District of North Carolina, concerning his recommendation to the United States Department of Justice that they seek indictments in the above captioned matter:

The Greensboro Record, Greensboro, North Carolina, issue of June 24, 1981.

The Greensboro Record, Greensboro, North Carolina, issue of June 25, 1981.

Greensboro Daily News, Greensboro, North Carolina, issue of June 25, 1981.

News and Observer, Raleigh, North Carolina, issue of June 25, 1981.

Raleigh Times, Raleigh, North Carolina, issue of June 25, 1981.

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DATE 6-11-84 BY SP2 TAP/JAC

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ENCLOSURE

44-81521-195

FBI/DOJ

Michaux to tell Klan action

By JIM WICKER
Record Staff Writer

In a final act as U.S. attorney, H.M. "Mickey" Michaux was expected to disclose late this afternoon that he had recommended that Ku Klux Klan-Nazi suspects in a fatal shooting here be charged with federal civil rights violations.

Michaux this morning refused to disclose his recommendation on the matter to the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington. He said he would make a statement after 3 p.m.

A Justice Department spokesman in Washington, John Wilson, also declined to disclose Michaux's recommendation this morning, but said the Nov. 3, 1979, incident "is still an active case in the civil rights division."

While Michaux delayed making public his recommendation, a source close to the federal court said this morning that the U.S. attorney's recommendation — made several weeks ago — was that the shooting suspects be charged.

The source said that the U.S. attorney's office feels that "this should be done to clear the air" in the case.

Specifics about the charges and the defendants involved could not be determined this morning.

Six of the Klan-Nazi activists charged by Greensboro police shortly after the shooting were acquitted on murder and rioting charges in Guilford County Superior Court.

After the acquittals, Michaux's office examined the possibility of bringing federal civil rights charges against suspects in the case. Michaux met with numerous people while he considered the civil rights charges and, at one point, met with representatives of the Communist Workers Party in Washington.

Michaux was asked by the Justice Department not to make his recommendation public.

But Tuesday, as he finished his last duties in the office, Michaux promised to "let the public know" what he had recommended and stood firm on his decision to wait until his last couple of hours in office to do so.

"I can tell you this, he (Michaux) did make a recommendation to the Justice Department, but under the civil rights procedure, I can't tell you what it is," Wilson said. He seemed surprised when told that Michaux would reveal his recommendation this afternoon.

Wilson said the Nov. 3, 1979, matter "is very complicated and complex and there are a lot of legal questions that have to be answered."

One question, he said, is "whether there is federal jurisdiction" in the shooting incident. Another is whether there were any violations of civil rights.

It is possible, according to Wilson, that individuals charged with civil rights violations in a case involving death could receive life prison terms if convicted.

There would be no double jeopardy in a case in which individuals are tried on murder charges in state court and on civil rights violations in federal court, Wilson said.

The five slain leftists, who also have been listed as "labor organizers" by the Greensboro Justice Fund, were leaders and members of the Communist Workers Party at the time of the confrontation.

The CWP group, which had planned a "Death to the Klan" march and rally through Greensboro, wrote letters to area Klan leaders prior to Nov. 3, 1979, challenging the KKK to come to Greensboro that day.

When a caravan of cars occupied by Klan-Nazi activists arrived at the CWP rally point, there was a stick fight and then gunfire.

Immediately after the shooting at Carver Drive and Everitt Street, then President Carter dispatched a large number of additional FBI agents to Greensboro to conduct an investigation and to submit reports to the civil rights division.



Michaux

Michaux: Indict Klansmen

Agent says mum CWP a holdup

By JIM WICKER
Record Staff Writer

Participants in the Nov. 3, 1979 confrontation which claimed the lives of five communists should be indicted and prosecuted, H. M. "Mickey" Michaux said Wednesday afternoon as he completed his term as U.S. attorney here.

Michaux, saying he was keeping a promise to "let the people know my decision," said he made the recommendation on May 5 in a three-page memo to the Justice Department in Washington.

But this morning a high-ranking FBI official who was a supervisor of the more than 25 additional agents sent to Greensboro by then-President Jimmy Carter after the slayings, said there "is a gap" in reports submitted to the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division.

"After a couple of weeks, we sent an initial report of several hundred pages to the Civil Rights Division, but we never had any cooperation from the communist side. We never had a single interview.

"We weren't able to get all the facts," said Cecil Moses, assistant special agent in charge of the FBI in North Carolina. "It is always better to have both sides of the story and we weren't able to get any information from one side (the Communist Workers Party) of the confrontation. That hampered our investigation, left a gap and had an adverse impact."

Moses said 25 and sometimes as many as 40 additional FBI agents were in the Greensboro area after Nov. 3 to gather information for the Civil Rights Division. The agents also presented follow-up reports.

Moses cited "false starts" in the FBI's efforts to interview Communist Workers Party members. "They indicated they might (talk to agents), then they'd back off. There were other complications, one being the big multimillion dollar lawsuit they filed."

Moses, many other federal, state and local law enforcement officers, and various governmental figures including Mayor Jim Melvin were named as defendants in the \$37 million suit filed on Nov. 3, 1980 in U.S. Middle District Court. The suit is still pending.

Communist Workers Party members and supporters have repeatedly said that government and law enforcement officials conspired with the Ku Klux Klan and Nazis before the confrontation at Carver Drive and Everitt Street at which five people were shot to death. The conspiracy allegations apparently are the basis for the suit and for the CWP's lack of cooperation with the FBI.

Michaux criticized the Justice Department for not acting on his recommendation, which the department is not bound to abide by.

"I really am disappointed. It didn't take me six or seven months to come up with my conclusion and they are far smarter than I am," Michaux said. He added that he was stunned when a Superior Court jury acquitted six of the Klan-Nazi defendants on murder and rioting charges in the case on Nov. 17.

But John Wilson, a spokesman for the Justice Department, said Wednesday that such a "complicated and complex" case takes many months to examine and he predicted that "it will be a long time" before a decision is made.

Moses, who formerly worked as a supervisor in the Civil Rights Division, also said that such cases require a lot of time "and there are questions which much be answered, such as was there a federal violation. The civil rights law is a little hazy," he said.

Moses said he cannot speculate on what impact the CWP's lack of cooperation in the investigation has had on the Civil Rights Division, "but I can say that it really hampered us in our (FBI) investigation."

In explaining his recommendation, Mi-

choux commented that "irrespective of a person's ideological difference, five people were killed." He also called for federal prosecution because "they were in an innocent neighborhood and ... what happened is a signal to other terrorist organizations. They may think they can do the same thing and get away with it."

Michaux did not specify in his recommendation individuals or groups he believes should be indicted.

The disclosure of his recommendation was criticized by Joe Grady, head of the White Knights of Liberty KKK group in Forsyth County and from Jerry Paul Smith and Coleman Blair Pridmore, both of Lincoln County, two of the Klansmen acquitted in the case last November.

Nov. 3 Rally Indictments Are Asked

By ED HATCHER
Daily News Staff Writer

U.S. Attorney H.M. Michaux Jr. said Wednesday he recommended that the Department of Justice begin criminal investigations and seek indictments against participants in the Nov. 3, 1979, anti-Ku Klux Klan rally, which left five Communist Worker Party members dead.

Michaux, on his last day in office as U.S. Attorney, said that he sent a three-page memo to the Justice Department on May 5 but did not indicate in the memo any specific persons or groups that should be charged.

"My recommendation is that the department begin with prosecution in this matter and seek indictments. I did not specify what persons or what groups to anyone at all."

A Superior Court jury acquitted six Klansmen and Nazis last November in one of the state's longest trials.

Michaux said the verdict "stunned" him and that he has been actively investigating the possibility of bringing federal civil rights charges since the trial.

Michaux criticized the department for not acting sooner on his recommendation. "I really am disappointed. It didn't take me six or seven months to come up with my conclusion, and they are far smarter than I am."

John Wilson, a Justice Department spokesman, said he did not want to comment on the memo, calling it an "internal affair." He did say, however, that it would be "months" before a decision is reached whether to prosecute.

The Nov. 3 shootout occurred at the start of a "Death to the Klan" march. Members of the CWP had written letters to the Klan challenging them to come to the rally.

When a caravan of Klanmen and Nazis drove through the southeast Greensboro neighborhood, a stick and gun fight ensued and five CWP members were killed.

Wilson said the matter was "complicated and complex" and that many legal matters still need to be resolved. He said that it was possible that individuals charged with civil rights violation where there is a murder involved could go to jail for life.

Although not going into the specifics of the memo, Michaux said there were three philosophical reasons that he asked for the indictments.

"Irrespective of a person's ideological difference, five people were killed. Number two is that they were in an innocent neighborhood; and number three, what happened is a signal to other terrorist organizations. They may think they can do the same thing and get away with it."

Reaction to Michaux's memo was immediate, some of it sharp.

During an interview with a reporter, Michaux received a telephone call which he later explained was from Klansman Joe Grady of Winston-Salem, complaining about Michaux's recommendations.

"Everyone is talking about preserving life," Michaux told Grady by tele-

phone. "And then everyone wants to take a life away because of ideological differences. There are other other ways of doing this, and I am going to find some way of doing it."

"You know what I am? You call me red. I am red, white, and blue."

"I am sorry you feel disappointed. I really am, Joe. I am saying some civil rights were violated, and it could very well be those people living in the community who were innocent."

"You're going to tell me those kids running around that neighborhood playing are not innocent victims of this thing? And that those old people living in the community weren't victims? What was Jerry Paul Smith (one of the Klansmen acquitted in the trial) doing blazing away with those two six-shooters?"

Smith, who lives in Maiden, reached by telephone for comment on Michaux's recommendations, said: "You can take ... (Michaux) and bury him just like they buried Sandy Smith. Now print that in your lie newspaper." Sandy Smith was the only black killed in the Nov. 3 shootings.

Coleman Pridmore, another Klansman acquitted in the trial, was more subdued. "I hope the Justice Department doesn't go through with the indictments. I think the jury spoke the truth when they let us loose. I think the case should be forgot about."

"If anyone's civil rights were violated, it was ours. We were the ones traveling in a public street and attacked."

An attorney for the Greensboro Justice Fund, representing widows and victims of the shootings, praised Michaux's recommendation. "It is extremely significant that a U.S. attorney after a lengthy investigation, has recommended criminal prosecution for at least some of those responsible for the assassinations on Nov. 3," Earl Tockman said.

"We are in full agreement with prosecuting all Klansmen and Nazis involved, and the victims will fully cooperate with prosecutors."

Michael A. Schlosser, Guilford County district attorney who prosecuted the 1980 murder trial, said that the state court would assist the federal court in its investigation if its help was requested. Schlosser said that Michaux told him of his memo to the Justice Department about a month ago, but Schlosser did not comment further on the conversation.

Michaux appeared in buoyant spirits in his last day in office as a Democratic political appointee Wednesday.

Although much of his last day was spent fielding questions from reporters about his May 5 memo, Michaux took the time to relax and joke.

After speaking to Grady on the phone, Michaux remarked, "If I decide to run for Congress, Joe Grady said he won't support me."

Michaux, who is the only black to serve as a U.S. attorney in the state's history, said, "I am in an upbeat mood. It's been four exciting years."



H.M. Michaux Jr.

Federal counts advised in CWP shootout case

GREENSBORO (AP) — U.S. Attorney H.M. "Mickey" Michaux said Wednesday that he had recommended that the U.S. Justice Department file civil rights charges against participants in a 1979 confrontation that left five Communist Workers Party demonstrators dead.

Six Ku Klux Klansmen and Nazis charged with murder and rioting shortly after the shootout were acquitted last November in one of the longest trials in North Carolina history. The shooting occurred Nov. 3, 1979, at a Greensboro housing project during an anti-Klan rally sponsored by the CWP.

In his last act, before

stepping down as U.S. attorney, Michaux cited three reasons for his recommendation, which was submitted to his superiors at the Justice Department May 5:

- Five people, all CWP members, were killed in the confrontation.

- "An innocent neighborhood was terrorized" in the ensuing shootout.

- The confrontation "smacks of a terrorist act" that could lead to further terrorism.

Michaux refused to give the names of those who might be prosecuted. He also declined to list specific charges or even to say how many people might be involved. But he said the federal charges "could involve everybody that was there" during the shootout.

Michaux said that could include Klansmen, Nazis and members of the CWP.

"I'm not at liberty to discuss the specific charges," he said. "I made the recommendations on the basis of requisite jurisdiction. The Justice Department is not bound by my recommendation."

Justice Department spokesman John Wilson said in Washington that there would be no double jeopardy if individuals tried on murder charges in state court were tried on civil rights violations in federal court.

Michaux cites threat of more 'terrorist acts'

GREENSBORO (AP) — Former U.S. Attorney H. M. "Mickey" Michaux said Wednesday that a confrontation that led to the slayings of five anti-Ku Klux Klan demon-

strators in a Nov. 3, 1979 rally "smacks of a terrorist act" that could lead to further terrorism.

That was one of three reasons he gave for recommending that the U.S. Justice Department press civil rights charges against those involved in the "Death to the Klan" rally that led to the slayings.

While Michaux did not specify who would be prosecuted, it could mean further charges against six Klansmen and Nazis acquitted last November in connection with the slayings.

Michaux, speaking on the day of his retirement from the office of U.S. Attorney, said the deaths of the five Communist Workers Party members and the fact that "an innocent neighborhood was terrorized" led to his May 5 recommendation.

In it, he urged his superiors to file criminal civil rights charges against those involved:

Michaux said the federal charges "could involve everybody that was there" during the shootout at the Greensboro rally.

"I'm not at liberty to discuss the specific charges," Michaux said. "I made the recommendations on the basis of requisite jurisdiction. The Justice Department is not bound by my recommendation."

Six Klansmen and Nazis charged with murder and rioting shortly after the shootout were acquitted last November in one of the longest trials in North Carolina history.

An all-white Superior Court jury ruled that the Klansmen and Nazis shot the five activists in self-defense.

Greensboro Justice Fund attorney Earl Tockman, who represents widows and victims of the shootout, praised Michaux's recommendations in a statement.

"It is extremely significant that a U.S. attorney, after a lengthy investigation, has strongly recommended criminal prosecutions of at least some of those responsible for the assassinations on Nov. 3," he said.

Robert Cahoon, attorney for one of the six tried in the slayings, said that if anybody's rights were violated, it was those of the Klansmen and Nazis, because the CWP instigated the confrontation.

CWP members have maintained that government officials were responsible for the slayings, and Tockman said Wednesday that "the American people will not be satisfied that justice is done until the role of the government is thoroughly exposed."

Tockman added, "Neither the Greensboro police nor the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has ever clarified the role of agents Ed Dawson and Bernard Butkovich who we believe fully participated in the planning and execution" of the slayings.

GreenKil

THE NEW YORK TIMES TH

F.B.I. Agent Says Shots Were Fired at Klan Members

Special to The New York Times

GREENSBORO, N.C., Sept. 24 — Jurors in the trial of six men accused in the murders of five members of the Communist Workers Party at an anti-Ku Klux Klan rally encountered an apparent contradiction today involving videotapes of the Nov. 3, 1979, shootings. While the recorded sights appear to incriminate the defendants, the recorded sounds, according to expert testimony, indicate that the defendants were not responsible for a number of the shots fired.

Percy Wall, one of six court-appointed defense attorneys, told the all-white jury that about half of 39 shots recorded in an 88-second period were fired by members of the Communist group.

In his opening remarks, Mr. Wall asserted that what happened away from the cameras, but within range of the built-in microphones, would demonstrate that the defendants, all members of the Klan, returned the fire of the Communists in defense of themselves.

Mr. Wall, who represents David Wayne

Matthews, called as his first witness a specialist in audio ballistics analysis for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who explained the results of 10 months of tests at the bureau's laboratory in Washington.

Seeks Origin of Shots

Bruce Koenig, a special agent supervisor in the bureau's technical services division, said that he used the tape and still photographs of the incident to pinpoint the order and the origin of the shots. Mr. Koenig said most of the shots had

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1980

been recorded fully enough to make an analysis of them nearly 100 percent accurate, with only a marginal possibility of error. Mr. Koenig said, however, that he could not identify the location of several of the shots recorded. He also said that fewer shots were recorded than the number of spent shells recovered by the police at the scene.

Under direct examination by Mr. Wall, Mr. Koenig identified about 12 shots fired by persons the prosecution and defense both believe to be members of the Communist Workers Party. The agent also identified Mr. Matthews, Mr. Wall's client, among those firing shots.

Mr. Matthews and the other five defendants face five counts of first degree

murder, a capital offense, and one count of engaging in a riot.

The F.B.I. study was initially requested by the prosecution. The defense was allowed to introduce the audio analysis in court under an agreement whereby the jury was permitted to consider the videotapes, which are not normally allowed as evidence in North Carolina courts.

Rick Greeson, an Assistant District Attorney, was restrained in his cross-examination of Mr. Koenig. The prosecution is expected to rely on the same study in the forthcoming trial of six surviving members of the Communist Workers Party who are also charged with engaging in a riot on Nov. 3.

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GREENSBORO

DAILY NEWS

Since July 18, 1909

GREENSBORO, N.C., THURSDAY MORNING, SEPTEMBER 25, 1980

Expert Testifies On Shots' Origin

BY STEVE BERRY
Daily News Staff Writer

At least a third of the gunshots fired at the "Death to the Klan" rally Nov. 3 came from where Communist Workers Party members were located, a defense witness testified Wednesday in Superior Court.

Bruce Koenig, a Federal Bureau of Investigation audio expert, for the first time identified a third person who fired a weapon from where the CWP demonstrators were gathered. He said a woman who defendants say was a communist, was wearing a yellow raincoat and firing a pistol from the west side of Carver Drive toward the Klan.

Previously, testimony indicated gunfire from the Communists came from CWP victim Bill Sampson who fired a shot as he fell dead and Rand Manzella. Police found Manzella carrying a .38 caliber pistol containing six spent shells when he was arrested after the shooting.

The next to the last of 39 shots

in the 88-second gun battle with the Ku Klux Klan and Nazis came from the south side of Everitt Street, Koenig said.

Several prosecution witnesses said they saw a white man in that area try to fire a derringer at the Klan. But they said the gun misfired each time. However, police later found one live and one spent shell in the derringer.

Eight other shots came from near a WXII-TV news car on the opposite side of Carver Street from where the woman in the yellow raincoat was shooting.

When the gunfire ended, five CWP members were dead.

Although Koenig's testimony about those 14 shots bolstered the self-defense claims of the defendants, he said the first shot came from one of the cars in the nine-vehicle caravan that brought the six defendants and about 30 other Klansmen and Nazis to the anti-Klan rally. His testimony also raised questions about defense lawyer Percy Wall's opening argu-

44-81521

Audio Analysis: Shots Came From CWP Area

From A-1

ment Wednesday that 17 to 19 of 39 shots came from Communists.

Wall argued that the Communists fired the four shots which followed the first one, but Koenig's testimony didn't clearly determine which side fired them.

Wednesday was the first time the defense has presented testimony. Earlier, the prosecution presented its case — calling 97 witnesses over a seven-week period.

Through it all, most of the defendants remained confident of acquittal, judging from interviews Wednesday.

Nazi defendant Jack Fowler Jr., 28, of Winston-Salem, said God told him during a religious vision he had while in jail that he and his co-defendants would be acquitted.

He said the vision came to him on Jan. 12 at 1:45 p.m., and from that day on he has considered himself a born-again Christian. "I'm not worried about a thing," he said.

Klan defendant Jerry Smith, 33, of Maiden, and Coleman Pridmore, 37, of Lincolnton, said they still are confident of acquittal and are optimistic now that the prosecution has completed its case.

The other three defendants are Roland Wood, 35, of Winston-Salem; Lawrence Morgan, 28, of Lincolnton; and David Matthews, 25, of Newton. Each is charged with five counts of murder and one of felonious rioting.

They say they were lured into an ambush and that when the six defendants saw the communists hitting the cars in front of them with sticks, they got out of their vehicles and raced to the aid of their fellow Nazis and Klansmen.

Not until they heard gunfire, Wall argued in his opening statement to the jury, did the defendants run back to their car to get weapons.

He said they had no intention of get-

ting in a fight before the gunfire started. He said they merely planned to throw eggs and heckle the CWP.

The prosecution says the six defendants should be convicted of first-degree murder, which brings a life sentence or the death penalty, because the five communists were killed while the defendants were rioting.

The prosecution originally planned to use Koenig as a witness. He was never called to testify, however, and no explanation was given. Even so, he is undergoing a long, but friendly cross-examination by Assistant District Attorney Rick Greeson. Greeson has led him through the slow-motion videotapes of the shooting scene recorded by cameramen from WTVD-TV of Durham and WFMY-TV of Greensboro who were assigned to cover the march.

Greeson is stopping the slow-motion pictures as each of the 39 shots is fired so Koenig can explain the scene and locate the shot on television screens and on the scale drawing. He is able to do this because of his analysis of the sound tracks of the videotapes.

Koenig's testimony showed that within 20 seconds after the first shot was fired, the defendants were in a stick fight with the communists. That fight was in progress when the second shot was fired. It came 22 seconds after the first.

That shot apparently was a shotgun blast, because a spent shell was found near the left lane curb where Koenig traced the shot. His testimony didn't identify which side fired it or the next three.

Those three shots came from somewhere in a wide area, covering both sides of Carver at the intersection with Everitt. That is the middle ground between the Klan and Nazis and the communists.

Koenig's testimony attributed four shots to defendant Wood, four to Fowler, one to Matthews, and two to Smith.

Half of the 14 shots attributed to the communists were among the last 10 shots in the gunbattle.

The Greensboro

Record

Thursday, September 25, 1980

**Shots-sound testimony
may not have precedent**

44-81521

BY RICK STEWART

Record Staff Writer

An FBI audio expert continued his testimony this morning in the murder trial of six Ku Klux Klansmen and Nazis and may be creating "new law" in North Carolina with his testimony.

Special Agent Bruce Koenig is testifying that through analysis of videotapes made by television newsmen on the morning of Nov. 3 he can reconstruct where each of the 39 shots fired that morning originated.

Wake Forest University Law Professor James Sizemore said in an interview that Koenig's testimony may be unique in the state. He explained that new law means that such testimony and illustrations are the first that have been entered as substantive evidence in a trial.

Defense lawyer Percy Wall, who called Koenig as the defense's first witness, said he thinks this is the first such testimony used in the state. He added that during his research for the trial he could find no other evidence of this kind.

Superior Court Judge James M. Long allowed Koenig's testimony when defense and prosecution lawyers agreed to let it be entered uncontested. Sizemore said it is unlikely an appellate court would rule the evidence inadmissible if both sides agreed to allow it into evidence.

The trial also created new law when Long allowed the videotapes to be introduced as substantive evidence. Sizemore said he has heard of several trials where the judge allowed a photograph to be entered as substantive evidence but said he is not aware, prior to this trial, that a videotape has been allowed into evidence. He explained that by allowing something in as substantive evidence the jury may consider everything they see. Other judges have allowed pictures and videotapes in as illustrative evidence but always instruct jurors they must consider only what they see that illustrates the testimony of a witness.

His testimony showed that the first shot was likely fired from one of the Klan caravan vehicles as it made its way past the staging area for a Communist Worker's Party "death to the Klan" rally.

In his testimony, Koenig is often pointing out on the slow motion videotape who likely fired the shots heard on the tapes.

In some cases, he said it is impossible to determine. But on others he said he can definitely determine who fired the shots. Defense lawyer Wall said Wednesday in his opening statement to jurors that the defense would show that perhaps 17, 19 or more of the 39 shots were fired by the CWP.

Koenig testified that he cannot tell exactly where shots 3, 4, and 5 originated. He said the sound waves are not sufficient for him to pinpoint the origins.

Koenig admitted during recess this morning it is unusual to have videotapes available to help analyze multiple gun shots. He said this is the first time he is aware that such evidence has been used in a trial.

In his testimony this morning, Koenig explained that determining where each shot originated by listening to portions of the videotapes is "slow, tedious" and requires "exacting physics."

He explained that for each second of sound on the audio, he made 200 inches of sound waves. He said he then matched the sound waves, including echo sound waves, with where they could have originated at the scene. "That's why it took us from November to the first of this month to do it," he explained to jurors. "We had to plot every sound and every echo." During the first hour of his testimony this morning, Koenig showed by using videotapes and a map where each shot originated. He was doing the same thing Wednesday afternoon, but court was recessed to give the videotape player time to cool.

WINSTON-SALEM JOURNAL

City Edition

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1980

Key Defense Witness's Testimony Helps State's Case

FBI Agent Pinpoints Gunshots

By Michael P. Massoglia
Staff Reporter

GREENSBORO — Defense attorneys in the murder trial of six Ku Klux Klansmen and Nazis called their first witness yesterday, but most of his testimony came during cross-examination and helped the state with its case.

Under direct examination, Bruce E. Koenig of the FBI testified that his analyses of television videotapes showed that 17 of the 39 shots fired at the anti-Klan rally here last Nov. 3 came from where Communist demonstrators were.

That testimony was significant for defense attorneys who have argued that their clients acted in self-defense in the shooting deaths of five Communist Workers Party members.

But on cross-examination, Koenig was able to narrate slow-motion videotapes of the rally that showed several defendants shooting guns and advancing

toward a group of anti-Klan demonstrators.

In order for a killing to be done in lawful self-defense, a defendant must be without blame in initiating the affray and must try to retreat, according to state law.

Jurors in Guilford Superior Court had seen the slow

motion tapes before the state rested its case last week, but yesterday they were able to hear Koenig describe individuals shooting guns.

"He's just fired now," said Koenig, pointing to a man an earlier witness had identified as Jerry Paul Smith of Maiden. "You can actually see smoke from his gun."

Besides Smith, Koenig described and pointed out on a television monitor three others shooting at the rally. Based on descriptions given earlier, they were Jack Wilson Fowler Jr. and Roland Wayne Wood, both of Winston-Salem, and David Wayne Matthews of Newton. Also being tried on charges

of first-degree murder and of a caravan of Klansmen and felonious rioting are Lawrence Gene Morgan, and Coleman Blair Pridmore, both of Lincoln.

Koenig's testimony showed that about 40 percent of the gunfire came from anti-Klan demonstrators. Although Koenig indicated that the first two shots came from the front

of a caravan of Klansmen and Nazis, the defense contended that the next three shots came from demonstrators.

"The evidence will show that these shots were fired by Communists, at members of the KKK," said Matthews, attorney Percy Wall, during his opening argument yesterday. "They (the

defendants) returned fire in defense of themselves.

Koenig said that he could not pinpoint the location of the third, fourth and fifth shots at the rally, except to say that they were fired in a broad area that included the intersection and a place where demonstrators had been seen. The locations of the other 36

shots at the rally, Koenig said, could be pinpointed to within several feet. The defense put a clear, plastic overlay on a four-by-eight wall diagram of the neighborhood, and Koenig put a red circle where he said the shots had come from. The state will resume its cross-examination when court reconvenes this morning.

44-81521

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P 262 1738Z MARCH 81

FM CHARLOTTE (133-12239) (44-3527) (P)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY OF NORTH CAROLINA (NSPNC), AKA
AMERICAN NAZI PARTY, DOMESTIC SECURITY, OO CHARLOTTE, CE FILE
133-12239, BUFILE 133-436323.

GREENKIL, CIVIL RIGHTS (A), OO CHARLOTTE, CE FILE 44-3527,
BUFILE 44-81521.

FULL DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF NSPNC AUTHORIZED
NOVEMBER 5, 1979, EXTENDED TO NOVEMBER 5, 1981. (X)

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY AND REFERENCES WILL PROVIDE FBIHQ
WITH AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON INDICTMENTS MARCH 2, 1981, IN
WESTERN DISTRICT OF N. C. OF SIX INDIVIDUALS FOR CONSPIRACY TO
VIOLATE TITLE 18, USC, SECTION 244 (1). (U)

INVESTIGATION OF THIS MATTER WAS CONDUCTED BY ALCONEL, 9 1031
TOBACCO AND FIREARMS (ATF) # CHARLOTTE OFFICE. THE INDICTMENT

44-81521-

NOT RECORDED
MAR 11 1981

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-1 GSK/RBG
ON 9/9/82

224,619

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-486823

PAGE TWO CE 155-12269, CE 44-3527 C O N F I D E N T I A L
DESCRIBED THE INDIVIDUALS AS "MEMBERS OF OR SYMPATHIZERS WITH
THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY OF AMERICA AND THE KU KLUX KLAN",
WHO "CONSPIRED TO USE EXPLOSIVES IN TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST
PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN GREENSBORO AND GUILFORD COUNTY, N. C."

THOSE INDICTED WERE [REDACTED] PENLAND, N. C., DOB

[REDACTED] PENLAND, N. C., DOB

[REDACTED] RAEFORD MELAND DAUDLE, WINSTON-SALEM, N. C.,

DOB [REDACTED] WINSTON-SALEM, N. C.,

DOB [REDACTED] WINSTON-SALEM, N. C.,

DOB [REDACTED] WINSTON-SALEM,

N. C., DOB [REDACTED] (U)

CHARLOTTE TELETYPES TO FBIHQ DATED SEPTEMBER 19, 1980, AND
SEPTEMBER 23, 1980, CAPTIONED "NSPNC; GREENKIL, AND [REDACTED]"

[REDACTED] AKA, DOMESTIC SECURITY - "NSPNC", AND CHARLOTTE
AIRTEL DATED OCTOBER 10, 1980, CAPTIONED "NSPNC; GREENKIL",
PROVIDED BACKGROUND INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS MATTER.
ADDITIONALLY CHARLOTTE AIRTEL/LHM DATED OCTOBER 17, 1980,
SUMMARIZED NSPNC ACTIVITY AND REQUESTED AN EXTENSION OF THE FULL
DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATION. THIS LHM ALSO REVIEWED THE
AIF CASE AND ON PAGE 4 STATED: "SINCE INFORMATION HAS BEEN

PAGE THREE CE 100-12209, CE 44-3527 C O N F I D E N T I A L

"RECEIVED THAT CAPTIONED ORGANIZATION, OR MEMBERS THEREOF, ARE PLANNING SOME TYPE OF PROTEST OR TERRORIST ACTIVITY ON THE COMPLETION OF THE KLAN-NAZI TRIAL, CONTINUED INVESTIGATION IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE FUTURE ACTIVITIES OF CAPTIONED ORGANIZATION." (U)

BY TELETYPE DATED DECEMBER 5, 1980, FBIHQ ADVISED OF MEMORANDUM DATED DECEMBER 3, 1980, FROM DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL (DAG) AUTHORIZING CONTINUATION OF NSRNC DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATION FOR ONE YEAR EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 5, 1980. DAG MEMORANDUM NOTED "THAT MUCH OF THE INFORMATION ON WHICH THE BUREAU RELIES FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THIS INVESTIGATION INVOLVES THE PARTICIPATION OF TWO MEMBERS OF THE CAPTIONED GROUP IN THE NOVEMBER 3, 1979, SHOOTING INCIDENT INVOLVING THE COMMUNIST WORKERS PARTY. DAG POINTED OUT THAT NOW THAT A VERDICT HAS BEEN RETURNED IN THE TRIAL OF THAT CASE, THE BUREAU SHOULD REVIEW THIS INVESTIGATION, PARTICULARLY TO DETERMINE IF A DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATION IS STILL WARRANTED. PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO DETERMINE IF MEMBERS OF THIS GROUP HAVE A CACHE OF ARMS OR EXPLOSIVES." (X)

CONTINUED LIAISON HAS BEEN EFFECTED BY CHARLOTTE OFFICE

PAGE FOUR CE 100-12209, CE 44-3527 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WITH ATF, CHARLOTTE, CONCERNING THIS CASE. SAC JOHN WESTRA,
ATF, PREVIOUSLY ADVISED THAT THE TITLE III WHICH ATF OBTAINED
ON TRAILER [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] MOST OF THESE WERE COMPLETELY INSIGNIFICANT,
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SAC WESTRA STATED THAT AFTER THE VERDICT OF "NOT
GUILTY" IN THE GREENSBORO KILLINGS, THIS CONSPIRACY COLLAPSED. X
ON FEBRUARY 13, 1981, SAC WESTRA, SUPRA, ADVISED THAT
AUSA [REDACTED] WOULD SEEK AN INDICTMENT OF THE
[REDACTED] GRAND JURY. WESTRA INDICATED ATF
NEVER OBTAINED A SEARCH WARRANT IN AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE BECAUSE NEITHER THE ATF UNDERCOVER AGENT NOR TITLE III
OVERHEARS ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF ANY SPECIFIC EXPLOSIVE
MATERIAL OR ILLEGAL WEAPONS IN THE POSSESSION OF THE CONSPIRATORS.
THEREFORE, ATF CURRENTLY HAS OBTAINED NO INSTR

UMENTALITIES

PAGE FIVE CE 100-12209, CE 44-3527 C O N F I D ~~X~~ N T I A L
WHICH COULD BE USED TO COMMIT A VIOLENT ACT. HE INDICATED
THE POTENTIAL INDICTMENT WOULD STAND OR FALL ON CONVERSATIONS
BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND SEVERAL OCCASIONS OF TRAVEL TO PLAN
THE ACTS. SAC WESTRA FURTHER ADVISED THAT TITLE III OVERHEARS
TENDED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE CONSPIRATORS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (X)
UACB, CHARLOTTE WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THIS MATTER UNDER
ITS AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT THE DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATION
OF NSPNC. (X)

~~C AND E 2204. REASONS (2) (3) 2. ERD MARCH 3, 1961.~~

HL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

b6
b7c

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: 9 OCT 1981

FROM : Wm. Bradford Reynolds
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

WBR:LKD:MDJ:bbg
DJ 144-54M-351

SUBJECT: Greenkil
CIVIL RIGHTS

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Reference is made to your memorandum dated July 2, 1981, enclosing a copy of a letterhead memorandum dated June 30, 1981 at Charlotte, bearing your field office file number 44-3527 and Bureau file number 44-81521.


Interviews with CWP members [redacted] and [redacted] have been arranged for October 19-20, 1981 in New York City. The interviews will be conducted at the FBI headquarters in Manhattan. FBI agents are requested to conduct the interviews. Departmental Attorney [redacted] will, however, be present. Accordingly, please do the following:

1. Arrange for Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] to be available on October 19-20, 1981 in New York to conduct the interviews.

2. Arrange for an interview room to be made available at your office in Manhattan. The room should be able to accommodate video reply equipment and approximately seven people.

3. Arrange for video replay equipment to be available which is capable of playing the composite video tape previously prepared by you.

4. Make the composite video tape available.



23 OCT 1981



4 NOV 20 1981



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DE CV

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24 OCT 81 21 05 Z

FM CLEVELAND (44A-1739) (P) (60 5)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

CHARLOTTE (44A-3527) PRIORITY

(ATTN: SUPV. [REDACTED])

BT

UNCLAS

SECTION 1 OF 2

GREENKILL DS-CR 00: CHARLOTTE

REFERENCE CLEVELAND AND CHARLOTTE TELCALLS OCTOBER 23, 1981.

ON OCTOBER 23, 1981, CLEVELAND AGENTS INTERVIEWED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] BORN [REDACTED]

NORTH

[REDACTED] WHERE HE
IS BEING HELD [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS
INTERVIEWED AFTER CLEVELAND WAS NOTIFIED BY HIS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THAT [REDACTED] POSSESSED INFORMATION

RELATIVE TO KU KLUX KLAN ACTIVITIES IN NORTH CAROLINA PRIOR
TO CAPTIONED EVENT IN NOVEMBER, 1979.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-12-84 BY SP2TAP/JAC

1-DOJ, CRD
0-708
10/26/81

209

DOJ aware
of contents
of IT.

Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____
Asst. Dir. _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Rec. Mgmt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____

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12 OCT 29 1981

SKV
Does this tie in with the
flow chart on page 2?

IN REFERENCED TELCALLS IT WAS DECIDED THAT CLEVELAND AGENTS WOULD TAKE WHATEVER INFORMATION [] COULD FURNISH REGARDING KLAN ACTIVITIES, LEADERS AND THE GREENKIL INCIDENT AND RELAY THIS INFORMATION TO CHARLOTTE FOR DISCUSSION WITH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS. NO PROMISES OF IMMUNITY OR WITNESS RELOCATION WERE MADE TO [] ALTHOUGH HE AND HIS ATTORNEY ARE HOPING THAT HIS TESTIMONY AGAINST OTHER KLANSMEN RE GREENKIL WILL RESULT IN ACCEPTANCE AS A PROTECTED WITNESS.

THE INTERVIEW OF [] TOOK PLACE IN THE PRESENCE OF

[] IS

AND []

[] HIS MOST RECENT ADDRESS IS []

[] NORTH

CAROLINA, TELEPHONE [] SERVED IN THE

[] HIS SSAN IS [] HIS LAST PLACE OF PERMANENT

EMPLOYMENT WAS AS A []

HEADQUARTERED IN []

[REDACTED] FIRST BECAME INVOLVED IN KU KLUX KLAN ACTIVITIES
IN NORTH CAROLINA IN [REDACTED] HE WAS INVITED TO HIS
FIRST MEETING BY [REDACTED] WHOM HE HAD MET
IN WINSTON-SALEM. HE ATTENDED WEEKLY KLAN UNIT MEETINGS
AT A KLAVERN OR KLAN MEETING PLACE, IN AN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WINSTON-SALEM9 HE RECALLS THE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TO HAVE HAD APPROXIMATELY 80 MEMBERS9

THE OFFICERS OF THIS UNIT, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS BEING
PART OF THE FEDERATED KNIGHTS OF THE KKK, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] AFTER ATTENDING WEEKLY MEETINGS

[REDACTED] WAS SELECTED BY [REDACTED] TO BE THE
[REDACTED]

SPPING OF [REDACTED]

MADE UP OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE MEMBERS OF [REDACTED]

ALSO FORMED THE

[REDACTED] THE PURPOSE OF THE

[REDACTED] WAS TO CONTACT TRUSTED PERSONS IN THE POLICE AND

SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENTS TO LEARN LAW ENFORCEMENT, INCLUDING

FBI, ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE KLAN. HE LEARNED FROM MEMBERS

OF [REDACTED] THAT ONE OF THE PERSONS THAT KEPT THEM

[REDACTED] ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE FORSYTHE UNIT.

ANOTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER CONNNECTED WITH THE

KLAN IS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TO BE ON "RESERVE-STATUS" IN THE FORSYTHE COUNTY

KLAN UNIT.

PAGE FIVE CV 44A-1739

UNCLAS

AT THIS POINT [REDACTED] INTERRUPTED THE INTERVIEW AND STATED HIS OPINION THAT [REDACTED] HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED HIMSELF AS A KLANSMAN, AND ASKED IF THE INTERVIEWING AGENTS WOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE EVENTS OF NOVEMBER, 1979.

[REDACTED] RECALLED THAT PRIOR TO THE CONFRONTATION WITH THE "COMMUNISTS" IN GREENSBORO ON NOVEMBER 3, 1979, A SIZEABLE KLAN GET TOGETHER WAS PLANNED IN SUMMER, 1979 AT THE CHINA LAKE, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIC CENTER. THE FORSYTHE COUNTY KLAN UNIT ALONG WITH UNITS FROM CHINA LAKE, YADKINVILLE AND KLANSMEN FROM GAFFNEY, SOUTH CAROLINA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WERE PLANNING TO SHOW THE MOVIE "BIRTH OF A NATION"

ATTENDING THIS MEETING WERE 20 - 25 FROM FORSYTHE COUNTY; 20 - 25 FROM CHINA LAKE; 10 - 15 FROM YADKINVILLE AND SEVEN FROM GAFFNEY SOUTH CAROLINA. DURING THE VIEWING OF THIS MOVIE, A LARGE GROUP OF BLACK AND WHITE DEMONSTRATORS CONDUCTED AN ANTI-KLAN RALLY OUTSIDE THE CHINA LAKE CIVIC CENTER WHILE THE KLANSMEN BARRACADED THEMSELVES INSIDE.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
AND SET UP A PLAN TO KILL THE LEADERS OF THE COMMUNIST WORKERS
PARTY. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] KLAN

RALLY AND ATTRACT ANOTHER COUNTER DEMONSTRATION BY THE CWP
WHERE THE KLAN WOULD PROVOKE THE CWP TO ATTACK THEM GIVING
THE KLANSMEN REASON TO DEFEND THEMSELVES WITH FORCE, MEANING
GUNS.

DURING THE TIME BETWEEN THE CHINA LAKE EVENT AND
GREENKIL, [REDACTED] AND APPOINTED
[REDACTED] TO THAT POSITION. [REDACTED] BECAME THE [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DESCRIBED TO BE A "COUNSELOR" TO THE
[REDACTED]

IN ABOUT MID OCTOBER, 1979, [REDACTED]
LEARNED FROM PUBLICITY AS WELL AS FROM CONTACTS IN THE

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b7D

PAGE TWO CV 44A-1739 UNCLAS

[REDACTED] THEY WOULD MEET WITH
OTHER KLAN UNITS AND WITH [REDACTED] WHO WAS SUPPOSEDLY
[REDACTED] ACCORDING TO [REDACTED]
HAD BEEN INFORMED WHERE THE "DEATH TO THE KLAN" RALLY WAS
TO BE HELD. [REDACTED] RECALLED IT TO BE A BLACK HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT CALLED "MORNINGSIDE" IN GREENSBORO.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] AND THAT THE POLICE WOULD STAY
AWAY FROM THE RALLY, AT THE BEGINNING AND ARRIVE ONLY AFTER
THE KLANSMEN HAD POSITIONED THEMSELVES TO ATTACK THE CWP
DEMONSTRATORS AND LEAVE THE SCENE. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PLANS WERE ALSO MADE FOR [REDACTED] WHO WAS ALSO
AT THE MEETING, TO BE WITH ANOTHER GROUP OF KLANSMEN AND

PAGE THREE CV 44A-1739 UNCLAS

PROVOKE THE CWP DEMONSTRATIONS BY THROWING EGGS AT THEM
AND SPRAYING THEM WITH POLICE-TYPE TEAR GAS AND MACE SPRAYERS
THIS WAS TO BE DONE HOPING THE CWP PEOPLE (WHOM THE KLAN
BELIEVED TO HAVE WEAPONS OF THEIR OWN) WOULD TRY TO ATTACK
THE KLANSMEN GIVING THEM REASON TO RETALIATE.

ON THE DAY OF THE RALLY WHEN THE [REDACTED] UNIT MET ON

[REDACTED] GREENSBORO, ABOUT ONE HOUR BEFORE THE
DEMONSTRATION, [REDACTED]

A [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHAT TOOK PLACE IN GREENSBORO

THAT AFTERNOON, [REDACTED] TO WINSTON-SALEM

PAGE FOUR CV 44A-1739 UNCLAS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HAD THROWN EGGS AT THE CWP
PEOPLE AS PLANNED AND "WHEN THE COMMUNISTS CAME AT THEM
WITH STICKS THE KLAN OPENED FIRE."

THE TUESDAY FOLLOWING GREENKIL, THE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND THE
REST OF THE USUAL GROUP WERE THERE. IT WAS A VERY BRIEF

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

AFTER THIS MEETING, THERE WERE ONLY OCCASIONAL MEETINGS

[REDACTED] BUT NEVER ANY FURTHER GROUP

DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE EVENTS AT GREENSBORO.

PAGE FIVE 44A-1739 UNCLAS

AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE INTERVIEW, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WERE AGAIN REMINDED THAT THIS INFORMATION WOULD
BE FURNISHED TO THE FBI IN CHARLOTTE AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE FOR EVALUATION AND THAT [REDACTED] FURNISHING
OF THE ABOVE, AT THIS TIME, WAS STRICTLY VOLUNTARY. BOTH

[REDACTED] ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE FBI'S
ACCEPTING OF THIS INFORMATION DOES NOT OBLIGATE THE
GOVERNMENT IN ANYWAY9

FD-302 WILL FOLLOW.

BT

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 11/2/81

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CLEVELAND (44A-1739) (RUC)

RE: GREENKIL
DS-CR

OO: CHARLOTTE

Re CV tel to Charlotte, 10/24/81.

Enclosed for Charlotte are two original FD-302s and two (2) copies each of an interview conducted on 10/23/81 at Cleveland, Ohio. One (1) copy of each FD-302 is furnished for information of FBIHQ.

No further investigation is being conducted at Cleveland.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6-12-84 BY SP2 TAP/SAC

ENCLOSURE

44-81521-1957

2 - Bureau (Enc. 2) *Xerox 2 cc of enc to CRD*
 2 - Charlotte (Enc. 6) (44-3527) *84070-13*
 1 - Cleveland *11/5/81*
 LAB/klt
 (5)

23 NOV 4 1981

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Approved: _____

Transmitted _____

(Number) (Time)

Per _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

1

DATE 6-12-84 BY SP2 TAP/JAC

Date of transcription 10/27/81

[redacted] was contacted at the [redacted] where he is being held on charges of [redacted]. He was advised of the identities of the contacting agents and our intention to interview him to determine his knowledge of Ku Klux Klan activities in North Carolina. He was reminded, in the presence of [redacted] that any statements made or facts furnished were strictly voluntary and our acceptance of the information does not constitute any agreements with or obligation to him on the part of the United States Government.

In the presence of [redacted] of Cleveland, Ohio, provided the following:

[redacted]
[redacted] He is married.

[redacted] His most recent address is [redacted]

[redacted] North Carolina, telephone [redacted]

[redacted] His social security account number is [redacted]

[redacted] His last permanent place of employment was as [redacted]

[redacted] first became involved in Ku Klux Klan activities in North Carolina in the [redacted]. He was invited to his first Klan meeting by [redacted] Winston-Salem. He attended weekly meetings of his Klan unit at a "Klavern" or Klan meeting place. [redacted]

[redacted] unit had approximately 50 members.

The officers of this Klan unit, which he described as being part of the Federated Knights of the KKK, [redacted]

After attending weekly meetings, [redacted]

Investigation on 10/23/81 at Cleveland, Ohio File # CV 442-1739

SA [redacted] and
by SA [redacted]

LAB:kw

Date dictated

10/27/81

44-81521-197

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

CV 44A-1739

2

in approximately the [redacted]

[redacted] advised that the Klan unit was further subdivided into a smaller group known as [redacted] This group was made up of [redacted]

[redacted] The members of [redacted] also formed the [redacted] [redacted] or [redacted] The purpose of the [redacted] was to contact trusted persons in the Police and Sheriff's Departments to learn law enforcement, including the FBI's activities against the Klan in North Carolina. He learned from members of [redacted] [redacted] that one of the persons that kept them regularly informed was the [redacted] was a friend [redacted]

Another law enforcement officer connected with the Klan in North Carolina is [redacted] Winston-Salem. [redacted]

At this point in the interview, [redacted] interrupted the interview and stated his opinion that [redacted] had sufficiently established himself as having been a member of the Ku Klux Klan in North Carolina, and asked the interviewing agents to only ask [redacted] questions having to do with the events at Greensboro, North Carolina in November, 1979.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6-12-84 BY SP2TAP/JAC

1

Date of transcription 10/27/81

[redacted] where he is being held on charges of [redacted]. He was advised of the identities of the contacting agents and our intention to interview him to determine his knowledge of the activities of the Ku Klux Klan in North Carolina prior to an incident between the KKK and members of the Communist Workers Party in Greensboro, North Carolina in early November, 1979. [redacted] was reminded, in the presence of [redacted] that any statements made or facts furnished were strictly voluntary and our acceptance of the information does not constitute any agreement with or obligation to him on the part of the United States Government.

In the presence of [redacted] of Cleveland, Ohio, he provided the following:

[redacted] acknowledged that he first became a member of the [redacted] from the [redacted]

[redacted] recalled that prior to the confrontation with the Communist Workers Party in Greensboro, North Carolina on November 3, 1979, a sizeable Ku Klux Klan event was planned in the summer, 1979 at the Civic Center in China Lake, North Carolina. [redacted] Units from China Lake, Yadkinville, North Carolina, and Klansmen from Gaffney, South Carolina, led by [redacted] were planning to show the movie "Birth of a Nation".

Attending this meeting were 20-25 Klan members from Forsythe County; 20-25 members from China Lake; 10-15 from Yadkinville; and 7 from Gaffney, South Carolina. During the viewing of this movie, a large group of demonstrators made up of blacks and whites conducted an anti-KKK rally outside the China Lake Civic Center, while the Klansmen barricaded themselves inside.

The following [redacted] meeting, held at the Klan meeting place or "Klavern" located on [redacted]

Investigation on 10/23/81 at Cleveland, Ohio File # CV 44A-1739

by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] LAB:kw Date dictated 10/26/81

CV 44A-1739

2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

another counter-demonstration by the Communist Workers Party. The Klan would then provoke the Communist Workers Party to attack them, giving the Klansmen reason to defend themselves with force, meaning guns.

During the time between the China Lake Klan event and early November, 1979, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In approximately mid-October, 1979, [REDACTED] learned from the available publicity, as well as from contacts in the local Sheriff's Office, that the Communist Workers Party were planning to have a rally in Greensboro, North Carolina.

On the Tuesday preceding the Greensboro rally, the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] met at the home of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The meeting was not held at the Klavern which [REDACTED]

At this meeting were [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

At this meeting it was planned for the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Greensboro just before the demonstration was to be held by members of the Communist Workers Party. There they would be joined by other Klan Units and by several members of the "Nazi Party" [REDACTED] According to [REDACTED] had been informed where the Communist Workers Party rally was to be held. He recalled it to be in a black

CV 44A-1739

3

housing development called "Morningside" in Greensboro.

[redacted]
[redacted]
from the rally, at the beginning and arrive only after the Klansmen had positioned themselves to attack the Communist Workers Party demonstrators. Furthermore, the Greensboro police were to have been told to "make it look good", but actually do little in stopping any shooting or apprehending the Klansmen. [redacted]
[redacted]

At this meeting, plans were also made for [redacted] to be with yet another group of Klansmen and to provoke the Communist Workers Party demonstrators by throwing eggs at them and spraying them with police-type tear gas and mace sprayers. This was to be done hoping the Communist Workers Party demonstrators, whom the Klan believed to have weapons of their own, would try to attack the Klansmen giving them reason to retaliate.

On the day of the rally in Greensboro, when the [redacted] [redacted] approximately one hour before the demonstration; [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] what had taken place in Greensboro that afternoon on the television, [redacted] headed back to Winston-Salem and enroute met, by chance, [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

CV 44A-1739

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The [redacted] the shooting at Greensboro.
the Klan Unit met again [redacted]
[redacted] of the Klan Unit were
there. It was a very brief meeting and [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] but never any further group discussion about
the events at Greensboro.

In response to specific questioning, [redacted]
[redacted] North Carolina during the
incident of November 3, 1979, between the Klan and members of
the Communist Workers Party.

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FM DIRECTOR FBI {44-81521}

TO FBI CHARLOTTE {44-3527} PRIORITY

FBI CLEVELAND {44-1739} PRIORITY

FBI PHOENIX PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS

GREENKIL; CIVIL RIGHTS; 00: CHARLOTTE.

RE CHARLOTTE TELETYPE TO FBIHQ, NOVEMBER 5, 1981, AND
CLEVELAND TELETYPE TO FBIHQ, NOVEMBER 6, 1981.

FBIHQ CONCURS WITH PROPOSED INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] AT
CLEVELAND ON NOVEMBER 12-13, 1981, BY SA'S [REDACTED]
{CHARLOTTE} AND [REDACTED] {PHOENIX}. TRAVEL AUTHORIZED.

BT

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FM CHARLOTTE (44A-3527) (P)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

CLEVELAND PRIORITY.

PHOENIX PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS

ATTENTION CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, CIVIL RIGHTS UNIT

GREENKIL, CIVIL RIGHTS

RE CLEVELAND TELETYPE TO CHARLOTTE DATED OCTOBER 26, 1981;
AND CHARLOTTE TELCALL OF SUPERVISOR SA [REDACTED] TO
CLEVELAND ON OCTOBER 23, 1981.

AFTER REVIEWING SUMMARY OF [REDACTED] STATEMENT TO CLEVELAND
SPECIAL AGENTS RE EVENTS LEADING UP TO AND INVOLVING THE
NOVEMBER 3, 1979, SHOOTING INCIDENT AT GREENSBORO, NC, BETWEEN
MEMBERS OF THE KKK/NAZI PARTY AND THE WORKERS VIEWPOINT
ORGANIZATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATTORNEY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DESIRES [REDACTED] TO BE INTERVIEWED IN DETAIL BY CHARLOTTE
AGENTS MORE FAMILIAR WITH THIS INVESTIGATION.

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AS CLEVELAND DIVISION HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED BY
WITH, PORTIONS OF [] STATEMENT ARE KNOWN TO
ENTIRELY CONTRADICTORY TO PREVIOUS STATEMENTS
FURNISHED BY HIM TO THE FBI, AS WELL AS CONTRADICTORY TO OTHER
STATEMENTS RECEIVED BY THE FBI FROM OTHER WITNESSES DURING THIS
INVESTIGATION. FOR THIS REASON, [] VALUE AS A POTENTIAL
WITNESS FOR THE UNITED STATES CANNOT BE PROPERLY EVALUATED
UNTIL THESE CONTRADICTIONS AND PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS ARE
CLARIFIED.

THEREFORE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DOES DESIRE A
COMPLETE AND THOROUGH INTERVIEW OF [] HOWEVER, AT THIS STAGE
OF THE INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (USDJ)
IS NOT IN A POSITION TO INTERCEDE WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES ON
[] BEHALF NOR TO INSURE [] PROTECTION OF THE WITNESS
PROTECTION PROGRAM UNTIL A FULL AND TRUTHFUL STATEMENT IS
FURNISHED BY [] IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR [] AND []
TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE FBI AND THE USDJ DESIRE ONLY A COMPLETE,
THOROUGH AND TRUTHFUL STATEMENT BY [] OF HIS KNOWLEDGE
OF THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO, AND AFTER NOVEMBER 3, 1979, INCIDENT.

IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT [] IS VIEWED AS A POTENTIAL WITNESS AND HIS VALUE, AS SUCH, IS SOLELY DEPENDENT UPON HIS TRUTHFULNESS AND FRANKNESS AS A WITNESS. IF [] AGREES TO AN INTERVIEW, HE SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION ON THE NEXT DAY TO SUBSTANTIATE HIS TRUTHFULNESS ON ANY QUESTIONABLE AREAS THAT MAY ARISE.

THE ABOVE INFORMATION SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY FURNISHED TO [] AND IF THEY ARE WILLING TO COOPERATE, SA [] GREENSBORO, NC, OF THE CHARLOTTE DIVISION, AND SA [] PHOENIX DIVISION, FORMERLY GREENSBORO RA, CHARLOTTE DIVISION, ARE PREPARED TO BE IN CLEVELAND BY 9 A.M. ON NOVEMBER 12, 1981, FOR A DETAILED INTERVIEW OF []

CLEVELAND DIVISION IS REQUESTED TO ASSIST IN THIS INTERVIEW BY HAVING AVAILABLE A POLYGRAPH EXAMINER ON NOVEMBER 13, 1981, IF IT IS DEEMED NECESSARY TO AFFORD A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION TO []

CLEVELAND, WILL IMMEDIATELY CONTACT [] AND ARRANGE FOR INTERVIEW OF MASON ON NOVEMBER 12, 1981, AT CLEVELAND.

SA [] PHOENIX DIVISION, IS REQUESTED TO BE PRESENT AT THE INTERVIEW OF [] AS SA [] PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED [] ON NOVEMBER 9, 1981, AT WINSTON-SALEM, FORSYTH COUNTY, NC, RELATIVE TO THIS INCIDENT. IN ADDITION, SA [] IS FAMILIAR WITH THE STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION AND THE LEADERSHIP OF THE KKK/NAZI PARTY AS IT EXISTED DURING THIS TIME AT WINSTON-SALEM, FORSYTH COUNTY, NC, AND WILL BE OF GREAT VALUE IN INTERVIEWING [] RELATIVE TO HIS ASSOCIATION WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS AT THAT TIME.

UNLESS ADVISED TO THE CONTRARY BY THE BUREAU, SPECIAL AGENTS [] AND [] ARE PREPARED TO TRAVEL TO CLEVELAND ON NOVEMBER 11, 1981, TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS ON NOVEMBER 12, 1981.

BT

Transmit attached by Facsimile - UNCLAS

Precedence PRIORITY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 To: New York (100-182800) COMMUNICATIONS CENTER
 Charlotte (44-3527) 70M 172
 From: Director, FBI (44-81521) 3 1981
 Subject: GREENKIL
 CIVIL RIGHTS
 OO: CHARLOTTE

Date: 10/13/81

Time: Transmitted - 3:57pm, 4:05pm

Initials - EM, TSA

44-81521-200

☐ Fingerprint Photo ☐ Fingerprint Record ☐ Map ☐ Newspaper clipping ☐ Photograph
☐ Artists Conception☒ Other Departmental letter, 10/9/81.

Special handling instructions: NOTE: Items #1 and #4 will be handled by
 Charlotte. New York arrange items #2 and
 #3. Advise FBIHQ by teletype of arrangements for interviews. NOV 16 1981

NOV 19 1981

Approved: JS/H

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FBI/DOJ

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FM CLEVELAND (44A-1739)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (PRIORITY)

CHARLOTTE (44A-3527) (PRIORITY)

PHOENIX (PRIORITY)

BT

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ATTENTION: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, CIVIL RIGHTS UNIT.

GREENKIL, CIVIL RIGHTS

REFERENCE CHARLOTTE TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1981.

[REDACTED] WAS CONTACTED
ON [REDACTED] AND WAS ADVISED OF THE FBI'S DESIRE TO OBTAIN
A COMPLETE AND TRUTHFUL STATEMENT FROM [REDACTED] REGARDING HIS
KNOWLEDGE OF THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO AND AFTER THE NOVEMBER 3, 1979
INCIDENT IN GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA. [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT [REDACTED]
WAS TO BE [REDACTED]

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CV 44A-1739

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THEREAFTER ARRANGED FOR A MEETING BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND SA [REDACTED] IN ORDER THAT SA [REDACTED] COULD EXPLAIN TO [REDACTED] THAT THE FBI AND THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DESIRED A COMPLETE, THOROUGH AND TRUTHFUL STATEMENT BY [REDACTED] REGARDING THE GREENSBORO INCIDENT AND THAT [REDACTED] MUST AGREE TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION TO SUBSTANTIATE THE TRUTHFULNESS OF ANY QUESTIONABLE AREAS THAT MAY ARISE FROM AN INTERVIEW BY SAS [REDACTED] [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] IS FURTHER ADVISED THAT HIS VALUE AS A WITNESS IS BASED SOLEY UPON THIS TRUTHFULNESS TO THE FBI AND THAT THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO INSURE [REDACTED] PROTECTION THROUGH THE WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM OR TO INTERCEDE WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES ON [REDACTED] BEHALF UNTIL SUCH TIME AS A FULL AND CANDID STATEMENT IS FURNISHED BY [REDACTED] AND THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IS SATISFIED AS TO THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THAT STATEMENT.

[REDACTED] ADVISED THAT HE WILL PROVIDE A FULL AND CANDID STATEMENT TO AGENTS OF THE FBI REGARDING THE GREENSBORO INCIDENT AND THAT HE

PAGE THREE CV 44A-1739 UNCLAS

WILL SUBMIT TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION AT THE FBI'S REQUEST.

[REDACTED] ADVISED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BE PRESENT DURING QUESTIONING
OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW ON NOVEMBER 12, 1981 AND
IF NECESSARY ON NOVEMBER 13, 1981 AT CLEVELAND, OHIO. CLEVELAND
FEELS THAT FOR SECURITY REASONS IT WOULD BE BEST THAT [REDACTED] BE
INTERVIEWED IN THE CLEVELAND FBI OFFICE AND THE NECESSARY ARRANGE-
MENTS FOR THAT WILL BE MADE BY CLEVELAND. SAC, CLEVELAND CONCURS
WITH THE NEED FOR SAS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] TO TRAVEL TO CLEVELAND TO
CONDUCT A DETAILED INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] CLEVELAND'S POLYGRAPH
EXAMINER WILL BE AVAILABLE ON NOVEMBER 13, TO AFFORD A POLYGRAPH
EXAMINATION TO [REDACTED] SHOULD IT BE DEEMED NECESSARY.

LEADS: CHARLOTTE DIVISION: WILL OBTAIN NECESSARY APPROVAL
FOR TRAVEL OF SAS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] TO CLEVELAND, OHIO AND NOTIFY
CLEVELAND OF FLIGHT ARRIVAL TIME AND LODGING REQUIREMENTS.

PHOENIX DIVISION: UPON RECEIVING APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL FROM THE
BUREAU WILL NOTIFY CLEVELAND OF FLIGHT ARRIVAL TIME AND LODGING
REQUIREMENTS.

BT

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TO DIRECTOR (PRIORITY)

CHARLOTTE (44-3527) (PRIORITY) COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

BT

UNCLAS

GREENKIL, CIVIL RIGHTS, (OO: CHARLOTTE)

REFERENCE BUREAU FD-448, DATED OCTOBER 13, 1981 AND DEPARTMENTAL MEMO FROM WILLIAM BRADFORD REYNOLDS, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, DATED OCTOBER 9, 1981.

PER DIRECTIVE AS SET FORTH IN DEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDUM, THE NYO HAS SECURED THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGES DIVISION II CONFERENCE ROOM FOR UTILIZATION REGARDING THIS MATTER ON OCTOBER 19 AND 20, 1981. ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THIS MATTER AS OUTLINED IN REFERENCED DEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDUM ARE REQUESTED TO REPORT TO THE RECEPTION DESK ON THE 28TH FLOOR OF THE NYO LOCATED AT 26 FEDERAL PLAZA, NY, NY, TELEPHONE (212) 553-2700 ON OR AFTER 8:15 A.M. ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1981 FOR ESCORT TO THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGES CONFERENCE ROOM.

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10 OCT 16 1981

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U N C L A S

HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS HAVE BEEN SECURED BY THE NYO FOR
DEPARTMENTAL ATTORNEY [REDACTED] AND SPECIAL AGENTS [REDACTED]
AND [REDACTED] THE SINGLE ROOM ACCOMMODATIONS ARE FOR
MONDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1981 AND HAVE BEEN MADE AT THE MILFORD PLAZA
HOTEL LOCATED AT 270 WEST 45TH STREET, NY, NY, TELEPHONE (212)
869-3600.

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FM NEW YORK (44A-3413) RUC (M-1) DIVISION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

CHARLOTTE (44-3527) ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

GREENKILL, CIVIL RIGHTS, OO: CHARLOTTE.

RENYTEL, DATED OCTOBER 15, 1981.

ON OCTOBER 19 AND 20, 1981, INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED
AT THE NYO BY SAS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] IN
THE PRESENCE OF DEPARTMENTAL ATTORNEY [REDACTED]

IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION REMAINS
IN THIS MATTER, WITHIN THE NEW YORK DIVISION, THE NYO IS
PLACING THIS MATTER IN AN RUC'D STATUS.

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FM CHARLOTTE (44A-3527) (P)

TO DIRECTOR (44-81521) PRIORITY

ATTENTION CIVIL RIGHTS UNIT

CLEVELAND (44A-1739) PRIORITY

ATTENTION SA [REDACTED]

BT

UNCLAS

GREENKIL, CIVIL RIGHTS.

RE CLEVELAND TELCALL TO CHARLOTTE DIVISION, NOVEMBER 23, 1981.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATTORNEY [REDACTED]

CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, HAS ADVISED HE HAS RECEIVED AUTHORIZATION

FOR FBI AGENTS TO APPEAR IN CAMERA BEFORE THE STATE OF OHIO

JUDGE, WHO WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SENTENCING OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS CONFERRED

WITH LOCAL PROSECUTORS AND [REDACTED] DEFENSE ATTORNEY IN THIS

MATTER AND BOTH ARE AWARE OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S INTEREST

IN [REDACTED] AS A POTENTIAL WITNESS FOR THE UNITED STATES IN CAPTIONED

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MATTER.

IN CAMERA APPEARANCE BY FBI AGENTS SHOULD ALSO BE ATTENDED BY THE LOCAL PROSECUTOR OF [REDACTED] SO BOTH PARTIES ARE AWARE OF INFORMATION BEING FURNISHED TO THE COURT. THE FOLLOWING BACKGROUND INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED TO THE COURT IN REGARD TO CAPTIONED INVESTIGATION.

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ON NOVEMBER 3, 1981, THE WORKERS VIEWPOINT ORGANIZATION (WVO), NOW AFFILIATED WITH THE COMMUNIST WORKERS PARTY (CWP), HAD ORGANIZED A PARADE AND RALLY AT GREENSBORO, NC, WHICH HAD BEEN GRANTED A CITY PARADE PERMIT. THE PURPOSE OF THIS RALLY WAS TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR THE WVO AMONG THE BLACK COMMUNITY IN GREENSBORO, AND THE THEME OF THE RALLY WAS ENTITLED "DEATH TO THE KLAN". THE KU KLUX KLAN, AS DESCRIBED BY THE WVO MEMBERSHIP, WAS A RACIST ORGANIZATION WHICH THE COMMUNITY SHOULD REJECT AND THE PURPOSE OF THE RALLY WAS TO EDUCATE THE COMMUNITY AGAINST THE KLAN.

PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 3, 1979, THERE HAD BEEN AN ARMED CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THESE TWO POLITICAL OPPOSING FACTIONS AT CHINA GROVE, NC, WHERE THE KU KLUX KLAN WAS HAVING A RECRUITING DRIVE, AND SHOWING THE FILM "THE BIRTH OF A NATION".

AT THIS KKK RALLY, THE WVO PARTICIPATED WITH A PORTION OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY AT THE CIVIL CENTER IN CHINA GROVE, WHEN THEY SHOUTED DOWN THE ASSEMBLED KLAN MEMBERS AND BURNED A CONFEDERATE FLAG.

AS A RESULT OF THAT SUCCESSFUL CONFRONTATION, THE WVO INCREASED ITS ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE KLAN IN THE PUBLIC MEDIA AND PLANNED A NOVEMBER 3, 1979, RALLY AT GREENSBORO.

THE PARADE AND RALLY, WHICH WAS TO START AT 12 NOON WAS TO ORGANIZE AND ASSEMBLE AT EVERITT STREET AND CARVER STREET AT 11:30 A.M.

AT APPROXIMATELY 11:20 A.M., A CARAVAN OF KKK VEHICLES OCCUPIED BY APPROXIMATELY 45 KLAN MEMBERS AND NAZI PARTY MEMBERS FROM THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, LOCATED THE ASSEMBLY AREA OF THE WVO RALLY AND BEGAN DRIVING PAST THEM. WORDS WERE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE OCCUPANTS OF THE VEHICLES AND THE STREET DEMONSTRATORS AND SOME OF THE STREET DEMONSTRATORS BEGAN STRIKING THE KLAN VEHICLES WITH STICKS, HANDS AND FISTS.

A STREET FIGHT ERUPTED IN THE INTERSECTION OF EVERITT AND CARVER STREETS WITH BOTH GROUPS USING 2X2'S AND OTHER PIECES OF WOOD AS WEAPONS.

AFTER THREE OR FOUR SHOTS WERE FIRED, THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE KKK AND NAZIS RETURNED TO THEIR VEHICLES AND REMOVED FROM THE TRUNK OF ONE VEHICLE AND A VAN A NUMBER OF WEAPONS, TO INCLUDE FOUR SHOTGUNS; ONE AR15; ONE 38 CALIBER; AND ONE 357 MAGNUM HANDGUN. THESE INDIVIDUALS THEN BEGAN AN ASSAULT FIRING TOWARDS THE INTERSECTION WHERE THE REMAINING WVO MEMBERS STOOD. THERE WAS SOME RETURN FIRE FROM THE WFO.

THE RESULTS WERE THAT FIVE PEOPLE FROM THE WVO WERE KILLED AND NINE OTHERS WERE WOUNDED. THE SHOOTING INCIDENT LASTED LESS THAN 90 SECONDS.

FOURTEEN MEMBERS OF THE KKK AND NAZI PARTY WERE ARRESTED AND CHARGED WITH CONSPIRACY AND FIRST DEGREE MURDER BY THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA. SUBSEQUENTLY, SIX KKK AND NAZIS WERE BROUGHT TO TRIAL BY THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA. AFTER A FOUR MONTH TRIAL, THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE ACQUITTED BY A JURY.

SINCE NOVEMBER 3, 1979, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FBI HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING AN INQUIRY INTO THIS INCIDENT, WHICH OCCURRED AT GREENSBORO RELATIVE TO POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT; SPECIFICALLY, TITLE 18, SECTION 245, USC.

IN NOVEMBER OF 19⁸¹~~79~~, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO

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FURNISH A STATEMENT OF THE FBI RELATIVE TO HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE PRIOR TO THE CHINA GROVE CONFRONTATION ON JULY 8, 1979, AND THE SHOOTING INCIDENT WHICH TOOK PLACE BETWEEN THE KKK, NAZIS, AND WVO ON NOVEMBER 3, 1979.

[REDACTED] VALUE AS A WITNESS IS THAT HE IS AN INSIDER AS

[REDACTED] AND

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] FURNISHED TO THE FBI APPROXIMATELY A FIVE HOUR STATEMENT AND FROM THE CONTENTS OF THIS STATEMENT. IT IS VIEWED THAT [REDACTED] COULD BE A POTENTIALLY VALUABLE WITNESS TO THE UNITED STATES.

IT IS EXPECTED [REDACTED] COOPERATION WILL CONTINUE IN THIS INVESTIGATION AND ANY POTENTIAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS WHICH MAY RESULT.

THIS INFORMATION IS BEING FURNISHED TO THE COURT FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE THE COURT MAY DEEM APPROPRIATE IN CONSIDERATION OF PASSING SENTENCE ON [REDACTED] RELATIVE TO THE CHARGES PENDING AGAINST HIM IN THE STATE OF OHIO.

THIS CONCLUDES THE INFORMATION WHICH SHOULD BE FURNISHED
TO THE SENTENCING COURT RELATIVE TO [REDACTED] AND IT IS
RECOMMENDED THAT SA [REDACTED], CLEVELAND DIVISION, BE
THE INDIVIDUAL WHO REPRESENTS THE FBI AT THIS APPEARANCE ON
NOVEMBER 30, 1981.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ole
TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
WBR/MDJ
FROM : Wm. Bradford Reynolds
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
SUBJECT: Greenkill
CIVIL RIGHTS
opp

29 OCT 1981
DATE:

WBR:LKD:MDJ:bbg
DJ 144-54M-351

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EX-100-#40

Reference is made to your memorandum dated October 26, 1981, enclosing a copy of a teletype dated October 24, 1981 at Charlotte, bearing no field office file number or Bureau file number.

Please conduct the following additional investigation:

1. Make Special Agent [] available to interview [] in Cleveland.
2. Make arrangements in Cleveland for [] to be given a polygraph examination.
3. Obtain a copy of the testimonial portions of the trial transcript from the local trial in Greensboro.
4. Provide a location in Greensboro for interviewing []
The facility should include capability to show [] the pertinent video tapes.

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Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Duke University
DURHAM
NORTH CAROLINA

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FBI/DOJ

SCHOOL OF LAW

POSTAL

October 5, 1981

Mr. William Webster, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Ninth and Pennsylvania Aves., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Mr. Webster:

I was asked last week to furnish a Memorandum to the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice respecting the applicable federal statutes and the uncertain status of federal interest in the Greensboro, North Carolina, Klan-Nazi-Communist Workers Party confrontation of more than a year ago. I understand that you may soon appear before the Subcommittee pursuant to the Subcommittee's interest and invitation.

I do not mean to burden you with unnecessary enclosures, but I thought it entirely right to share with you in advance a copy of what I have prepared for the Subcommittee. Lengthy as it is, it doubtless may well leave out of account some matters of which I lacked sufficient information. Necessarily, I would be grateful to you for correcting any misimpression I may have and, of course, I would be pleased to provide any clarification that you might find helpful.

Sincerely,



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P. PROC.
OCT 8 1981

November 2, 1981

Professor [redacted]
[redacted]

Dear [redacted]

Green Ki

Thanks for sending me a copy of your very thorough analysis of the Federal Criminal statutes applicable to the shooting incident involving the Communist Workers Party, the Ku Klux Klan, and the Nazi Party in Greensboro, North Carolina, in November, 1979.

As you may be aware, I directed FBI Agents to the scene within hours after the events took place and we gave the fullest cooperation to local law enforcement authorities with respect to matters within their jurisdiction. The results of our own investigation, predicated upon Federal jurisdiction, have been under study for some time by the Justice Department, and it would be inappropriate for me to anticipate the Department's conclusions. There are as you know some important judgment calls both on the sufficiency of the evidence and matters of policy on dual prosecutions where there are overlapping jurisdictions.

Warm best wishes,

Sincerely,

1st Bill

William H. Webster
Director

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 10:40 AM
DATE 11-3-81
BY [signature]

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TRANSMIT VIA: AIRTEL

CLASSIFICATION: _____

DATE: 11/2/81

FROM: Director, FBI (44-81521)

TO: SAC, Charlotte (44-3527)

**GREENKILL
CIVIL RIGHTS**

OO: CHARLOTTE

Enclosed are two copies of a self-explanatory Departmental letter dated **10/29/81**

Complete the requested investigation in accordance with the provisions of Section _____
Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines, and surep within _____²¹ workdays of the receipt
of this communication.

State in the first paragraph of the details of your report that it contains the results of a
☐ limited investigation and underscore the word ☐ limited
☐ preliminary ☐ preliminary

Advise ☐ all persons interviewed
☐ appropriate officials at the outset that this investigation is being conducted at
the specific request of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Remarks:


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FBI/DOJ

November 9, 1981

Greenkil

Judge:

You recently inquired if we were attempting to obtain a copy of the study of the slayings of five men of the Communist Workers Party (CWP) in Greensboro, North Carolina prepared by the Institute for Southern Studies. Your inquiry was prompted by the attached article in the Washington-Afro American.

The Congressional Affairs Unit (CAU) has obtained a copy of the study from Mr. Bill Kaplan of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, House Judiciary Committee (Conyers' Subcommittee). Kaplan advised that the Subcommittee was interested in the study in connection with a planned hearing on racially motivated violent crime. (You have declined an invitation to testify at this hearing.) In Kaplan's opinion, many of the allegations contained in the study are not substantiated and he finds it of little value. Because of his dissatisfaction with the report, he obtained an analysis of the federal statutes applicable to the Greensboro incident from Professor [redacted] of Duke University School of Law. I have previously furnished you a copy of this analysis. [redacted] will be a witness at the Subcommittee's hearing.

I am forwarding a copy of the Institute's report to the Criminal Investigative Division for information.

4
[redacted]

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted] Enclosure
(Attn: [redacted])

1 - [redacted]
2 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

TER. [redacted]
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ENCLOSURE

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off. of [redacted]

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[redacted]*

FROM

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO

OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW

10-8-81

What are
we doing
about getting
a copy of this
report?

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See Me _____ ()
 Note and return _____ ()
 Prepare reply and return for my signature _____ ()
 Please Handle _____ ()
 Respond over your signature _____ ()
 Prepare memo for the Department _____ ()
 For your recommendation _____ ()
 What are the facts? _____ ()
 Hold _____ ()

Remarks: _____

Bond urges federal role in CPW killings

The Institute for Southern Studies is seeking a Congressional investigation into the Nov. 3, 1979 slayings of five members of the Communist Workers Party (CWP) by members of the Klu Klux Klan and Nazi parties. The incident took place in Greensboro, North Carolina.

The Institute charges that the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the Greensboro police acted "improperly" during the incident.

"We have talked with Congressman (John) Conyers (D-Mich.) and he is very interested in it," said Bob Hall, director of the Institute.

"It (the incident) was the failure of local police," said Hall. He also said that when there is a breakdown of the power of local police departments, "the federal government must intervene."

Hall is optimistic about the chances of an investigation, despite the conservative tide in Congress. "There are several house committees where the Democrats are in control," he said. He said that Conyers' committee has done some form of an investigation, but hopes they will do more.

Hall said about the attitudes of Secretary William French Smith's Justice Department, "they are stonewalling." He also said that North Carolina's governor James Hunt believes that Greensboro police "performed properly" during the shooting. However, Hunt is concerned about the state's jury selection process, where no black jurors were picked to serve on the jury.

Julian Bond, Georgia's only black state senator and president of the SCLC, read a statement about growing Klan violence and the actions of local officials.

"The gross negligence of the local officials in Greensboro, N.C. represents a frightening trend that demands immediate federal action," said Bond.

He added, "In growing number of cases... from Montgomery County, Md. to Montgomery, Ala. racist hate groups have challenged the public at-large and government leaders."

"The Greensboro case reveals what happens when there is a total collapse of the criminal justice system in protecting citizens from racial hate and pseudo-patriotic vigilante groups."

Bond said that the U.S. Attorney in Greensboro recommended "strong, decisive action" by the U.S. Justice department. He said no action has been taken.

However, Liz Wheaton, primary researcher for the Institute's report on the killings, said, "We didn't set out to prove a conspiracy... that is why we are calling for the Congressional investigation."

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 The Los Angeles Times _____
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
Date 10.10.81

Page 5 FBI/DOJ

INSTITUTE FOR SOUTHERN STUDIES REPORT:

THE THIRD OF NOVEMBER

On November 3, 1979, television cameras from four stations recorded in awesome detail the killing of five communist demonstrators by members of the Ku Klux Klan and Nazi Party. Six men charged with first-degree murder were tried by an all-white jury. Their acquittal one year later did not erase the videotapes which show them calmly unloading their weapons from a car trunk, running after victims and firing, in some cases, at point-blank range. Some people choose to believe the jury learned things about that day which the rest of us don't know, some evidence that established the innocence of those charged. Others would like to forget the incident altogether.



By now we, too, might have forgotten — except for three things: (1) we spent hours interviewing a reporter who sat through the entire trial; (2) we watched and analyzed the entire footage of all four cameras, everything that the jury saw; and (3) we spent four hours interviewing, as no other reporter has done, a police informant within the Klan who was intimately involved in the planning and execution of the confrontation on November 3, but who was never called as a witness.

Once we had done that much, we could no longer forget the Greensboro killings. Too many questions remained unanswered, and those that our research answered pointed us toward deeper research, particularly into the role of the police, the prosecuting attorney and city officials in managing and mismanaging the events surrounding the killing, subsequent publicity and the trial.

This report will document the following conclusions:

- The police monitored the organization of the "Death to the Klan" march and rally for nearly a month prior to November 3. Two weeks before November 3, they were informed that a large group of Klan members was planning to "disrupt" the rally. As early as 7:30 on the morning of November 3, they were informed that armed Klansmen and Nazis were gathering south of Greensboro. There is evidence that patrol cars drove past the Klan/Nazi rendezvous where rifles and shotguns were visibly displayed on the front lawn. A Greensboro police detective and an identification specialist watched and photographed the formation of the nine-car caravan of Klan/Nazis; the officers were in constant radio contact with police headquarters and several of the officers assigned to the march. During the 17 minutes it took the Klan/Nazi caravan to get from its formation point to the rally site, police units working on normal patrol duty in the rally area were instructed to leave the vicinity. And during those critical 17 minutes, the officers in command and most of the tactical units assigned to the march were out of radio contact with those monitoring the caravan.

There were two known agents involved in planning the confrontation: Bernard Butkovich, an agent for the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, infiltrated the Nazis

during the summer of 1979; and at the request of the Greensboro Police Department, former Klan member Ed Dawson informed on the Klan from mid-October. Dawson suspects that there was a second informer who rode with the caravan on November 3. And there is evidence that there was an informer in the CWP as well.

- Greensboro city officials, the local and state Human Relations Commissions, the news media and the U.S. Justice Department diverted attention from the murders and the role of the Greensboro police by focusing on the damage done to Greensboro's reputation by "the incident." The dead and wounded were labeled as provocateurs, their survivors were viewed as the lunatic fringe (and they acted in ways which only enhanced that image). The Klansmen and Nazis were portrayed as hapless boobs who simply lost control in a volatile situation. "The real victims," wrote one Human Relations official, "are the police and the citizens of Greensboro." And no one in the news media challenged that distortion or many, many others.

In the weeks following the murders, city, state and federal officials tried concertedly to thwart the organization of legal, nonviolent demonstrations, rallies and even a memorial service through harassment, intimidation and red-baiting. The red-baiting was particularly effective, since patriotic fervor was at an all-time high following the Iranian takeover of the U.S. embassy in Teheran on November 4, 1979.

- The district attorney systematically weakened the prosecution of the first six Klansmen and Nazis who were indicted for felony riot and murder. Although 14 people were originally charged with murder and conspiracy, the DA declined to pursue the conspiracy charges in his request for grand jury indictments. Without exploring the question of conspiracy, it was all but impossible to prove either intent to assault or intent to murder, thus leaving open the claim of self-defense for the assailants. The DA refused to file charges on behalf of the wounded demonstrators, one of whom is partially paralyzed with a shotgun pellet lodged in his brain.

The prosecutors seated avowed anti-communist jurors. The jury foreman was a Cuban refugee and a former member of the CIA-sponsored 20th of May Organization, a paramilitary anti-

Castro group. Another juror was seen giving "the finger" to the prosecutors through most of the trial, yet they did not raise objections to this or to red-baiting of witnesses by the defense attorneys.

At the request of the prosecution, the FBI conducted a sound-wave analysis from news tapes of the shooting which traced all but three shots to specific weapons and individuals. Those three shots proved to be the determining factor in the jury's acquittal of the assailants, partially due to the fact that at the beginning of the trial, the prosecutors traded the FBI analysis to the defense.

The two witnesses who could have proven the Klan and Nazis' intent to assault (which would have provided the basis for conviction on felony murder), BATF agent Butkovich and Greensboro police informant Dawson, were never called to testify although both were interviewed by the prosecution. Dawson claims that he was interviewed by two assistant district attorneys and a police captain — not in city offices, but in a motel room. When Dawson told them he would refuse to testify even if he had to go to jail for contempt of court, he was told to think about it overnight and phone the police captain with his decision. Dawson says he made a tape recording of that phone call, that he maintained his original decision not to testify and the captain told him, "Good decision, Ed. I knew we could count on you."

Our intent in this report is not to prove any conspiracy but rather to provide a record of what happened in a way that illuminates a host of remaining questions which must be answered before anyone in good conscience can place Greensboro in its proper perspective. To date, the Greensboro Police Department has provided a record. So has the Communist Workers Party. Both reports are evasive and distorted, their primary purpose to absolve each organization of any responsibility for the confrontation. Our report aims to provide a third voice, an independent perspective on the events. It does not try to prove a single thesis or vindicate anyone of wrong-doing.

From what we know now, the actions of various parties can still be explained in more than one way, some more palatable than others. The mere possibility that certain police officers plotted with Klansmen to

assassinate troublesome communists may be unthinkable to some. A reporter who read a draft of the entire report remarked, "I know this kind of thing happens in places like El Salvador, but it's too frightening for me to think about the implications of it happening here. I *can't* believe it." But even if one gathers from our report only that the police knew a caravan of armed Klan and Nazis were headed toward the demonstrators, a reasonable reader still has to conclude that their failure to warn the demonstrators or bystanders, or to be on the scene to prevent violence, amounts to gross negligence and raises grave questions about their motives for such inaction.


Some of the questions raised here may never be answered. A massive civil suit initiated by the wounded demonstrators and relatives of those slain may unravel some mysteries as federal agents, police officers, Klan and Nazi leaders, city officials and others are forced under oath to explain their part in actions leading up to and following the event. But that suit is moving slowly. A well-financed investigative team of reporters would probably uncover other information, too. We only hope to encourage the probing effort and to share what we know so others can learn from what happened in and around Greensboro on November 3.

BACKGROUND

1 November 3, 1979, was not the first confrontation between Nazis, Klansmen and members of the Communist Workers Party (CWP). In the spring and early summer of 1979, the Federated Knights of the KKK began holding public meetings at which they showed the film "Birth of a Nation" and attempted to recruit new members. A few protesters — members of the Revolutionary Communist Party — came to one of the public meetings in Winston-Salem, but it wasn't until the Klan took the film to a community center in China Grove that protesters arrived in force.

On Sunday, July 8, members and supporters of the CWP (which then called itself the Worker's Viewpoint

photo by Signe Waller



Roland Wayne Wood, center, then-head of the Forsyth County Nazi unit at the July, 1979, confrontation with the Workers Viewpoint Organization in China Grove, North Carolina.

Organization, or WVO*) arrived at the community center about an hour before the film showing was scheduled to begin. The tiny China Grove police force was also early, stationing officers at the community center well ahead of starting time. The counter-demonstrators outnumbered and outflanked the Klansmen gathering outside the center; pressing forward while the police tried to keep the groups separate, they succeeded, as they later put it, in driving "these scum Klansmen off the lawn of the China Grove Community Center."

Their symbolic victory consisted of capturing and burning two Confederate flags while "these 'brave Klansmen' defended them by peeping out of the windows as the flags went up in smoke." The group inside the center included Roland Wayne Wood, head of the Forsyth County unit of the Nazi Party and one of the men later charged with the November 3 murders. Raeford Caudle and Jerry Paul Smith, two other participants in the November killings, were also inside, along with members of the moderate and militant factions of the North Carolina Klan. According to one Klan leader, both sides were armed and the only reason the men inside did not open fire on the communists was that "if shooting began, the three policemen trying to maintain order would be killed."

After the China Grove confrontation the WVO got cocky. Members had marched into the heart of Klan country and, they thought, publicly shamed the "cowards" into submission. "What made a difference in China Grove," they boasted, "was the mighty force of militant, armed and organized fighters, fighting in the people's interest. WE AFFIRM THE CORRECTNESS OF HOW TO FIGHT THE KLAN AS SHOWN BY CHINA GROVE!!!"

The WVO leaders were exceedingly naive, some would say stupid, to think that these men who embraced the violent, macho image of the Klan could continue to be baited yet never retaliate.

The WVO failed to research their adversaries adequately. Had they done so, they would have known that Grady and Pierce's Federated Knights were

not the only Klan faction in North Carolina; they would have discovered that the more militant Invisible Knights, headed by Virgil Griffin, were beginning to court the Nazis. And the most elementary research would have shown that although the state's Nazis are far fewer in number than the Klan, the Nazis' hatred of blacks, Jews and communists surpasses even the racist fervor of their white-robed colleagues.

What of the communists who confronted them? The CWP considers itself to be a "revolutionary vanguard" party. Originally made up of Maoist Asian-Americans in New York, it merged with several like-minded groups across the country, including a Marxist-Leninist faction that split from the New American Movement chapter in North Carolina in 1974. In Greensboro, local officials and the news media went to great lengths to portray the CWP as "outside agitators," but most of those involved in the November 3 rally had been active in the area for a half-dozen years or more. They were people who, in the late '60s and early '70s, worked with nonviolent campus, civil-rights and peace groups such as the New University Conference, American Friends Service Committee and the United Church of Christ's Commission on Racial Justice.

By the mid-1970s, the North Carolina WVO had decided that a communist-led workers' revolution was necessary and inevitable. Their first attempt in the state was a union organizing drive among cafeteria workers and other minimum-wage employees at Duke Hospital in Durham. The WVO based its actions on intellectual theory rather than the practical realities of organizing in an atmosphere in which hostility to unions is surpassed only by hostility to communism. The Duke organizers projected their "politically correct" analysis, refusing to cooperate or listen to potential allies; they managed, according to most progressive activists in the city, to destroy the hospital's union. It was the same kind of tactical blunder which led the CWP to dare the Klan to meet them in Greensboro on November 3.

But the communist activity at Duke had attracted new young, college-educated radicals to the WVO, and, as the group delved further and further into "political correctness," a new strategy evolved: the workers' revolution must begin with the largest class

of oppressed workers in the state, those in the textile mills. The WVO targeted Cone Mills, the state's largest, where the skeletal remains of Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) locals provided a handle for organizing a more effective union of black and white workers in the plants. At Cone's Haw River, White Oak and Revolution plants, WVO activists provided services that the impotent union had left unattended: meetings were held, grievances were filed, and shop-floor issues were confronted. Although most workers were uncomfortable with the radical philosophy of their new leaders, they were able, for the first time, to enjoy some of the benefits of their union contract.

ACTWU was less than pleased with the new local leadership. The national union took over the locals and suspended elections, despite the fact that the union membership under the WVO had increased substantially in some Cone plants. But the Revolutionary Communist Party had also become active in the mills. RCP's strategy was to lay low while the WVO rekindled interest in the union. Then, when the difficult initial organizing was accomplished, the RCP would try to take control, often resorting to violence to show its greater strength. The RCP's violent activities in the mills and on the streets may have been the impetus for ACTWU's takeover: while effective radical leadership of the locals might have been tolerated, vandals and hoodlums — as RCP members showed themselves to be — could not.

The WVO's desire to outdo the RCP may have further blinded the WVO to the danger of its "Death to the Klan" challenge. The rivalry between the two communist groups was bitter, but its subtleties and very existence escaped most outsiders. Significantly, even then-Nazi Party head Harold Covington, who lived in Raleigh, confused the two groups. On September 11, 1979, he sent a letter to RCP member Cindy Hopkins claiming the Nazis could get help to combat communists. He warned that most Nazis had killed communists in Vietnam, but "so far we've never had a chance to kill the homegrown product." Covington continued, "We've put a few in the hospital and we nearly killed some of your people at China Grove — we had it all worked out with the cops, that if you were dumb

* In October, 1979, the WVO, at a national meeting in New York, changed its name to the Communist Workers Party.

incidents at the university, Hampton Homes and White Oak, that misinformation could have provided justification in the minds of certain officers to hold back and let the Klan/Nazis beat up the communists on November 3.

October 19: Nelson Johnson, a WVO leader, applied for a parade permit for the November 3 march. The Greensboro police advised him of the proposed restrictions against weapons and he agreed to them.

October 20: Virgil Griffin and his Invisible Empire held a march and rally at the Lincoln County Fairgrounds. After the rally, Griffin convened a meeting, with about 90 people attending, at which none other than informant Ed Dawson was the featured speaker. The purpose of the meeting was to recruit people to confront the "Death to the Klan" march. Dawson told us:

"And at the speech I explained everything that was going on in Greensboro. I didn't add, I didn't take anything away. That they were going through the schools and throwing red paint, that there were signs posted, and this, that and the other thing. I gave maybe a 20-minute speech on the goodies that was going on and I asked for a show of hands, how many people was coming. Eighty hands went up in the air!

"So then I gave the second part of my speech: what to expect if they came up here. I told them, 'Now, if you come up here, I want you to know that we're not fooling around. I don't know if any of you know Marion Porter and the Labor Party, but these people here are different. You push *them* around, they'll push back. They're big enough, they won't just stand there while you're screaming at them.'

"'Number two,' I said, 'if you carry a gun, if you go out in the open there with a bulge in your pocket, that place is going to be infested with police and you *will* be arrested. If you carry a gun, you better have your damn bond money in your pocket, because you're gonna be arrested if you try any garbage.' And after that speech, I asked for a show of hands. Then only about 40 or 50 of them raised their hands, after the second part of it. Because I wanted them to know what to expect if they were gonna come up here and start screaming and carrying on."

October 22: The WVO released an

"Open Letter to Joe Grady, Gorrell Pierce and all KKK Members and Sympathizers." The letter read, in part, "Yes, we challenge you to attend our November 3 rally in Greensboro. You were quoted in the AP press release as saying that 'If the communists think they are going to get me to attack them, they are crazy as hell.' No Grady and Pierce — we are not crazy. You 'invited' us to show up at Klan rallies. *Grady and Pierce, we accept! Where in the hell are you holding your scum rallies?* You cowards manage to keep the location of your rallies a secret. We challenge you to say in public where and when you hold your rallies so that the people can organize to chase you off the face of the earth." A copy of this letter was obtained by the Greensboro police on November 1, according to their administrative report.

October 23: The FBI began an investigation of the CWP in Greensboro and Durham which was completed on November 2, according to newspaper reports. Andrew Pelczar, an FBI field agent in Greensboro, said the investigation was started because the organizations made frequent statements supporting "the use of violence to achieve its goals." Pelczar later refused to elaborate on his statement, and his superiors in Raleigh and Washington deny that any FBI investigation had begun prior to November 3. The report on the investigation after the shooting, and one for any investigation before, has never been made public.

Newspaper reports after November 3 also disclosed that an agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) of the U.S. Treasury Department infiltrated the Nazi Party in North Carolina sometime in the summer of 1979 and sold a number of high-powered weapons to its members. BATF agent Bernard Butkovich attended at least one planning meeting for the caravan, but did not ride with it on November 3. He left the state soon after the shooting. His role in the event has never been revealed. Because of our limited resources and primary focus on actors in Greensboro, we could not pursue an investigation of Butkovich or other suspected federal agents active during the period.

October 28: Nazi and Klan members gathered in Winston-Salem (Forsyth County) to plan for the November 3 confrontation. Virgil Griffin called Ed Dawson to tell him that three

Lincoln County Klansmen at the meeting would call him afterwards with a report. Dawson says he waited until 11 p.m. and then went out to paste Klan posters over the CWP's "Death to the Klan" signs. His posters showed a figure hanging from a noose with the slogan, "It's Time for Some-Old-Fashioned Justice." We do not know what, if any, plan was devised at the Winston-Salem meeting. We do know that all of the men in the last two cars of the caravan — the men who fired on the demonstrators — were Nazis and Klansmen from Forsyth and Lincoln Counties. Dawson later told us that although he "firmly believes" no gun attack was planned, he didn't realize the Nazis were involved until the morning of November 3.

October 31: CWP members met with the Board of Elders of All Nations Pentacostal Holiness Church, who had suddenly withdrawn permission for the communists to hold their November 3 conference (which was to follow the march) at the church. The CWP had held previous public meetings at the church, but this time they say they were told that a church member who worked as a secretary in the police department had been warned by the police that the church might be bombed if the meeting were held there. Reverend Curtis Johnson, minister of the church, refused to answer our questions regarding the decision.

November 1: Nelson Johnson and Paul Bermanzohn held a CWP press conference to announce final plans for the march and to denounce the police and city officials. Their complaint was three-fold: the police had never mailed them their parade permit (a process which normally takes three days), had obstructed their use of the church and were harassing CWP people who put up posters advertising the march and conference.

Following the CWP news conference, Ed Dawson, who had watched the whole thing, spoke briefly with Johnson and Bermanzohn. According to Bermanzohn, he portrayed himself as a "small-business owner." Dawson then went inside the police department, asked for and received a copy of the parade permit, which detailed the route of the march, gave its correct starting time and place, and had written on its face the restriction against weapons.

After meeting Johnson and Ber-

Landis - The Klan Tries to Rebuild Its Shattered Image

August 25, 1979. Some Ku Klux Klansmen huddle nervously in a field at Bostian and Old Beatty Ford Rd. in Landis. They shout at each other for two hours to build up their image, which was shattered in China Grove. After seeing the coast is clear, they flash their rifles and beat their chests. The most vicious poison drips from their lips. They slander Jews as dirty and slimy. They say Black people "smell like billy goats." One Klansman points to the darkness and says, "If there are any niggers down there that come up here, I'll put a bullet between their eyes."

Just at a time when things are bad for all of us, when Black and White have more reason than ever to unite, the Klan is trying to confuse us by telling us our problem is each other. They are intensifying the conflict between different peoples in the working class, who are oppressed by the brutal system of capitalism.

SMASH THE KLAN WITH THE CORRECT UNDERSTANDING AND ARMED SELF-DEFENSE:

Historic Stand in China Grove Shows How to Fight the Klan



Hated symbol of the Klan goes up in smoke in China Grove

Just a month and a half earlier, the people of China Grove, along with the Workers Viewpoint Organization, chased these same scum Klansmen off the lawn of the China Grove Community Center. Armed with pipes, bottles, sticks and rifles, the people defended the China Grove Community. They burned the hated symbol of the Klansmen -- their confederate flags. After deserting their flags, these "brave Klansmen" defended them by peeping out of the window as the flags went up in smoke.

For weeks, the media and newspapers had built up the Klan's showing of a racist film, while afterward, in one edition, they distorted the facts and meaning of the people's heroic stand against the Klan. Kicking the press out of our ranks at the rally after the demonstration was correct. The bourgeoisie (rich capitalist class which includes the Cannon, Cones, Dukes etc.) uses many forms to disguise and maintain their rule. They use the newspapers and media to make the Klan look strong and the workers look weak.

WVO leaflet announcing "Death to the Klan" rally.

manzohn for the first time, Dawson realized that the "Death to the Klan" group was not the same as the RCP. "I had been to a couple of Revolutionary Communist meetings, but never to the Worker's [CWP]," Dawson told us. "I asked the [police] lieutenant how many communist organizations there are here, and he said, 'one.' The Revolutionary Communist was supposed to be the top . . . and the Worker's was just an offshoot."

Dawson wasn't satisfied, so he called an old FBI contact who also professed ignorance about the number of communist organizations in Greensboro. "I started reading him names from literature and television and newspapers, and he says, 'Eddie, I'm afraid you're right. There are two different communist parties here -- the Worker's Viewpoint and the Revolutionary Communists.' Dawson then passed the information on to the police department, but he commented, "It didn't mean much at the time."

The police held two meetings on November 1 to plan for the events of November 3. According to the administrative report, "Items which were discussed included the parade permit and its contents, groups that

might attend the march, and police assignments." Also discussed "was the importance of having officers in their assigned positions by 11:30 a.m. . . in accordance with the 12:00 noon starting time shown on the parade permit."

There were actually two CWP plans with two different starting times: the CWP's public announcements called for a march beginning at the Windsor Community Center at 11 a.m., with a march to the site of the anti-Klan conference, to be held at two p.m. The real plan, which was detailed on the parade permit, was to assemble at the intersection of Everitt Street and Carver Drive in Morningside Homes, a black public housing project about one mile east of Windsor Center. From there the demonstrators were to march, at 12 noon, past Windsor along a winding route through other housing projects and residential areas to the intersection of Florida Street and Freeman Mill Road. (There are two different explanations for the different starting times: according to the police report, a WGHP-TV news person who went to the community center at 11:00 a.m. was told by Nelson Johnson that the difference

What made a difference in China Grove

was the mighty force of the militant, armed and organized fighters, fighting in the people's interest. The combination of armed self-defense with the clear understanding that the Klan is secretly supported by the bourgeoisie is what put the Klan on the run and made the bourgeoisie tremble. WE AFFIRM THE CORRECTNESS OF HOW TO FIGHT THE KLAN AS SHOWN BY CHINA GROVE!!!



Take a Stand! Smash the Klan! Expose the Misleaders!

For a hundred years the Klan has beaten, murdered and raped. They have shot and lynched thousands of Black people, tarred and feathered Black and White union organizers, ridden in the night shooting into people's homes. How do we fight these dogs?

Do we stay home behind closed doors and tremble? Do we say ridiculous things like, "This is a quarrel between two hate groups?" Do we make public statements to the press saying we deplore violence and then do nothing? This is the way the Reverends Quick, Washington and Hamilton in fact covered for the bloody history of the Klan and misled people after China Grove.

Let's be clear -- what Reverends Quick, Washington and Hamilton did was to take the heat off the Klan and pave the way for the Klan to grow unchecked, allowing the Klan to put out their vicious hate teaching among brothers and sisters of the working class in Landis. This is what they objectively did, whether or not they intended it. These misleaders attacked the fighters of the Klan, including the Workers Viewpoint Organization, the Communist organization. The issue is whether you support the Klan or whether you fight against the Klan and what they represent. Reverends Quick, Washington and Hamilton are the most successful defenders of the Klan. They were able to do what the cops, press and local politicians couldn't do -- confuse, demoralize and disarm the community with their non-violent teaching.

The Klan Must Not be Allowed to Grow!

The Klan must not be allowed to grow! They have to be exposed for what they are -- servants of the ruling bourgeoisie. They should be physically beaten and chased out of town. This is the only language they understand. Armed self-defense is the only defense. We uphold this stand in Tupelo, Decatur and all the places where the masses have beat back the Klan. We call on the people in China Grove and Landis to join with us to SMASH THE KLAN!

JOIN US NOV. 3RD IN GREENSBORO!
COME TO THE W.V.O. ANTI-KLAN CONFERENCE!

DEATH TO THE KLAN! PROMOTE ARMED SELF-DEFENSE OF THE COMMUNITY!!

CRITICIZE THE ROLE OF THE MISLEADERS!!

BUILD THE MULTINATIONAL UNITY OF THE WORKING CLASS!!

This leaflet by Workers Viewpoint Organization: For more info, call (919) 882-1014

was in order to create a "certain amount of diversion from people who would want to ride by and attack our leadership." However, the CWP maintains that Windsor was selected as the assembly point because it is on a major thoroughfare which people from out of town could find easily; march organizers would then lead people from Windsor to Morningside, which was the official starting point for the march.)

While the police professed confusion over the two starting times as the reason they were not on the scene when the shooting started, they never explained why they didn't take the simple precaution of determining in advance which was the real site. They also didn't explain why, when they saw that people were gathering at Windsor at 11, they did not call in a couple of backup units to assist the three officers who were there. Chief of Police W.E. Swing did, however, give the official rationalization as to why the police didn't notify the CWP that the Klan had obtained a copy of the parade permit: they "didn't think it was important."

November 2: CWP leader Nelson Johnson met privately with Richard

Bowling, owner of the COSMOS II nightclub located in a shopping center across the street from the All Nations Church. According to Bowling, Johnson told him that the church had withdrawn permission for the CWP to use its facilities for the anti-Klan conference after police told church members that violence would occur if the conference were held there. Johnson asked if the group could use a building adjoining COSMOS II for the conference, and Bowling agreed on the condition that the new location not be made public. "Johnson promised," Bowling told us, "and I didn't talk to anyone else about it — not the police or anyone."

At about 11 p.m. Virgil Griffin addressed a group of 14 Klan members and Nazis at the Buffalo Gas Station in Lincoln County. He reportedly stressed the importance of "making a show of force" in Greensboro the next day. Afterward Griffin drove to Greensboro with Coleman Pridmore, the Exalted Cyclops of Lincoln County, and Jerry Paul Smith, Chief of Security for the Invisible Empire. They were joined by Griffin's girlfriend, Cindy, and arrived in Greensboro at three a.m. on November 3. Ed Dawson met the group at an all-night restaurant and then led them past the Florida Street shopping center, where, Dawson told them, "the rally was supposed to end."

Dawson refused to tell us where he got the information about the new termination point for the march. However, he knew the correct location within hours after Johnson and Bowling made a supposedly secret agreement.

We might note here that of the groups involved in or affected by the shootings on November 3, only the Greensboro police and the Klan and Nazis knew that a "counter-demonstration" was planned. Even if, by some stretch of the imagination, the police could justify not telling the demonstrators that a potentially dangerous situation was brewing, their failure to alert the innocent families in Morningside is inexcusable. The police decision to allow the confrontation to occur is clearly racist — most observers doubt it would have happened if the march had been scheduled to weave its way through a white residential section.

NOVEMBER 3

2 Racists from across North Carolina began gathering at a small house on Randleman Road south of Greensboro at about four a.m. Dawson had persuaded his old friend Brent Fletcher to allow the use of his home as a rendezvous point for the caravan. It was marked with a Confederate flag. According to Dawson, the group sat around drinking and talking, "small talk, old-time talk, Klan stuff," and "showing off guns" including a shotgun and a .357 Magnum. About 4:30 a.m., Dawson went home to get some sleep.

From 5:45 to seven a.m., according to the police report, Sergeant W.D. Comer met with each of the oncoming first-shift patrol squads to inform them that he would be coordinating

activities for the anti-Klan march. He told them the march was scheduled to form at 11 a.m. and begin at 12 noon, and he said that two tactical squads — 17 officers — had been assigned to the march. And, the police report says, "The officers were further advised to have their riot gear available if they were needed for assistance other than traffic control."

Dawson says he got up at about seven a.m. and called Detective Jerry Cooper, his long-time police department contact. "I told him how many people were over at the house, and what was there — they had a couple of guns. . . . I was just supposed to be their source on how many people and if they had guns. So I said, 'I doubt if I'll be able to contact you again or call you.' So he [Cooper] gave me the number of his car, so if I could get away . . . I could contact him in his car."

Then Dawson returned to the house on Randleman Road. And, at about 8:30, he did manage to slip away again and telephone Cooper. The message

Police-Klan Strategies

In his interview with us, Ed Dawson talked about an earlier confrontation between the Klan and "communists" which reveals his close relationship with the police, their influence over Klan strategy, and control of how a confrontation develops. Ed Dawson:

It was like this: any time I brought the Klan up here [Greensboro], I would go to the police department. Nine times out of 10 you had to get a permit, regardless. This is being an informant, to a certain extent. You have to tell them how many, who's the leader, who's in charge and this, that and the other thing. You have to tell them all this and then get the permit approved by the city manager. And I'd go back and tell the Klan they told me this, that and whatever.

So when we were going over there to K-Mart that day, I went downtown and spoke with Lieutenant Forbes. I said, "We're having nine men over here Saturday and we're going over to K-Mart and

push the communists [U.S. Labor Party] around a little bit. Disrupt their program." And he said, "I'll tell you one thing. If you touch one of them you'll be arrested. I'm going to have that place covered with men, and if you do anything out of the way, you'll be arrested."

Okay. So the Klan comes up that Saturday morning and I said, "Empty your pockets. I don't want no knives, no guns, no weapons." And I told them Lieutenant Forbes said so-and-so, I explained it to them. I didn't hide nothing from them.

And when we got there the place was infested — the police were there, the FBI was there, SBI was there. Lieutenant Forbes was there. But the communists were not there yet.

When Marion Porter and the gang arrived there in the parking lot, they got out and put their sandwich signs on. Then they looked down there — at me and the Klan — and they took their sandwich signs off and went about their business.



"There was 12 to 14 people at the house and they had guns, *everybody had a gun.*" (emphasis added)

At 10 a.m., Detective Cooper briefed the police commanders and tactical squads that an "undetermined number of Klan members" were assembling at the house on Randleman Road and that some of them had "handguns." The officers were told that the Klan planned to heckle the marchers along the parade route and throw eggs at them and that, if a confrontation occurred, it would come at the end of the parade. After receiving their location assignments, the tactical units were given permission to go to lunch and instructed to be at their posts by 11:30 a.m. — a half hour before the march's scheduled beginning.

Included in the briefing session were Detective Jerry Cooper; Lieutenant P.W. Spoon, officer in command of District II (the Morningside area); Lieutenant S. Daughtry, field commander, tactical section; Maurice A. Cawn, police attorney; Sergeant Tracy L. Burke, supervisor, Tactical Squad A; Sergeant J.L. Hightower, supervisor, Tactical Squad B; and 15 officers assigned to the two tactical squads. The officer assigned "primary responsibility" for escorting the anti-Klan march and rally, Sergeant W.D. Comer, was *not* present at this briefing. There is no indication in the police report that Comer was told that armed counter-demonstrators were mobilizing south of Greensboro.

The police have never revealed what, if any, plan they had to thwart the caravan's disruption of the parade. Nor have they explained how they reached the conclusion that the confrontation would not occur until the end of the march — it is inconceivable that black and white anti-Klan marchers on a three-mile trek through predominantly black neighborhoods would not defend themselves against egg-throwing counter-demonstrators. How the police knew about an egg-throwing assault is also a mystery. Dawson claims he did not know such a plan existed, only that he "expected" a "fist fight" to break out, probably at the end of the march: "There would have been a couple of heads bashed in. . . . A broken arm, broken leg. Oh yeah, I figured there'd be a fight. *I told them.*"

As the morning unfolded, the failure of the police to incorporate information they possessed into a



THE WAY IT HAPPENED

Based on interviews with eyewitnesses, courtroom testimony and the videotapes, Patricia MacKay reconstructed a narrative of the November 3 confrontation. We present it here with a sample of what the cameras recorded that day.

The CWP demonstrators had just finished singing and were beginning to get picket signs out of a small pickup truck which was parked at the intersection of Everitt and Carver. It's a very small intersection — the streets are like alleys, hardly wide enough for two cars.

Some of the demonstrators had gotten signs out of the back of the pickup and were preparing to assemble when the nine-car caravan came down the street.

Raeferd Caudle, the Nazi from Winston-Salem who owned the blue Ford Fairlane, rolled down the window of the car he was in and yelled, "Remember China Grove!" Other Klansmen and Nazis yelled, "Kike!" and "Nigger!"



photo by Morganton News-Herald

Ed Dawson and Virgil Griffin are attacked after their "street walk" in Morganton, North Carolina, in November, 1975.

If one cop had been there"

Ed Dawson told about a 1975 Klan march in Morganton, North Carolina, during which police pulled back as a confrontation between blacks and whites developed:

I knew that my job [as an FBI informant] was not to incite; it was to keep everything low profile, more or less. Morganton's a quiet place — typical Saturday afternoon up there; 30 or 40 blacks downtown, 50 or 70 white people shopping. We got there at 12 o'clock or whatever, and there was 15 of us gonna walk up and down the streets. So Virgil [Griffin] and I walked the course. The cops were there, everything was fine. We were gonna walk the street, go up to the courthouse and make a speech. And there was maybe a dozen cops up at the courthouse and two or three in town along the street.

Well, we went to the five-and-dime to have coffee, and when we come out, God Almighty, there's 150 blacks there! So we're walking back — I'm in my uniform but Virgil wasn't in his robe — walking back there to where we were gonna start through all these blacks. And by the time we started the street walk, there was 300 to 400 blacks. So somebody says, "What are we gonna do?" And I said, "We

came here to march. Let's march."

So I picked the people. Like there was an older fellow there and I told him, "You can't go." And the women couldn't go. I told them to walk down the other side of the street and we'd go down the middle of the street, single file, staying about four feet in back of one another.

So we started our street walk, pushed our way through. And there wasn't a cop around, not a cop. They disappeared completely.

We headed on to the courthouse, and this black runs up to me — I was in the rear cause when you're in the rear you can look at the reflection in store windows and see what's going on around you. So crossing the street there, this young black comes running up to me and grabs me by the arm there. I didn't know if she stabbed me or what. It happened so fast, I just cold-cocked her and she went flying down the damn street. And I was surrounded by blacks yelling at me, "You hit that woman."

We got down to the courthouse — still no cops, not a cop around — and the Grand Dragon from New Jersey was there along with the Grand Dragon of South Carolina. We couldn't talk because the blacks just screamed and jeered. There were some white people to one

side, and the blacks were over here. So I just walked over to the white people and said, "We're going to have to call this off. These cannibals are acting up, it's a bad time of year for em. You come to the next one."

Well, on the way back to the cars this black comes up to Virgil Griffin with a stick and hits him over the head with it and knocks his helmet off. So he turns around and cold-cocks her. Then all hell broke loose.

We were between the cars — that's what saved our backsides, I think. But Virgil wanted to get out in the street there and fight, so I grabbed him and threw him across the car and was holding him down.

Maybe three minutes went by and then three carloads of cops came from behind the bank and stopped in the middle of the street. And cops and detectives and SBI agents and all jumped out of the cars and pushed the blacks back and got us out of there.

The moral to that is. . . Well, there wasn't a cop, not a cop earlier. Now we're jumping all the way to November 3 — just one cop, if one cop had been there, that's all. We would have just driven on through. Same with that in Morganton. If there had been cops there, that never would have happened.




strategy for defusing possible violence became all too apparent. Other law enforcement officials interviewed have noted that the half-hour lead time for the tactical units is a far from cautious approach to what was shaping up as a head-on collision between armed racists and militant anti-racists.

While the tactical units ate lunch, Detective Cooper and the regular officers of District II began taking their positions. At 11 a.m., Sergeant Comer radioed Lieutenant Spoon, who was in command of the entire operation, that he had again tried to talk with some of the 40 to 50 demonstrators gathering at the Windsor Community Center, but they were "very hostile towards the police ... no one would talk to us." Comer decided to station himself and the other patrol car assigned to escort the march near Windsor — even though he knew the parade permit said the march would begin in Morningside Homes eight blocks away. Press reports and CWP posters had designated Windsor as the starting point — at 11 a.m. — but as television crews, reporters and CWP members gathering there left to assemble at Morningside, one wonders why an alert police officer didn't unravel the confusion surrounding the two starting points.

Remarkably, the two tactical squads assigned "to provide surveillance of the marchers" were of no help to Comer or anybody else; they were still eating lunch 23 minutes later when the shooting began.

The list of officers out of action on November 3 should perhaps begin at the top with the commander of District II, Captain T.A. Hampton. He had a previously scheduled noon meeting and had turned command for the day over to Lieutenant Spoon. For no explained reason, Spoon was out of radio contact from his 11:00 conversation with Comer until 11:14, when he was called back inside police headquarters to discuss a phone call from the pastor of All Nations Church. Spoon did not return to radio contact until 11:21 — only 45 seconds before the caravan reached the CWP demonstrators.

In an effort to explain the absence of a commanding officer during the crucial period, the Police Department's Administrative Report emphasizes that the minister's call "was very significant because of the intelligence information



The first seven cars of the caravan drove through the intersection and eventually stopped. The blue Ford and yellow van stopped 10 or 20 feet before the intersection, and the demonstrators didn't even notice them. You could see on the film that they were all looking toward the first part of the caravan which had driven past them; several of them were laughing and joking with each other. It obviously hadn't dawned on them even then that there might be real trouble.

A few demonstrators near the front of the caravan began chanting, "Death, Death, Death to the Klan." There was more yelling back and forth. One of the TV cameras filmed the fellow who later fired the first shot as he was loading his gun in his lap, or at least you can see him on the film looking down, working on something in his lap.

Then one of the demonstrators hit a car with a stick. Virgil Griffin's car. There was shouting and some of the Klan in the front of the caravan stopped, got out of their cars and started toward the demonstrators. And then Mark Sherer, the one filmed loading his gun, leaned out of the window of the third car, pointed his gun in the air, and fired a shot with black gun powder. It's unheard of to use black gun powder; it's messy and old-fashioned. But you can see the black smoke for quite a distance. That's one reason for thinking it was a signal shot.

received by 613 [Cooper] earlier in the day that if trouble developed, it would likely be at the termination point of the march. . . . A new location at which to hold the planned rally at the end of the march would now have to be located." Spoon was working on this matter when he returned to his squad car radio. Whether or not this explanation holds up — and Ed Dawson knew about the new conference site before November 3 — it still does not explain how Lieutenant Spoon and his partner for the day, police attorney M.A. Cawn, remained uninformed of the fact that by 11:14 a Klan/Nazi caravan had formed and was headed toward the CWP march. It certainly was not because the caravan went unnoticed.

According to Dawson, the group left Randleman Road about 11:05. As he tells it, "We went outside then and everyone was standing around . . . and I said, 'If we're going, let's go. If we're not, let's go home.' And someone says, 'Who's in charge here?' And I looked at Virgil, and Virgil looked at me. . . . So Virgil points at me and says, 'I guess he is.' So I said okay.

"Well, I was going to ride with [James] Buck in his truck . . . So I said, 'Who's got a CB?' Okay, so we lead off and the car about halfway back has a CB. And the van replies that they have a CB, so I said, 'Good, why don't you bring up the back?' So that's how the hell the van got in the back. And I went back to the van and there were six or seven guys in there, but I didn't see no guns at all."

"So we started off and finally got down to the ramp at I-85 and 220, and I was talking on the C.B., 'KKK. Everything okay?' But the van hollered, 'Can you hold it up? The Fairlane from Winston just went by. He's lost apparently, he didn't see the cars on the ramp.' So we all got out on the ramp there. *I could see [Detective] Cooper's car just parked there on the overpass. He was watching us.*"

At 11:06 Cooper tried to radio the unavailable Spoon and then asked for Lieutenant Daughtry, the field commander of the tactical section. He was told Daughtry was still in the office, so Cooper reported to Sergeant Burke of the tactical unit: "Okay, you got eight vehicles parked and loaded on the ramp from *down where we went this morning*. They're on the ramp off 85 and 220. It looks like 30 or 35 people. . . . They're just sitting on the ramp

there waiting, all in the vehicles. So we're gonna stand by here and kind of monitor them, see what they do."

At 11:13 Cooper radioed Burke again: "We're rolling now, headed that direction from this location. There's a total now of nine vehicles."

The ninth vehicle, which the caravan had been waiting for, was Raeford Caudle's blue Ford Fairlane, driven by Jack Fowler. Among the weapons in its trunk were the AR-180 semi-automatic rifle with which Fowler later wounded Mike Nathan, the .357 Magnum pistol with which Jerry Smith killed Cesar Cauce, and several shotguns. Although the Fairlane was the last car to arrive at the caravan assembly point, Fowler positioned it in the second-to-last slot, in front of the yellow van in which Smith, Matthews, Wood and the others later charged with murder were riding.

At 11:16 Cooper finally reached Lieutenant Daughtry and advised him of the Klan/Nazi caravan's location: "On [U.S.] 29 now, approaching Florida Street."

At 11:16, as the Klan/Nazi caravan was moving closer, Daughtry radioed to Burke, "Tracy, are y'all in position?" To which Burke replied: "Not really. We can start that way, most of us jumped out to get a sandwich or something."

By this time, most of the CWP people were at Morningside Homes, at the Everitt/Carver intersection site of the march kick-off. They were singing freedom songs and clapping. There were lots of children, some of them in CWP "Youth Corps" uniforms, and they were poking and punching at an effigy of a white-robed Klansman while the adults were passing out literature and putting posters on a flat-bed truck where their microphones and amplifiers were.

WFMY-TV news photographer Jim Waters and CWP member Dori Blitz told us of seeing two marked police cars at the intersection of Everitt and Dunbar, two blocks east of the rally site, approximately 10 minutes before the Klan/Nazi caravan arrived. According to an anonymous source who was monitoring a police radio scanner that morning, the patrol units were investigating a minor traffic accident as the caravan drove toward Morningside. Rather than being instructed to stay on the scene in case of a confrontation, the officers were ordered via radio to *clear the area*.

The police transcripts of the radio conversations between officers assigned to duty are very precise as to what the police were doing during these crucial minutes before the Klan/Nazi caravan arrived at the CWP gathering.

11:17:45: Cooper to Daughtry: "Just made the turn onto Lee Street." (This placed the caravan at about a half-mile east of Windsor Center and about the same distance southwest of the corner of Everitt and Carver.)

11:18:57: Cooper: "Turning on Willow Road now." (Any possible police confusion as to where the caravan was headed should now have been cleared up, because Willow Road leads away from Windsor Center and onto Everitt Street.)

11:19:28: Daughtry to Burke: "Let's hustle on in and get in those positions because they're moving before we anticipated." Burke: "We're on the way."

11:20:14: Cooper to Daughtry: "Part of them should be there by now almost."

11:20:31: Daughtry to the operator: "See if you can raise 202 [Lieutenant Spoon]."

11:20:41: F-3: "No contact."

11:20:52: Cooper to Daughtry: "They're parking up on Everitt Street at Willow Road." (This is about two blocks from the corner of Everitt and Carver.)

11:21:09: Daughtry finally made radio contact with Spoon. He said, "You been copying the traffic of 613 [Cooper]?"

Spoon: "Negative, I've been on the phone. I need to get with you. Another thing just popped up you need to be aware of." (Spoon was referring to the conversation with Reverend Johnson about the CWP's use of his church.) Spoon asked Daughtry for his location, which was at the corner of Washington and Benbow, about two blocks from Windsor Center. "Meet me there about the old train station," Spoon said. Daughtry agreed to do this despite the fact that the train station is about a half-mile west of Windsor and more than a mile west of Everitt and Willow where he knew the caravan had stopped. Although Daughtry knew Spoon was unaware of the caravan's progress, he made no attempt to inform him of the situation.

11:22:02: Cooper to Daughtry: "They're now at the formation point." Spoon to Cooper: "What traffic you got going?" Cooper: "OK, we got

about nine or 10 cars on the opposite side has now arrived at the formation point for the parade and it appears as though they're heckling at this time, driving on by, uh, they're definitely creating attention and some of the parade members are, uh, [break in transmission] ... 10-4, they're scattering, stand by one."

There is an unexplained 32-second pause. Then:

11:23.10: Cooper: "We've got a 10-10 [fight in progress] down here, you better get some units in here."

Note that "here," "the formation point" and Cooper's previous vague references to the Everitt/Carver intersection left other officers still confused about where to go.

Spoon to Daughtry: "Your people in position over there?" Daughtry: "10-4."

11:23.27: Cooper: "Shots fired, sounds like..."

11:23.31: Spoon: "Move the [District II] cars into the area." Daughtry to Burke: "Move in." Burke: "On the way... Come on, Gary."

11:23.41: F-3 operator to Spoon: "Can you advise for F-1 where you want the [District II] cars?" Spoon: "Move them into the area... should be there at Windsor Community Center." (emphasis added)

11:23.47: Cooper: "Heavy gunfire."




Spoon: "Pull all available cars in the city to the area of... the Windsor Community Center. Don't all come to the area, I'll advise further when I arrive on the scene."

11:23.50: F-1 operator to three District II units: "Everitt and Carver, move into the area, have a 10-10, possible shots fired, just move into the area and stand by." (F-1 had apparently been monitoring Cooper and knew the location of the fight.)

11:24.14: Comer: "It's not at Windsor, I think they're at Everitt and Carver where... the Tact units are at. We're with the group at Windsor, no problem."

11:24.29: Cooper: "Most of the fire is coming from the yellow van, coming from the yellow van, they're now leaving the scene."

For the next 37 seconds, the F-3 channel was interrupted by phone calls from residents in the area asking for police assistance. However, the F-1 operator continued to instruct police units into the area of Everitt and Carver and to switch their receivers to F-3 for



The people began to scatter, of course, when they heard this shot. But the defendants and several others who were in the two vehicles on the other side of the intersection then got out and grabbed picket sticks from the back of the CWP's pickup truck, which was open. They claimed in court testimony that they were coming to the aid of several women riding in Griffin's car — but they never got near that car.

Jim Waller, Cesar Cauce and Mike Nathan remained at the intersection, apparently trying to defend the people behind and to the north of them who were trying to flee. All three of them were unarmed. But the Nazis and Klansmen grabbed the sticks and began assaulting demonstrators with them. One of them hit Sandi Smith so hard that the pathologist testified her skull had "nearly separated" from the brain stem.

information. But by the time the police arrived, the shooting was over. Detective Cooper, who reported the shots, apparently made no attempt to stop the gunfire or to apprehend any fleeing vehicles. Another police unit did arrive in time to capture the yellow van, and reported its capture on the radio at 11:25.27. Almost two minutes later, at 11:27.19 — four minutes after Cooper first reported shots — an order finally went out to seal off the Carver/Everitt area. By that time, all the other cars had gotten away.

The shooting lasted only 88 seconds. Cesar Cauce, Sandi Smith and Jim Waller were dead. Bill Sampson died a few minutes later. Mike Nathan was sprawled on his back with blood gushing out of his face. He was still alive but he would not survive the wound. He died in the hospital two days later.

THE RESPONSE

3 The initial reaction in Greensboro was shock and outrage; the Sunday morning newspapers were filled with descriptions of the shootings and with unanswered questions about how it all happened. But, almost immediately, the fact of the five murders, the deaths of five human beings, began to be obscured, as the victims' ideology and tactics — rather than the actions of the Klan, Nazis or police — increasingly became the main objects of public scrutiny.

The most nearly neutral, "objective" headlines appeared the first few days afterwards, before the "official response" solidified. Most of these headlines attacked both the CWP/WVO and the Klan, but did at least call the Klan the attacker — though one, in anticipation of the eventual official view, referred to a "shootout" between Klansmen and communists. A reading of the Greensboro papers of November 4 and 6 would also have led one to believe the police had been less than thorough in their attempts to prevent the murders. Questions about the police were raised in the first few days, notably in a November 6 editorial in the *Greensboro Record*. But these

questions, still unanswered, disappeared as the media became preoccupied with the latest in a stream of official explanations which trickled forth from police headquarters.

Each new police statement seemed to divert the press further away from questions of police irresponsibility or complicity by raising such side issues as the legal right of the Klan to possession of the parade permit, the CWP's motives in setting conflicting starting times and places for its march, CWP hostility toward the idea of police escorts, the change of conference sites, and the history of CWP/WVO action against the Klan.

By November 6, the Greensboro papers had begun to follow the lead of the Police Department by soft-pedaling the motives of the Klan and attributing the violence to the communist victims. There were "in-depth" explanatory articles about the revolutionary ideology of the victims headlined "WVO 'Targeted' Cone, Other Mills for Infiltration" and "They All Hate Each Other," Professor Says of Leftists." There were no parallel articles exploring the racist ideology of the Klan or the Nazis, but there were two articles — headlined "Wife Says Couple Joined Klan Group in Ignorance" and "Nephew's Radical Bent Surprises Lincoln Deputy" — that portrayed two of the arrested Klansmen as naive dupes who didn't know what they were getting into.

In the next few days, the attacks on the CWP/WVO for causing trouble intensified, and the Klan was described as no longer opposing blacks, just communists. A headline reported that a young Nazi was there solely because "It was just something to do." On the other hand, a story based on an unnamed co-worker of a CWP victim said the communists were there because they "needed a martyr" and had "a plan" to accomplish that goal.

Ironically, as the press narrowed its search for causes behind the killings, it simultaneously sought to absolve the city of Greensboro from any responsibility for the violence. Greensboro mayor Jim Melvin led the way, personally telephoning reporters to promote the official interpretation that the killings were "an isolated incident involving mostly outsiders."

On November 5 the *Greensboro Record* carried a front-page article headlined "Why was this city picked for battleground?" Its lead paragraph

stated a theme that was repeated over and over in coming months: "In the aftermath of a mind-boggling tragedy that has focused unwanted world attention on the city, Greensboro is asking itself 'why us?'" The article quoted CWP leader Nelson Johnson's observation, "This is my hometown, man. We [many of his fellow party members] live here. Greensboro is no different from any other town." But the article projected a picture of a town where leftist activists were unwanted and unneeded. As the writer put it, "What will the incident do to the image of the city, which has generally been regarded as a progressive, even liberal Southern community?"

The Greensboro newspapers' fundamental assumption that racial tensions don't exist in Greensboro is an attitude that has held sway for 20 years, as Bill Chafe documents thoroughly in his book on the city, *Civilities and Civil Rights*. After the killings, the papers perpetuated the city's self-deception by printing numerous editorials from around the country which praised Greensboro racial relations. Some blamed the violence on the Klan, others blamed both the Klan and the communists, but all reinforced Greensboro's self-concept as a victim of outsiders and extremists.


Those community groups which sought to focus attention on the tragedy saw their efforts frustrated at every turn. Some groups wanted to condemn racist violence and police complicity; others expressed a need to organize within the Greensboro community to prevent similar occurrences in the future; still others merely wanted to declare publicly their outrage at the Klan's cold-blooded murder of other human beings. But all met with disdain from the press and resistance from city officials. Instead of ensuring that protests were safe and orderly, officials chose to scare off potential demonstrators with repeated warnings of impending violence, constant publicity about mobilizing more police or national guard troops, speculation on the need for medical services, jails and magistrates and so forth.

In mid-November, the Police Department's Administrative Report reiterated its explanations and added some new excuses, such as "There was insufficient probable cause to stop and/or arrest the members of the

caravan." The report concluded that "the police officers assigned to the march performed their duty in a professional and reasonable manner," and again it focused on the hostility and "confusion created by" the communist demonstrators to explain the delayed response to what it called "the Worker's Viewpoint Organization-Klan confrontation." The implication that the CWP/WVO took the lead role in the confrontation pervades the report from the first sentence on; several pages are devoted to leaflets, letters and quotes from the CWP to document how it "had been in conflict with the Klan prior to the shooting incident." Yet the report did not include a single Nazi or Klan leaflet; no evidence of Klan/Nazi planning for the rally was included, nor did it mention or reproduce the KKK posters Ed Dawson tells of tacking over CWP posters (a figure hanging from a noose and the slogan "It's time for some old-fashioned justice"), nor did it include the threatening letter sent by Nazi leader Harold Covington to Cindy Hopkins of the RCP.

Even the local and state Human Relations Commissions adopted similar attitudes. Rather than facilitate a peaceful airing of grievances, they discouraged the need for citizen involvement and acted as public relations agents for the city and state. On November 16, Jerry Drayton, chair of the city's Human Relations Council, sent a one-and-a-half-page memo to his council members that described the events of November 3 as "a shooting" in which Klansmen were "reacting to Communist challenges to a confrontation" and which resulted from their cars' having been "attacked by marchers with heavy sticks."

Although Drayton acknowledged in his memo that blacks were "dissatisfied with the performance of the police," he explored neither the police nor the Klan/Nazi roles on November 3. The Nazis are not even mentioned in his report. The HRC's subsequent memo, dated November 19, to the North Carolina Department of Administration, explains how the council had acted to thwart participation of Greensboro college students in the funeral march held by the CWP on November 11. Students from N.C. A&T State University were advised their campus would be protected and that "if they were going to participate,



About 20 seconds after the first shot was fired, Brent Fletcher fired a shotgun into the air from his car window. People were running everywhere — into houses, apartments, everywhere. The camera crews retreated to the other side of the street. It was during this period that two shots were fired from the area of the stick fight, the intersection. These were the "pistol" shots whose source the FBI analysis couldn't positively identify. The jury ultimately decided they came from the CWP and that they were the first "hostile" shots — shots 3 and 4.

After shot 4, Jim Waller tried to grab a gun from the back of the pickup, and Klansman Roy Toney wrestled it away from him. Although the FBI analysis was not able to identify shot number 5 either, other evidence and testimony indicated that Toney fired the gun after he got it away from Waller.

After shot 5, the first seven cars loaded up and began to take off. Within 30 seconds, they were all out of the area. In the film, you can see Cesar Cauce standing beside the pickup with a stick in his hand — just standing there. Meanwhile, the other Nazis and Klansmen went back to the blue Ford, opened the trunk and pulled out their weapons. Twelve seconds after shot 5 was fired, Nazi Wayne Wood began firing birdshot at the demonstrators. The FBI identified shot number 6 as coming from Wood's gun.

they should know with whom they were affiliated." The memo carefully notes that the HRC staff did not tell the students whether or not to join the funeral procession. But, according to student leaders, the focus on violence and communism was a clear warning that marchers would be risking their lives if they participated.

The memo dismisses the occurrence of anti-Klan demonstrations in other cities around the nation as a strategy of "far-left groups seeking to exploit the issue of right-wing extremism in order to strengthen the forces of left-wing extremism." These demonstrations are characterized as violent, with the police suffering the majority of injuries as they attempted to keep Klan marchers separate from communist counter-demonstrators. "Few of the violent counter demonstrations [sic] have been ordinary citizens," the memo says. It then lists six communist or communist-affiliated groups as the dominant anti-Klan forces and ignores the leadership of respected civil-rights organizations such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organizations (IFCO) and Jewish groups like the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

While an Anti-Defamation League analysis of Klan membership is included in the report, it lists only factors like average age, education level, income and estimated numbers in various Klan factions across the country. There is no breakdown for North Carolina and, more importantly, no acknowledgement of Klan violence. And, once again, the Nazis are ignored entirely.

The only reference to the Klan as a less-than-desirable presence in North Carolina comes in a suggestion that the State Bureau of Investigation be called upon to monitor the group's actions in light of the increased possibility that Klan factions would move into Greensboro as a result of the "notoriety given the incident [the CWP murders] by the media." North Carolinians might be drawn to the Klan, the memo says, "because it will be perceived that they were fighting the communists and not necessarily blacks and Jews."

By continually projecting the image of outsiders, professional leftists and communist agitators, the HRC followed the official pattern of obscuring Greensboro's indigenous racism and

legitimate concern for its elimination. One sentence in particular sums up the distortion promoted by public officials and the HRC: "Again, the police and the citizens of the community in which this incident occurred were the victims."

There was *one* public agency that tried to conduct an impartial investigation into the impact of the murders and the adequacy of the city's response. In mid-December, Bobby Doctor, regional director of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, came to Greensboro to meet with North Carolina's representatives to the commission. At a news conference following the meeting, Doctor commented that race relations in the city had "gone into a tailspin" since the shootings. "I don't think five people can be shot down in the streets and you can just walk away from it," he said.

According to the *Greensboro Daily News*, Doctor "repeatedly pressed the committee to focus its investigation on relations between the police department and the community [and] charged police are influenced by racism in hiring and deciding how to cover demonstrations.

And, Doctor said, "If the ['Death to the Klan'] march had been scheduled in a white community, I can't help but feel there would have been a stronger police response."

The *Daily News* seemed to spearhead an attack on Doctor's analysis of the situation: "Doctor later admitted that he was unaware that the commander of police forces assigned to the November 3 march is a black." Apparently, neither the *Daily News* nor any public official bothered to inform Doctor that the black commander, Captain Hampton, had been relieved of official duty on November 3. And even if a black officer had been in charge, that would not absolve the police department of responsibility to protect the marchers and the residents.

Although Doctor stated that his comments were based on information from commission staff interviews with Greensboro residents and statements made to the commission by James Wright, director of the Greensboro Human Relations Commission, and George Simpkins, president of the local NAACP chapter, the *Daily News* capitalized on the fact that Doctor had attended an IFCO meeting in Atlanta at which CWP members were present. The city responded by filing

a complaint through Congressman Richardson Preyer's office officially charging Doctor with making "improper" and "irresponsible" statements. In a news conference announcing the city's action, Mayor Jim Melvin charged that Doctor had not "bothered to talk to any person in Greensboro other than representatives of the Communist Workers Party and others attending the conference in Atlanta last weekend."

Once again public attention had been manipulated away from the question of police behavior on November 3. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights eventually upheld Doctor's analysis of the situation, but by that time his credibility as well as the commission's had been destroyed in Greensboro. It seems ironic, to say the least, that city officials could orchestrate such a sophisticated subversion of public scrutiny into the events leading up to and following the shootings when, on November 3, they didn't have the presence of mind to order a police escort of the Klan/Nazi caravan into Morningside Homes.

Considerable evidence indicates another federal agency immeasurably assisted the city's response. Agents from the U.S. Justice Department's Community Relations Service (CRS) apparently arrived in Greensboro within 24 hours of the killings to help coordinate a "cool out" response. Under their guidance, officials publicly interpreted the incident as a "gun battle," "shoot-out" and "showdown" between two extremist organizations from outside Greensboro. The city had no cause for alarm, except to prepare for opportunists that would seek to exacerbate tensions for their own gains. By spreading rumors through the press and via contacts in the liberal community, the agents created an atmosphere of suspicion which fragmented a coherent, united community response and portrayed anyone willing to speak out as a possible CWP agent, communist sympathizer or pawn of outside leftists, who did indeed flock to the city to "lead" the protest effort.






The CRS succeeded in instilling such fear in Greensboro that a memorial service planned for November 18 by a group of black ministers and other respected citizens was abruptly canceled. The ministers had envisioned their service, and a rally planned to follow, as a positive alternative to the

CWP funeral march. While the November 3 killings shocked and grieved the ministers, they — like many other human-rights advocates — strongly opposed the CWP's provocative rhetoric, disruptive actions and insistence on bearing arms during the funeral march. No sooner was the service announced, however, than one of the ministers was threatened; others were warned about impending violence and shown secret government files on alleged "communists" who were helping to organize the rally.

The Community Relations Service's orchestration of this campaign of intimidation is documented in Pat Bryant's article, "Justice vs. the Movement," in the Summer, 1980, issue of *Southern Exposure*. Bryant also documents how the CRS tried to abort a subsequent march and rally sponsored by the National Anti-Klan Network on February 2, 1980. That demonstration was planned as a massive protest of the killings and as a commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the Greensboro sit-ins, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that the coalition planning it succeeded. Official interference included an attempt to block the coalition's use of the city coliseum on February 2, an attempt which was not abandoned until coalition lawyers filed suit against the city.

Under the direction of the CRS, law enforcement officials around the state met with student leaders to discourage them from getting involved. Although the sponsoring coalition, the February 2 Mobilization Committee, had made a firm decision to hold a nonviolent march with all participants unarmed, State Bureau of Investigation officials visited campuses around the state and warned student groups that bloodshed was nearly inevitable.

Delaney Wilson of North Carolina Central University, for example, was told by SBI agents that bombs or other explosives might be used and that, in the event of communist-incited violence during the march, the police and National Guard would be stationed all along the parade route with their rifles aimed directly at the marchers. Wilson and the NCCU students were not intimidated, but shortly before February 2 the bus company they had hired to transport them from Durham to Greensboro canceled their contract. Wilson was told that the company feared its buses



Shots 7 and 8 were fired by Jerry Paul Smith, with the .357 magnum pistol, as he was running down the sidewalk toward Cesar Cauce.

Wood then fired two more shots — numbers 9 and 10. By this time, nine people had been wounded, including Jim Waller, who was then killed by shot number 11, the first shot fired by David Wayne Matthews.

Shot number 12 was the first shot positively identified by the FBI as coming from a CWP gun. Dorl Blitz, who was standing near where Waller died, fired a pistol at the assailants.

The next shot was another blast from Wood's gun, then Blitz fired shot 14 at Jerry Smith who was drawing a bead on Cauce as he scrambled on his hands and knees near the rear of the truck. Smith fired shot 15 at Cauce, and Blitz fired three shots at Smith. Cauce was fatally wounded by shot 19.

In testimony, Wood claimed that he was shooting at three "niggers with shotguns" who were shooting at him from the community center. However, the FBI analysis identified shot number 21 as the first shot to come from the community center, probably fired by Rand Manzella or Bill Sampson, and this shot was not fired until 15 seconds after Wood fired his final shot (number 13).

would be bombed. The students made arrangements with another bus company and participated in the march. But Wilson found, in discussion with other student participants, that all had been warned by SBI or other agents that they might be bombed or shot at or, at a minimum, identified as communist sympathizers.

Not until May, 1980, did any official or quasi-official city agency question the action of the police on November 3. And even that criticism, from the mayor's blue-ribbon Greensboro Citizens Review Committee, was superficial at best. "At least 17 minutes passed during which the Police Department could have dispatched cars to surround and accompany the caravan," the committee's report pointed out. The committee also criticized the police for lying in early statements regarding the extent of their knowledge of the Klan/Nazi caravan, but it did not investigate inconsistencies in the police report itself.

When asked why the committee didn't conduct a more thorough hearing into the Police Department's role on November 3, a committee member who asked to remain unidentified said, "You have to understand that the people serving on this committee were essentially volunteers. We all had to work at our regular jobs during the day, and then we had these meetings from seven to 10 or 11 at night. There was no staff to work with us, and there's only so much you can do without any staff.

"There was a lot of information that simply wasn't available to us. We didn't have subpoena power, so we had to rely on people's voluntary statements and on information which was already a matter of public record. Also, the people who testified before the committee were not under oath — we had no way of knowing whether or not they were telling the truth. Do you want to know what I learned from all this? Never to participate in such a group again. Not without staff and other resources. You just can't conduct a proper inquiry in your spare time."

At the time the jury selection began for the Klan/Nazi trial in June, 1980, the question of police complicity or negligence remained unexplored. Most of the Klan/Nazi defendants had been depicted in the press as good ole boys who were just in the wrong place

at the wrong time. The CWP victims had been depicted as violent communist revolutionaries who had been looking for trouble and martyrs. And the city of Greensboro had become the object of public sympathy.

THE TRIAL

4 From the beginning, District Attorney Michael Schlosser insisted that he would not allow the trial of the four Klansmen and two Nazis to become "political." But if the motives of those charged with first-degree murder were even going to be discussed, the prosecutor would necessarily have to explore the Klan and Nazi political beliefs. By rejecting that approach, Schlosser seemed to give away a big part of his case.

Schlosser's own political biases — he told the media shortly after the killings that the communists "got what they deserved" — understandably led the victims' widows to ask that a special prosecutor, an outsider, be appointed to conduct the case. But Schlosser, an elected official who acknowledged his constituents' growing anti-communist sentiments, denied the request without a hearing.

Many other questions remain about decisions Schlosser and the prosecuting team he headed made before going to trial. Since he is now a defendant in the CWP's civil suit arising from the killings, Schlosser cautiously sidesteps questions involving substantive aspects of the trial.

When asked why the prosecution decided not to pursue conspiracy charges against the defendants, each of whom had originally been charged with five counts of murder and one count of conspiracy, Schlosser responded that the law does not allow prosecution on two group charges. Since conspiracy and riot are both group charges, the defendants could not be indicted on both. But our question was not about conspiracy to riot, it was about conspiracy to murder. When asked to respond to the original question, Schlosser simply maintained, "There was no evidence of conspiracy to murder."

"What about conspiracy to assault?"

we asked. "Surely there was sufficient evidence to show that the defendants came to Greensboro with intent to assault the demonstrators — they brought guns." Schlosser's response: "The Klan always carries guns."

Why were conspiracy charges dismissed against Raeford Caudle, who brought several of the murder weapons to Greensboro? "He wasn't riding in the van with the assailants. He didn't shoot anybody."

Why were no charges brought against Virgil Griffin, who was clearly instrumental in organizing the caravan? "There is no evidence that any plans were made to attack the demonstrators."

Why were BATF agent Bernard Butkovich and police informer Ed Dawson never called to testify in the trial? "Both were subpoenaed, but the defense chose not to call them." Why didn't the prosecution call them? "Butkovich did not witness anything that would have helped us. Dawson's testimony wouldn't have helped us either."

But Dawson *did* know that an assault would occur — "A broken arm, a broken leg. Oh sure, a fight, I figured. *I told them*" — and court testimony indicated that Butkovich encouraged the Nazis to bring weapons November 3. Griffin organized the Klan caravan and coordinated plans with the Nazis who brought their weapons in Caudle's car. By dismissing the possibility of a planned assault with a flippant observation such as "The Klan always carries guns," Schlosser gave the defense attorneys the opening they needed: the claim of self-defense.

The decision to go for first-degree murder was particularly problematic, and several veteran criminal attorneys have said they knew the jury would return a not-guilty verdict as soon as they found out about the charge. "I tried to get some bets," recalls one attorney, "but no other attorneys would bet on a guilty verdict. First-degree murder carries the death penalty, so right there you exclude [from the jury] blacks, liberals and more educated people who are opposed to capital punishment. They are also not as frightened about communism and more aware of what groups like the Klan and Nazis stand for. They are precisely the kind of jurors you want in a trial like this. By excluding them on the capital punishment question,


the chances of conviction were nil."

Then, too, the prosecution tactics were limited by the decision to charge several CWP survivors with felony riot. If Schlosser hoped to prove later, in their trial, that the communists intentionally engaged in a riot which resulted in the death of five people, he could hardly present evidence now that the Klan/Nazis were solely or primarily responsible for the riot. Yet how could he hope for first-degree murder convictions without such evidence?

Meanwhile, all of the defendants were provided with free court-appointed legal counsel, though in some cases their claims of indigence were questionable. And for reasons never explained, the prosecution agreed to reschedule the trials of David Matthews and Wayne Wood, so all six first-degree murder defendants could be tried together. There were several advantages for the defense from this consolidation, explained John McConahay, a Duke University professor and recognized expert on jury selection.

"First," McConahay told us, "the more defendants you have, the more likely it is that jurors will become confused over which person did what. But more importantly, when you bring a whole bunch of people together for a trial, you have a pooling of peremptory challenges during jury selection which allows you to exclude more prospective jurors than if you had just one defendant on trial. Obviously, the more you are able to pick and choose, the better your jury will be."

McConahay stressed that the jury which was finally seated was the kind of jury prosecutors would want in a typical murder trial. "The system is very well-equipped to convict the usual defendant — someone who's poor, someone who's black, someone who's killed someone who's either not of major concern to the community or who is of major concern but in a positive way, like a police officer or the town's richest kid. But when you kill somebody who is unusual in a negative way — a gay or a black, even if it's a black school teacher, or a member of the Communist Workers Party — then the system isn't quite equipped to handle that. The normal kind of jurors who are likely to be conviction-prone then find themselves trying someone who has killed a 'bad' person, and they're conflicted about it."



Shots 22 and 23 were fired by Jack Fowler with the AR-180 semi-automatic rifle. The next shot was from the community center, and then Roy Toney fired the gun he had taken earlier from Jim Waller. Fowler fired the AR-180 twice more, wounding Mike Nathan as he was running to help Waller.

Toney fired shot 28, and it was either this shot or his earlier shot which critically wounded Paul Bermanzohn, who is now partially paralyzed with a shotgun pellet still in his brain. In the film, you can see Bermanzohn with a stick in his hand facing the armed Toney, who fires on him.

As shots 29 and 30 were fired from the community center, the Nazis and Klansmen began running back to their car and van. But David Wayne Matthews continued shooting. With shot number 31, he killed Mike Nathan. His next shot, 33, probably hit Sandi Smith as he fired toward the person at the center who fired shot 32. Another shot came from the community center, and Matthews fired back, fatally wounding Sampson, who reportedly fired shots 36 and 37 as he was falling.

Indeed, Schlosser allowed people to serve on the jury who admitted they held views such as "It's less of a crime to kill communists." Of those selected to serve, only one was college-educated. That juror, a Cuban refugee named Octavio Manduley, belonged to an organization characterized in the media simply as "an anti-Castro organization." In fact, the CIA-sponsored *20th of May Organization* conducted the bungled Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Manduley joined the group while he lived in Cuba, served on its board when he moved to Miami in 1960, and recruited and trained other anti-communist exiles for the invasion. He worked with the group until 1965 when he moved to Greensboro.

Manduley acknowledged during questioning that he had heard of the CWP, and he characterized it as a group that followed the same pattern as "any other communist organization. They need publicity and a martyr and they need to project that they have many more people than they certainly have." He said that he knew little about the Nazis or the KKK, except that they were "patriotic" groups.

Schlosser told the press he accepted Manduley because of his "honesty." He was later chosen foreman of the jury.

Jury selection ended on July 28. All 12 jurors and four alternates were white. In addition to Manduley, William A. Browning ("juror number seven," as he came to be known) stated during questioning by the defense that he felt "sympathy for anyone sitting on the defense side of the room." Browning reportedly remained aloof from the other jurors throughout the trial and deliberations, but when defense attorneys would win a point during examination of witnesses he would often smile and nod his head. When the prosecution questioned a witness or made statements to the jury, Browning would prop his chin in his left hand with the middle finger extending up along his cheek. "Somebody must have told him to clean up his act," one of the prosecutors commented as the trial neared its end. "Number seven isn't giving us the bird anymore." Although his behavior in the jury box was a topic of considerable conversation among reporters and others at the trial, no one apparently thought it was worth mentioning to Judge Long, who could not see "the bird" because

he sat to Browning's right. When the full jury was empaneled, the prosecutors had accepted two other jurors who said the CWP had instigated the confrontation and another who thought the Klan stood for "patriotism and the family." So, of the six men and six women seated on the jury, five expressed definite biases against the communists and/or in favor of the Klan or Nazis.

The prosecutors might have neutralized the anti-communist sentiment of the jury by emphasizing the humanity of the victims. In fact, the prosecutors took the opposite tack, referring to those gunned down as "the alleged victims" or "the communists." According to courtroom reporter, Patricia MacKay, "The prosecutor did nothing to humanize the victims. While the refusal of the CWP survivors to testify made it more difficult to mitigate the effects of the victims' communism, the prosecutors could have, but didn't, bring in friends or co-workers as character witnesses."

Schlosser and his partners also failed to raise legal objections when the defense attorneys intimated by their questioning that communism was the issue on trial. No objection was raised even when the defense red-baited witnesses put on the stand by the prosecution. "The defense would intimidate black witnesses, especially," said MacKay. "They'd ask, 'Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party? Have you attended a communist meeting? Have you ever read a communist leaflet?' Only one person refused to answer those kinds of questions."

By allowing defense attorneys to badger witnesses for the prosecution in this manner, the prosecutors left the jury with the impression that it is somehow illegal to associate with communists or to read their literature. The prosecutors thus damaged the credibility of their own witnesses by default and further escalated the jurors' anti-communist biases.

The bulk of the evidence for the prosecution, however, rested not on the testimony of eyewitnesses but on the news photographs and TV videotapes taken on November 3. The admission of films and photos was problematic; under present law, the only way the prosecutors could introduce them as substantive evidence was to convince the defense attorneys to agree, to stipulate, that the films

could be used in this way. In return for this stipulation, the prosecutors allowed the defense team to introduce an FBI sound analysis of the shooting — an analysis that traced all but three of the 39 shots fired on November 3 to specific weapons and the areas where the weapons were located.

Robert Cahoon, leader of the six-member defense team, commented, "As soon as we saw it [the FBI report], we figured it would clear us. That report dumbfounded the state, and bless their hearts, they were the ones who had it prepared." An unidentified juror confirmed Cahoon's statement: "The part that did play a greater impact on the verdict was the highly technical analysis of the firing — in the pinpointing of the shots. Without that, we never would have known there was anybody else doing anything except the Klan."

There are grave doubts about the accuracy of the FBI analysis, however. The three untraced shots — numbers 3, 4 and 5 — were identified only as "pistol" shots coming from the area of the stick fight at the intersection of Everitt and Carver. The jury attributed these shots to CWP demonstrators and, most significantly, considered them to be the first "hostile" shots fired, agreeing with the defense's arguments that the first two shots from Klan weapons were directed into the air.

At the time the FBI report said shots 3 and 4 were fired, the videotapes show the stick fight breaking up and demonstrators can be seen dragging a person to the front of the Channel 12 news car. That person is Frankie Powell, who was eight months pregnant at the time. Don Pelles, one of the demonstrators, told us, "I thought she was dying. She was bleeding severely from head wounds and had been hit in the back of her legs. All we could do was to try to get her under the car because they were still shooting. I was wounded in the legs and Tom Clark was wounded in the head as we were trying to get Frankie to safety."

Birdshot, not pistol bullets, caused Powell's, Clark's and Pelles's wounds. And only one person was seen with a shotgun in firing position at that time: Johnny Pridmore, Exalted Cyclops of the Lincoln County Klan. Pridmore claimed his gun jammed and he never fired a shot. Although WTVD photographer Ed Boyd testified that



he saw Pridmore shoot, and chemical tests were introduced to show that his gun had been fired, FBI firearms specialist Gerald Wilkes testified that only unspent shells from Pridmore's gun were found at the shooting scene. And since the FBI sound analysis did not trace shots 3 and 4 from Pridmore's gun, and the birdshot taken from the demonstrators' wounds was never analyzed or introduced as evidence, the jury chose to ignore the eyewitness and chemical evidence.

The refusal of CWP survivors to testify at the trial may have made a crucial difference in this aspect of the case. At least the jurors might have questioned whether the "mystery" shots came from the CWP if they had heard testimony from Powell and Pelles, which could be substantiated by the videotapes and the birdshot taken by doctors from their wounds.

The other major discrepancy in the FBI analysis concerns the number of shots fired by Jack Fowler, who was shooting the AR-180 semi-automatic rifle. Although nine spent shell casings from that gun were found on the street where Fowler was standing, the FBI analyst testified that only four shots were fired from the AR-180. Fowler claimed that the extra shell casings fell out of his pocket, but did not explain why he was carrying spent ammunition from a gun which belonged to someone else.

Demonstrator Allen Blitz, who was near the news people on the south side of Everitt Street, was attempting to shoot Fowler with a two-shot derringer as the Nazi was firing at people on the north side of the street. Although the small pistol jammed repeatedly, Blitz kept Fowler in his sight for at least 30 seconds and he insists that the rifle was fired "much more than a few times. He was pumping shots off — rapid fire," says Blitz, who finally got off one shot from the derringer as the assailants were returning to their cars.

It should also be pointed out that the sound analysis used by the FBI and uncontested by the prosecution is far from infallible. Professor Mark Weiss, who worked with the firm of Bolt, Barneck & Newman which developed the sound analysis methodology in work on the Kent State killings and Kennedy assassination, says it is possible for two experts to take the same evidence and reach different conclusions because more



Shot number 38 came from the other side of Everitt Street, near the parking area where most of the TV and newspeople were. Matthews blasted one more shot, and then the van began to move out. It stopped to pick up one more person. If it hadn't made this stop, it is quite likely the whole caravan would have gotten away.

As it was, one police unit arrived in time to capture the yellow van, and they so reported on the radio at 11:25:27.

The shooting lasted 88 seconds. Cesar Cauce, Sandi Smith and Jim Waller were dead. Bill Sampson died a few minutes later. Mike Nathan never recovered; he died two days later. Nine others were wounded. After all the cars had moved out, you can see Detective Cooper's yellow car come into the intersection.

Our thanks to WTVD in Durham and to North State Public Video for their assistance with the film reproduction shown here.

REPEAT PERFORMANCE

It is difficult to measure the devastating consequences of the permissive attitude toward racist organizations which resulted from the actions of Greensboro police, public officials, news papers and prosecutors. Perhaps one news item will suffice.

"Twenty robed Klansmen mobbed the Lincolnton, North Carolina jail on March 9, 1981

and demanded that a black suspect charged with raping a white woman be released to them. One of the leaders, Jerry Paul Smith, was recently acquitted of murder charges in Greensboro. Ernest Smith, the black man charged with the rape, had been relocated and his court-appointed attorneys are considering asking that the trial be moved from Lincoln County."

than one type of analysis can be used. It is an experimental technique, not a rigid science. The Greensboro trial, to his knowledge, was the first time the FBI had attempted to use the methodology. The basic approach depends on measuring distances of sound waves as they bounce off objects; the more movement of objects, weapons, and microphones, the more difficult it becomes to pinpoint the number and originating source of gunshots. When we described the scene in Greensboro, including the number of shots fired within a short space of time, Weiss exclaimed, "You'd have one hell of a time trying to isolate one train of echoes from another because of their overlap." The FBI is confident its analysis is correct, but even its experts cannot explain why nine spent shell casings from Jack Fowler's AR-180 were found on the street when the analysis says the weapon only fired four shots.

The four defendants who were identified as firing weapons testified at length in the trial, but most court reporters were astonished that the jury chose to believe their claims of self-defense. Defendant Wayne Wood, for example, claimed he was shooting into the air to scare demonstrators, but the FBI analysis showed that his first shots wounded people hiding under a car.

"Jerry Paul Smith's story was the most absurd," said courtroom reporter MacKay in an interview following the trial. "He first testified that he didn't kill anybody, although we could see it on the film. But if he did, he claimed, he didn't remember because he got hit over the head in the stick fight — and besides, he was shooting in self-defense. We were hysterical in the audience. A multiple-choice defense — who's going to believe this? But the jury did."

"Matthews testified that he saw a bunch of black guys, three of them — 'niggers with shotguns' — and they were shooting at him, so he was shooting back. There were no blacks with shotguns. The camera was on the area where he supposedly saw the black guys. There weren't any. All there were in that area were people running away, and none of the other witnesses saw any blacks with shotguns there. And the police didn't find any spent shells in the area, either."

"Wayne Wood said he only began firing at demonstrators after they

began firing at him. But according to the FBI analysis, Wood's last shot was fired about 12 seconds before the first CWP shot. Wood sang like a canary when the police interrogated him right after November 3. He said that Fowler told him, 'I got my share,' and that Smith pointed a gun at his TV set on November 1 when a CWP news conference was shown and said, 'I'm gonna get me a commie.' Under oath, though, he denied making those statements.

"Jack Fowler also testified that he shot only at people who were shooting at him. The one person he hit, Mike Nathan, was alone and unarmed in the middle of Carver running towards where Jim Waller fell. Fowler told an FBI agent when he surrendered that he knew he had done something wrong and would have to go to jail. In court, he said that what he meant by that statement was that he would have to go to jail because he fled from the state after the shooting. That's another strange thing — Fowler was never charged with illegal flight to avoid prosecution.

"The prosecutors did a good job of cross-examining the defendants and they brought witness after witness to contradict their testimony. I don't know how anyone could have believed the Klansmen and Nazis. The evidence against them was solid, but it wasn't enough to overcome the jurors' prejudice. The damage had already been done. In testimony the defendants all hid under the cover of anti-communism, whereas in their police statements right after the incident all they talked about was 'niggers, kikes and race-mixing.' Their defense attorneys decided, I think wisely, that it was not legitimate to hate Jews and blacks, to talk about that kind of hatred. It was safe to hate commies, though, because *that's* patriotic."

One person who was *not* brought in to contradict the defendants' testimony, although he was interviewed by two assistant district attorneys, is Ed Dawson. As Dawson tells it, he met with DAs Jim Coman and Rick Greeson during the trial to discuss whether he would testify. Also present at that meeting was an unidentified police captain. The group did *not* meet in the DA's office or at police headquarters, however. They met in a motel room.

Dawson says, "There were six damn defense attorneys who would chop the shit out of me and even if the judge

might object or whatever, the whole story would have hit the fan. But Coman didn't care, he didn't give a damn. He said they could subpoena me, and I said, 'Then I could do the 30 days.' Refuse to testify, you know."

"Well, Greeson said, 'I don't think it will come to that. Let's leave it go now. Go home, think about it. Call the captain here tomorrow morning, let him know your answer. I gotta know by 10 in the morning.'"

"So, next morning I called the captain. He didn't say hello or kiss my ass or nothing — just, 'Very good, Ed. I knew we could depend on you.' I said, 'Whoa! How do you know what my answer is going to be?'"

"Well,' he said, 'we figured you'd stay with last night's decision.' I said, 'Yeah. I'm not coming.' I just wanted to make sure that we understood one another. . . . But I got it on tape. I got lots of stuff on tape cause they said it would be my word against theirs."

While it is not unheard-of for a police officer to be present during the questioning of a prospective state's witness, it is unusual for a witness to be questioned in a motel room rather than the prosecutor's office. When asked about Dawson's instruction to phone the captain with his decision, a veteran criminal attorney replied, "That is very suspicious. I can't imagine any legal basis for doing it."

The final witness for the defense was "surprise" witness Rexford Stephenson, who worked with Jim Waller at Greensboro's municipal waste treatment plant. Six days after the killings, a story in the *Greensboro Record* quoted an unidentified co-worker of Waller's as saying Waller told him the CWP "was looking for a martyr and national news coverage" and that the group had "something" planned which "was likely to give them both."

Those words were hauntingly similar to the words used by jury foreman Octavio Manduley when asked during jury selection what he knew about the CWP: "They need publicity and a martyr."

On October 13, 1980, Stephenson dropped his shield of anonymity and took the witness stand for the defense. A two-term Vietnam War veteran and avowed anti-communist, he testified that during a conversation about the China Grove confrontation, he warned

Waller that someone could get hurt or killed. "We are prepared for violence," Waller responded. And when warned again that someone might get killed, Stephenson said Waller told him, "That's what we need, a martyr."

Under further questioning, Stephenson described Waller as "a dangerous and violent man . . . capable of using a gun against those who disagreed with his views." (Other co-workers interviewed for the original news story said Waller was "quiet, gentle, a good worker.")

The circle was now complete: from foreman to final witness, the prevailing opinion — barely challenged by the prosecutors — held that the slain protesters had called for, and were thus responsible for, their own deaths. The jury deliberated for 10 days, and then announced that all six defendants were found not guilty of the first-degree murder charge. Shortly after the verdict, foreman Manduley characterized the four men and one woman killed on November 3 as "despicable." Said defense attorney Robert Cahoon, "The defendants were very patriotically depicted while the victims were very subversively depicted. That had to make a difference."

The stereotypes of the victims and defendants were as much a part of the evidence as the FBI analysis. By refusing to discuss the ideologies which brought the groups to the corner of Everitt and Carver on November 3, and perhaps more importantly, by refusing to discuss their own biases regarding the victims and defendants, the jurors deliberated in a climate of ignorance and prejudice. And by refusing to explore the role of police and federal agents in planning the Klan/Nazi caravan, the prosecution preserved the defense claims that the CWP had provoked the confrontation and that the defendants acted only in self-defense.

In such an atmosphere, a Greensboro jury on November 17, 1980, absolved a group of "patriots" of responsibility for eliminating the lives of five human beings.

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Appendix 1: Cast of Characters

THE DEAD & THE WOUNDED

Cesar Cauce: CWP member; data terminal operator and union organizer at Duke University Medical Center. Cuban refugee. Killed by .357 Magnum bullet fired by Jerry Smith; shot entered back of neck, ripped down through heart and lungs.

Dr. Michael Nathan: Supporter but not member of CWP. Pediatrician at Lincoln Health Center in Durham. Non-fatal wound to shoulder from semi-automatic rifle fired by Jack Fowler; fatally wounded by buckshot fired by David Matthews into the side of his head and neck; he died two days later. Inducted into CWP in hospital shortly before his death.

William Sampson: CWP member; union organizer and shop steward at Cone Mills' White Oak plant in Greensboro. Phi Beta Kappa; M.A. from Harvard Divinity School; resigned from University of Virginia Medical School shortly before graduation. Fatally wounded in chest by David Matthews's final shotgun blast.

Sandra Neely Smith: CWP member. Former student leader at Greensboro's Bennett College; moved to Kannapolis, North Carolina, in 1979 to organize union at Cannon Mills. Near-fatal head wound when clubbed during stick fight — assailant charged past a white woman demonstrator in order to strike Smith; killed as she hid behind the corner of a building by a single shotgun pellet in the brain from David Matthews's gun.

Dr. James Michael Waller: CWP Central Committee member. Former staff physician at Duke University Medical Center; resigned in protest over restrictive policies in doctor/patient relationships. Worked and organized for unions at Cone Mills in Haw River, North Carolina, and later at the municipal waste treatment plant in Greensboro; provided free medical treatment for friends and co-workers at night. Wounded in chest by birdshot fired by Wayne Wood; clutched his chest and turned, bent over, and was running for cover when shot in the back and killed by David Matthews's first shotgun blast.

Besides the five people fatally wounded on November 3, eight others

received wounds ranging from critical to superficial during the attack. One Klansman was accidentally struck in the legs by stray buckshot from one of his comrades' guns, and a TV news photographer was hit by birdshot pellets while he was hiding under a car. But the most serious wounds were inflicted on demonstrators. When several of them attempted to file charges against their assailants, they were told by the magistrate that only the district attorney could file criminal charges. DA Mike Schlosser refused to process charges on behalf of any of the people wounded on November 3.

Dr. Paul Bermanzohn: CWP member; former emergency room physician at Alamance County Hospital (Burlington, North Carolina). Critically wounded and now partially paralyzed by large shotgun pellet or bullet lodged in his brain.

Thomas Clark: CWP member; emergency medical technician from Durham. Birdshot wounds to head; hit as he was trying to drag Frankie Powell to safety.

Nelson Johnson: CWP leader and long-time activist in Greensboro. Stab wounds in both forearms, probably inflicted by Lawrence Morgan.

Don Pelles: CWP member from Durham. Birdshot wounds to head and left side as he helped Clark move Powell to safety.

Frankie Powell: CWP member from Greensboro. Birdshot wounds to head, back and legs received as stick fight was breaking up. Powell was eight months pregnant at the time, but the wounds did not cause her to deliver prematurely.

James Wrenn: CWP member; industrial worker and union organizer from Rocky Mount, North Carolina. Serious buckshot wounds to face and chest; probably fired by David Matthews.

THE DEFENDANTS

Jack Wilson Fowler: Nazi from Winston-Salem; tire recapper. Drove the car in which most of the guns were transported to the rally site. Fired an AR-180 semi-automatic which wounded Mike Nathan in the shoulder.

David Wayne Matthews: State Night Hawk, member of Inner Circle, Invis-

ible Empire KKK; unemployed. Fired the shotgun which killed Jim Waller, Bill Sampson, Mike Nathan and Sandi Smith.

Lawrence Gene Morgan: Klan, Invisible Empire. Drove the van in which most of the assailants rode to the rally site. Was not accused of shooting anyone, although he may have stabbed Nelson Johnson in the arms with a buck knife that was in his possession when he was arrested.

Coleman Blair "Johnny" Pridmore: Exalted Cyclops (president), Invisible Empire, Lincoln County Klan; textile worker. First assailant seen aiming weapon at demonstrators. Claims his gun jammed, but it's highly probable that he fired shots 3 and 4, which wounded Frankie Powell, Don Pelles and Tom Clark.

Jerry Paul Smith: Colonel of Security, North Carolina Invisible Empire KKK; logger. Fired four shots from two pistols at Cesar Cauce, who was scrambling on his hands and knees to get away. Videotapes show Smith firing at Cauce, including the fatal shot.

Roland Wayne Wood: Nazi from Winston-Salem; construction worker. Fired shotgun loaded with birdshot; only one non-fatal wound to Jim Waller was attributed to Wood's gun.

OTHER NOTABLES

Raeford Milano Caudle: Nazi from Winston-Salem. Owned two of the murder weapons and the car in which they were transported to the rally site. Not involved in the shooting, but did participate in planning meetings. Originally charged with conspiracy, but charges were dismissed after the district attorney declined to pursue conspiracy charges against all the defendants.

Harold Covington: National Party Leader, Nazis; from Raleigh. Former mercenary in Rhodesian army. Introduced BATF agent Bernard Butkovich to the Winston-Salem Nazi unit. Did not participate in November 3 confrontation, but held numerous fundraising rallies for the defendants, whom he characterized as "heroes." Later introduced another BATF agent to the Nazi group, which subsequently was indicted for planning to blow up Greensboro if the Klan/Nazi defendants were convicted. Covington has since gone "underground."

Virgil Griffin: Grand Dragon, North

Carolina Invisible Empire KKK. Responsible, with Covington, for organizing the Klan/Nazi coalition, the United Racist Front. One of the key figures in planning and organizing the November 3 confrontation, drove one of the lead cars in the assault caravan, yet was never even charged with conspiracy.

AGENTS

Bernard Butkovich: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), U.S. Treasury Department; stationed in Cleveland, Ohio. "Proved" himself to Nazi Party leader Harold Covington when he participated in a melee between Nazis and Jewish Defense League demonstrators at a national Nazi gathering in Ohio. Infiltrated Winston-Salem Nazis in summer of 1979. Attended one or more planning meetings, but did not participate on November 3. Was not called to testify in trial; DA claimed his testimony would have been "dull."

Edward Dawson: Long-time Klan leader; organizer and Colonel of Security for North Carolina Knights of KKK (disbanded in 1976). Served as FBI and Greensboro police informer on Klan from 1969 to 1976; also informed on the U.S. Labor Party (1974-76) and the Revolutionary Communist Party (1979) in Greensboro. Criminal record includes: AWOL from Army during World War II; armed to the terror of the public ("terrorizing") for 1967 Klan-related shooting spree in Alamance County; participating in a riot, involving the Klan and blacks at a 1969 Fourth of July Klan rally in Swan Quarter, North Carolina.

Well-known in Greensboro Police Department as (Intelligence Unit Detective) "Cooper's Contact." Asked (probably by Cooper) in mid-October, 1979, to contact Klan leaders to find out if plans were being made to come to the "Death to the Klan" march and rally. Spoke at Klan rally in Lincoln County, October 20, to recruit people to "harass" anti-Klan demonstrators on November 3. Contacted Cooper twice on November 3 to report on how many Klansmen were gathering, how many weapons they had. Led the Klan/Nazi caravan to the rally site; did not participate in the shooting. Refused to testify at the trial; was told by police captain: "We knew we could count on you."

Appendix 2: Ed Dawson's Story

Ed Dawson is a con artist, or in his words, "a good bullshitter." As a Klan leader turned informer for the FBI and later the Greensboro police, Dawson spent more than a decade refining his skill at setting up verbal smokescreens.

So how does one decide whether to believe anything Dawson says? And how does one decide what is true, what is false and what is in that gray area between the two? After four hours of interviewing Dawson, and after reading several interviews he had given in the mid-1970s, we concluded that there is a method to his con: he tells a lot more of the truth than anyone would expect.

Eddie Dawson obviously gets a kick out of deceiving people with honesty. He spoke of meeting during the trial with Brent Fletcher and James Buck, old-time Klan buddies who rode in the caravan on November 3. "We'd be sitting in Shoney's and something would come out about the trial, and they'd say, 'They had to have an informant to find out about that. Wonder who it could have been?' And I'd say, 'Well, I think it's Buck.' And Buck would say, 'No, it's Brent.' And Brent would say, 'No, it's Yankee.' And I'd say, 'You're right. It's me. I'll be honest with you, it was me.' They wouldn't believe me!"

Out of 60 pages of transcripts, we were able to verify a great deal of what Dawson said. But doubts remain: Dawson did not grant this interview out of the goodness of his heart, nor did he choose to talk with us to clear his conscience; he wanted to clear his name, overcome the widely held suspicion that he master-minded the assault on the anti-Klan demonstrators. Throughout the interview Dawson persistently discounted his influence over and knowledge about the planning of the confrontation.

His background provides more insight into what makes Dawson tick:

Shortly after moving to Greensboro with his first wife in the early 1960s, Dawson struck up a coffee shop conversation with a stranger who subsequently invited him to a local Klan meeting. Twenty men, "in over-

alls, mostly," watched suspiciously as Dawson pulled into the parking lot in the kind of car that has become his trademark, a white Cadillac. When Dawson said "Hi" in his thick New Jersey accent, the Klansmen beat a hasty retreat in the hall — this was obviously not one of the good ole boys, they reckoned; he must be from the FBI.

Undaunted, the man who became known as "Yankee" penetrated the hostile group and gradually earned their respect. He was soon appointed Chief of Security for the state unit of the United Klans of America and was one of the select few in the Klan's hit squad, the Inner Circle. Known only to each other, the members of each Klan's Inner Circle carry out acts of terrorism in the name of the organization. "It was just me, James Buck and a couple others — the ones who would get out and do something," Dawson told us. The code of the Inner Circle is simple and strict: "Any member who gives out information to the enemy causing any other member prison or hardship shall suffer death."

Dawson's allegiance to the code eventually spread his notoriety from the UKA to the North Carolina Supreme Court. In 1967, Dawson, James Buck and two other Klansmen were captured in a roadblock following a shooting spree in Alamance County. As owner and driver of the getaway vehicle, Dawson was the first to stand trial. The original charge against the four, "assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill," was reduced to "armed to the terror of the public." "Terrorizing," Dawson recalled. "King Edward law, 500 years old. Last man to be convicted, 250 years ago." Dawson refused to testify. "If I had of taken the stand I would have had to expose everything."

Appealed to the state Supreme Court, Dawson's case established the sentencing standard for "armed to the terror." He served nine months of three concurrent 18-month sentences. His three cohorts received lesser sentences; one in particular made Dawson suspicious. The charge against James Buck was dropped to breaking and entering; he served only four months. Yet Dawson and Buck rode together once again on November 3 where, ironically, one of the surviving CWP demonstrators was arrested under the statute enacted following Dawson v.



Ed Dawson

North Carolina: armed to the terror of the public. (The charge was later dropped.)

No sooner was Dawson released from prison than he was arrested again, this time for participating in a riot involving blacks and Klan members on the Fourth of July, 1969, in the tiny coastal town of Swan Quarter, North Carolina. Dawson found an attorney — Bob Cahoon, later the lead attorney of the Klan/Nazi defense team — who agreed to represent all 14 Klan rioters for \$3,000. But the UKA demanded that they hire Arthur Hanes, the attorney who represented James Earl Ray, for \$15,000. Hanes arranged a plea bargain which gave his clients each a year's suspended sentence, five years' probation and a fine of \$1,000.

Dawson was outraged. Convinced that UKA Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton had skimmed a percentage of Hanes's legal fee, he demanded to see the canceled checks. When the Klan leadership failed to produce any documentation, Dawson went before a statewide meeting and accused them of stealing. "I was banished that day, banished from the United Klans," said Dawson.

Other UKA members had become equally mistrustful of Shelton, so when Dawson and another banished member started the North Carolina Knights of the KKK, they had an almost instant following.

The FBI was well aware of the disputes over Klan finances. A Greensboro agent began putting the pressure on: first he threatened to send Dawson

"up the river where you belong," then he appealed to his anger over the way he had been shafted by the UKA. Finally, it was the prospect of five years of probation which led Eddie Dawson to strike a deal with the FBI: "I hated that probation with a passion! So I told them, 'I'll work along with you as long as you get me off probation.'"

Like most "exposed" Klan-FBI informers, Dawson insists that during the seven years he was with the FBI he only relayed information. "Never, never did I do anything to get our people in trouble. I did more to keep them out of trouble."

By 1976 the FBI had sabotaged the Klan sufficiently that Dawson's unit in Greensboro consisted of three people — Dawson, James Buck and Brent Fletcher. Dawson estimated that statewide, under Virgil Griffin, there were perhaps 15 members.

Dawson claims he quit the Klan and the FBI in 1977, but in the meantime he had become somewhat of a free-lance informer for the Greensboro police, where he had made some important contacts during his tenure with the feds. From 1974 to 1976, the U.S. Labor Party, which proclaimed itself to be "communist," was maintaining a high visibility in Greensboro. Dawson began attending Labor Party meetings, and he spoke of "getting in thick" with party leader Marion Porter. He later turned on the group, leading nine Klansmen to confront the Labor Party at a leafletting site.

By the summer of 1979, the Labor Party had long before departed from North Carolina — discredited among leftists as provocateurs from the right. Two new communist groups had emerged: the Revolutionary Communist Party and the Worker's Viewpoint Organization. The RCP was the more visible of the two, and Eddie Dawson began attending their meetings and monitoring newspapers and television for information about the communists' activities.

In mid-October, several RCP members were arrested for disrupting classes at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, where they went to "recruit" people to come to a speech by the party's presidential candidate, Bob Avakian. They were also accused, but not charged, with throwing red paint in the public schools. On October 11, several more

On the FBI Payroll

Ed Dawson: "Now the FBI, they were supposed to phase out this stuff after the whole Watergate thing. But they did not. I was still involved, it was still going on. They did not stop it immediately when they were told to stop it. I was still on the payroll."

"With a good bullshitter like myself, somebody would say some-

thing about the Klan and I'd say, 'The only reason I'm in the Klan is I'm an FBI informant.' This fellow that I worked for, I met him in a barbershop [after November 3] and he says, 'Man, that's quite a write-up you're getting in the paper.' And I said, 'I told you when I worked for you I was an FBI informant!' He says, 'Yeah, you gotta admit, though, you say an awful lot.'

"So I can get away with a lot of this crap. Tell the truth and people laugh at you."

SAC, Charlotte (157-7200)
REC-64

Director, FBI (157-18601)

ST-113

NORTH CAROLINA KNIGHTS OF THE
KU KLUX KLAN (NCKKKK)
EM

8/5/76

Reurlet 7/15/76.

FBIHQ concurs with Charlotte recommendation that the investigation of the NCKKKK be discontinued.

Information is not to be accepted from informants concerning the NCKKKK as an organization unless that information pertains to specific extremist, subversive, or criminal activity in which we have investigative interest. Information pertaining to criminal matters not within our investigative jurisdiction should be accepted and given proper dissemination.

With regard to those extremist informants who are presently reporting on NCKKKK activities exclusively, consideration should be given to directing their coverage to individuals and organizations of present investigative interest to the FBI. These informants may be in a position to furnish information of value concerning matters of security or extremist interest or regarding criminal matters, and you should consider converting them to security or criminal informants where appropriate. In the event an extremist informant providing coverage exclusively on the NCKKKK cannot be directed into other areas of interest, his services should be discontinued.

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SEE NOTE PAGE 2

RCP members were arrested for inciting a riot at a Greensboro housing project. Then, as RCP-inspired anti-communist sentiment seethed in Greensboro, the Worker's Viewpoint Organization announced the "Death to the Klan" march and rally to be held Saturday, November 3.

Klan members, Nazis and free-lance racist anti-communists began to coa-

lesce around the anti-Klan rally. Virgil Griffin, Grand Dragon of the Klan's Invisible Empire and one of the head organizers of the racist coalition, remembered his old pal Eddie Dawson, who, Griffin knew, had gained considerable knowledge about Greensboro's "communists" through his infiltration of the Labor Party.

And someone in the Greensboro

Police Department, probably Dawson's long-time contact, Detective Jerry Cooper, asked Eddie to contact his old Klan allies to find out what their plans were for the "Death to the Klan" rally.

To this day, I'm not positive if Virgil called me first or if I called him — I think he called me just as I was about to call him. They were having a meeting that night, and Virgil asked what did I know about the communists and what did I know about "Death to the Klan" and all that. I briefed him a little bit over the phone. Then he said they were having a rally, October 18 or whatever, and would I come down to explain to the people what it was all about. And I agreed.

He was having a street walk in Lincolnton that day and this here rally that night. Virgil asked me to stay around until after it was over when they would have a special meeting inside the building on the fairgrounds. So after the rally, the cross burning and all, we went inside the building and Virgil introduced me as a buddy. There were about 90 people there.

And at the speech I explained everything that was going on in Greensboro. I didn't add, I didn't take anything away. That they were going through the schools and throwing red paint, that there were signs posted, and this, that and the other thing. I gave maybe a 20-minute speech on the goodies that was going on and I asked for a show of hands, how many people was coming. *Eighty* hands went up in the air!

So then I gave the second part of my speech: what to expect if they came up here. I told them, "Now if you come up here, I want you to know that we're not fooling around. I don't know if any of you know Marion Porter and the Labor Party, but these people here are different. You push *them* around, they'll push back. They're big enough, they won't just stand there while you're screaming at em.

"Number two," I said, "if you carry a gun, if you go out in the open there with a bulge in your pocket, that place is going to be infested with police and you *will* be arrested. If you carry a gun, you better have your damn bond money in your pocket, cause you're gonna be arrested if you try any garbage." And after that

speech, I asked for a show of hands. Then only about 40 or 50 of em raised their hands, after the second part of it. Cause I wanted them to know what to expect if they were gonna come up here and start screaming and carrying on.

I was going on the China Grove deal, that this party. . . . Well, you know at the time, after China Grove, there was all these communist parties — the Revolutionary Communists, the Worker's Viewpoint, who the hell is who? Are they one party or two? Well, where I got a lot of my stuff from was back in the summer of '79, a television program on the Chapel Hill station, they interviewed the, Revolutionist [sic] Communist Party and the Worker's Viewpoint Party and another communist party — *three* communist parties here at that time! And I quick got their names. [He pulls a piece of paper from his wallet.] Tim Hopkins, Kathy Zeigler, they were Revolutionist Communist Party; David Burt, B-U-R-T-T, two *T*s, National Workers Organization; and Bermanzohn, Worker's Viewpoint.

When I was getting involved with the police in the November 3 deal, I asked the lieutenant down there how many communist organizations there are here, and he said, "One." The Revolutionary Communist Party was supposed to be the top and then the rest were just — the Worker's Viewpoint was just an offshoot of the Revolutionary Communist Party. Well, I wasn't satisfied so I went home and got out all my papers on the communists, the names and everything else.

I called this fellow I knew at the FBI. He said, "What makes you think there's more than one communist party here?"

So one thing led to another and I started reading him names from literature and television and newspapers, and he says, "Where the hell are you getting these names? Repeat these names, spell them." I thought, I'm talking to our *government*? They got time and money, they can get in back of those people — and here I am, I've got to work for a living and do this on my own, you know. So I told him all this and he said, "Eddie, I'm afraid you're right. There are two different communist parties here — the Worker's Viewpoint and the Revolutionary Communists."

So, of course, I called downtown [the police department]. It didn't

mean that much at the time. I had been to a couple of Revolutionary Communist Party meetings, but never to the Worker's.

Now, prior to this, the CWP accuses me of infiltrating their organization. If you want to call standing there while a speech is being given in front of the courthouse "infiltrating," well then, yes, I infiltrated. That was the day Nelson Johnson got the copy of the permit [November 1], and they had a rally there with a big banner, "Death to the Klan." And television was there, Johnson was talking and the fellow who got shot in the head, Bermanzohn, he was standing there and I walked up to him. I played stupid. I said, "What the hell is this all about? What's this sign, 'Death to the Klan?' What are you going to do, kill these people?"

And Johnson was just finishing with the TV people, and he walked over and the three of us was talking. He said, "Those chicken people won't come off their hill." So I said, "What're you gonna do to them? Suppose they do, what are you gonna do to them?" And he said, "Well, they won't."

We made small talk, you know. And that was the height of my infiltrating the CWP. The only other words that were spoken, they invited me to come down to their rally, their meeting or march or whatever. So I said, "What if I want to *join* the Klan? Where would I go?" He said, "In there with them pigs." And he pointed toward the police station. And I walked away.

And as far as the permit, when I picked up the permit, it meant nothing to me. I put it away. I didn't even read it. I put it in a folder. And, uh, the time was changed. Well, on the cards, on the "Death to the Klan" posters, it said 11 o'clock. But in the permit, they changed it to 12 o'clock. And I was ignorant to it. I had not looked at the permit, did not know. And they said that I was hustling them on Saturday morning. Well, it was after 11 o'clock and I figured they'd be gone already from down on Everitt Street. Should have known that the communists is no better than the Klan: if you got an eight o'clock meeting, it don't start till quarter to nine.

[Editor's note: This is one of the few inconsistencies in Dawson's story. If the only information he had regarding the starting time and place was

from the posters, which said 11 a.m. at the Windsor Center, he would not have known without looking at the permit or being told that the starting point was at Everitt Street and Carver Drive.]

Someday, maybe I'll tell you how I tried to stop the march. But nobody cooperated with me, to try to stop the communists from marching. The people in official capacity thought it was a great idea, but who's gonna do it? Me. As a Klansman. They wouldn't do it though. I told this party, I said, "Next time I want a favor from you, I'll bring you a bucket of blood." Not that I figured there was gonna be a shooting or anything, nothing like that. I just figured there was gonna be trouble. I just had a strong feeling, call it intuition or whatever you want to call it. I thought there would be some good fights. And I knew that the communists weren't all people that you could spit on and get away with it. And neither are some of the Klan members. It don't take much. I been around a long time. You know, you're walking in a crowd and step on my foot, well, you push me, I push you, pretty soon everybody's pushing everybody. It's as simple as that. And that's what I expected — at Florida Street. Cops wouldn't have made a difference with a fist fight. There would have been a couple of heads bashed in.

Now we're getting into November 3. They came up about three in the morning — Virgil Griffin, Smith and Pridmore, and this woman who was with Virgil. I met them on High Point Road, and we drove down to the Your House restaurant where we had coffee and a sandwich. Virgil by this time said that he wanted to shack up with this girl he was with, so he stopped at the Orange Motel on Randleman Road. He stayed there, and Pridmore, Smith and myself drove over to Brent Fletcher's house — I had made arrangements to meet at his house.

Now they said in the trial that I brought them over to Florida Street and showed them where we were supposed to meet — there at the shopping center where the rally was supposed to end. See, first the CWP was supposed to have their meeting in this church [across the street from the shopping center]. But the minister found out who they were and what they were, and he backed them off. So they were going to use the shop-

ping center there.

I'm not going to go into that too deep about how and why I knew that they could not use the church. We're coming about now to how I got the permit. I'm not going to go into that at this time — about how I got the permit and certain other things about that.

So I'm saying that that night we didn't go to the shopping center on Florida Street. We drove past it. I did not stop at the shopping center and say *this* is where we're going to be. Definitely not.

We drove down to the Orange, left Virgil and that girl there. Virgil had a gun, a small caliber pistol, and he gave it to one of them, Pridmore or Smith, I'm not sure which. Then we went over to Brent Fletcher's house on Randleman Road. And we sat there, no discussion of the march or anything. It was small talk, old-time talk, Klan stuff, things like that.

They were tired. I was drinking coffee; Brent was half-drunk, which was not unusual. And one of them had coffee, the other had a beer. They were just showing off guns, a couple of guns they had brought with them. Guns don't impress me. I mean, here's a magnum or whatever. Shotguns, one shotgun looks just like another to me. So what? It's just a gun. So I'd look at em and say, "Nice gun," and give it back to em. And this was the conversation up to that point.

And if I ever heard anybody say, "We'll take some potshots at em, or scare the — out of em," I think things would have been a little different. I know they would, I don't think it. I'd of found a way to back that thing off.

A fight, I figured. A broken arm, broken leg. Oh yeah, I figured there'd be a fight. I told them. I knew that these communists were not like the Labor Party, they were big enough not to back off you. I knew from some of the things they'd pulled off prior to this that they weren't going to be pushed around. And then with the deal down in China Grove, the way they went about that. They were big enough not to stand there, just to let you go screaming at em. Oh yeah, sure.

There was absolutely no plan, where we were gonna park or anything else. How many people would be there... no plan. We didn't go to check it out, where the speaker stand

would be — well, I guess they were gonna use the rally truck. I thought we would just lay back. Of course, I didn't know at that time about the eggs — once they started throwing eggs, the stuff would have hit the fan, regardless. But I was gonna be smart enough — if I got pushed at that time, like I say, I'd just had a disc removed from my back. If I got pushed to the ground, I would have had to ask a communist to pick me up! So I knew I had to stay the hell back.

So I went on home. I got to bed about four o'clock and got up about seven. And I called Cooper. I called him "Rooster," and he told me that he was getting dressed and going downtown for a briefing on this thing. So I told him how many people were over at the house, and what was there — they had a couple of guns. I was just supposed to be their source on how many people and if they had guns. So I said, "I doubt if I'll be able to contact you again or call you." So he gave me the number of his car, so if I could get away and he wasn't home, I could contact him in his car.

I went over to Randleman Road and there was only maybe a dozen people there. This was about 7:30, 8:30. It was a mystery to them how anybody got out of the house after that to make a report to the police. It was me! I got out of the house again because I had back surgery a couple months earlier, and that was my excuse, to go get my back pills. So I shot home and called Rooster again and told him there was 12 to 14 people at the house and they had guns, everybody had a gun. That was the last of the contact with Cooper, and I shot back to the house. I was only gone a short time.

Well, James Buck was there. I was shocked to see him because he had been out of the Klan for years and years, before me, even. By this time there was 40 or 50 people there, milling around. No talk of what are we going to do or nothing else. Virgil was back by this time. And people were going back and forth across the street, there was a store. And people were out in the yard, maybe 20 people — "Hey, look at my gun." You know, the cops could ride up and down, which they did, and they weren't hiding any guns. It's a common thing with the Klan to carry guns — makes you feel big, 10 feet tall!

So we're standing around and Buck

says, "Where's this thing at?" And all I knew was Carver Street, but he had a knowledge of the area better than I did. So he says, "Don't you have a copy of the permit? It's on the back of the permit." Well, I ran out to the car, and sure enough, it's right there, all the streets that they were going on. And he had a map in his truck, a city map, and I was calling out the streets the way they were going: they're turning here, 29 up to Lee Street and all that. Okay, so we could not find Everitt and Carver Street on the whole map. But we knew about the direction.

While Buck was making the map, Virgil called me into the bedroom. And this stocky fellow, a big giant fellow, says, "I have a teargas bomb out there, do you think we'll be able to throw it?" I said, "Let me tell you, where we're going, the streets are narrow, there are going to be cops all over. We'll probably get the worst end of the teargas if you throw it. I wouldn't bother with it."

That's when I got my first inkling that he was a Nazi. He said, "Well, I'll call my lieutenant and you can explain it to him." I knew then that we had a Nazi, cause in the Klan we got security guards. So this little guy comes in, I don't know his name, and I explained it to him. He said, "Throw it in the car anyway." The Nazi was Wood, and the lieutenant, I can't remember his name. He was just a little guy. Seems like it should have been the other way around — the big guy should be the lieutenant.

But Virgil always did like to get in good with the Nazi Party. See, about eight or nine years ago we marched with Matt Koehl's group [National Socialist White People's Party] out of Arlington, Virginia. He came down with a bunch of men, and we marched together. Afterwards I said to Virgil Griffin, "This will never happen again. We'll not march with those people no more. You mention Klan and that's bad enough. You mention *Nazi* and Klan — well, there's just no word for it." So then, of course, when I got out, I didn't know he was tying up with the Nazis. I did not know there was Nazis involved until we were in the house on Randleman Road. That's when I first realized I was talking to a Nazi.

So we went outside then and everyone was standing around. "What are we gonna do?" Well, the only words that were spoken was "harass."




photo by Alma Blount

It was five after 11, and I said, "If we're going, let's go. If we're not, let's go home." And someone says, "Who's in charge here?" And I looked at Virgil, and Virgil looked at me. I wasn't about to say, "Me." So Virgil points at me and says, "I guess he is. He knows the town better than we do." So I said okay.

Well, I was going to ride with Buck in his truck, not in my Cadillac, because of my back. So I said, "Who's got a CB?" Okay, so we lead off and the car about halfway back had a CB. And the van replies that they have a CB, so I said, "Good, why don't you bring up the back?" So that's how the hell the van got in the back. And I went back to the van and there were

six or seven guys in there, but I didn't see no guns at all.

We started off and finally got down to the ramp at I-85 and 220 [Randleman Road], and I was talking on the CB, "KKK. Everything okay?" But the van hollered, "Can you hold it up? The Fairlane from Winston just went by. He's lost apparently, he didn't see the cars on the ramp." So we all got out on the ramp there. I could see Cooper's car just parked there on the overpass. He was watching us.

Now, how come the Fairlane got in the rear was for that very reason. They were the last ones to get there. And the guns were in the Fairlane. Why, I don't know. I never saw them put their guns in there. In fact, I never saw

the Fairlane except in the news pictures. From what I understand, they were there, then left to get something to eat, then passed us -- and didn't see us -- and went all the way back and then caught up with us again. So they must have put them guns in there prior to us pulling out of there.

So we sat there and sat there, and Buck and I small-talked. And one thing led to another and he said something about a fight. I said, "Jesus, if a fight breaks out, neither one of us has a damn gun. You got a gun?" He said, "No. But I got a hammer." I said, "Jesus Christ. I don't want to have to get close enough to anybody to have to hit em with a hammer!"

Then I said, "Jesus Christ, are we gonna wait here all day?" You know how when you're waiting five minutes seems like an hour. So I got out of the car and walked about halfway back in the caravan. I *thought* I walked halfway back, but I was told that in the tape they were taking -- Cooper and Matthews, the photographer from the police -- that I walked all the way back to the van. They must have filmed it, but I didn't see any of the pictures. There are probably a lot of pictures you didn't see.

So then somebody hollered, "Let's go!" We headed on to 85, of course, and like I say we weren't positive where to turn to get to Carver Street, to get to Morningside Homes there. So we went down 29 North there and turned right on Lee Street. Buck spotted Willow Street, said it went right down to Everitt, so we went down and there was a light. We looked left, and by God, there they were. So we turned left.

As we got down there, Johnson was on television on the left. And the group, there was about 20 kids down there. I say to this day, thank God there wasn't any of those kids killed. That would have been a road of no return.

They were chanting and they had this dummy they were beating on, carrying on, "Death to the Klan" and all that stuff. I got up to Bermanzohn, you know he invited me to the march, so as I got up to him, he sort of half smiled. They said that I leaned out of the truck and said, "You wanted the Klan. Here they are." That's not *all* I said. I said, "You communist bastard, you wanted the Klan and here they are."

We drove on, and I was looking

backwards and Buck was looking in the mirror. And about the fifth car, there was a gap, I could see that they weren't coming through. The three cars in back of us, of course, there were gaps of five feet, another five feet, and then maybe 20 feet where the other car was. I understand that blacks came out and got in front of the car and held the thing up or we just would have went on through. And Buck says, "Why the hell they stopping for?" And that's why we stopped.

Buck and I got out of the truck and went back, Buck says to the first car, I thought it was about the second car. We didn't get very far back, anyway, when we heard the first shot. Well, I couldn't move too fast, of course, cause of my back -- but I *moved* and so did Buck, back to the truck, and we took off. What should we *do*? Well, we headed up to Bessemer Avenue there, to the shopping center, and we went into a place that had a radio on so we could listen for a news bulletin.

Pretty soon, someone came on with the news: three people dead, several wounded. Terrible. Well, you know the old saying about returning to the scene of the crime. Buck and me drove back down there to see if we could find out what happened. But, of course, there were cops all over the place, roadblocks, and we couldn't get near the place.

What should we do *now*? We decided to go back to Brent's house and get my car, then go back to my house to try to figure out what to do next. Course, we knew that the cops would be after us any minute, but we wanted to be somewhere that people could contact us. So it wasn't long before Virgil got there and a couple others, a couple women. And Buck says we should all go to a motel where the cops wouldn't find us.

Well, see, I was always a little suspicious of Buck, ever since that terrorizing deal in Alamance County when I had to serve nine months and he only served four. So I said, "Okay. You go down to the Orange Motel and get us a room." So he left, and then I had one of the women call another motel up on 29 North -- the other side of town from the Orange. She made up some story about wanting a room for the afternoon where relatives coming through town could get together for a little while.

So a bunch of us went on up there to figure out how everybody was going to get away, where they were going to go. I knew Virgil disappeared for a few days, but I don't know where he went. And one woman, her husband was one of the ones arrested, and she wanted to go to her mother's. But she didn't have any way to get there, so I drove her down to the bus station. Everybody took off, and I went on home and called my wife -- she was visiting up in Roanoke -- and I just told her everything went okay. Didn't mention the shooting or nothing. She was pretty shocked when she heard it on the news, of course.

I was surprised not to see any police there. Definitely. First thing I noticed, not a car there, not a cop standing there. I looked both sides and that was one of the first things that hit my mind -- there's not a damn cop around here. Now, if they were at the ends of the streets, I wasn't sure. You know, your hindsight is better than your foresight. Oh, I expected a couple of cars to get hit with sticks and all that stuff, but I thought we'd keep moving. Then they say *we* shouldn't have stopped, that we held the thing up. We did not hold the thing up. We kept moving but they were hitting either Brent's or Griffin's car. Johnson had a stick about yab big, and he went right up to the back of either Virgil's or Brent's car. I looked right at him when he did that.

So I didn't know until that morning that Nazis were there. And I don't know how many were there, I had no idea -- four or five. And if they had something separate planned for the communists, again, they would have made sure that they were at a good spot. In the caravan. The last or the middle, they'd want to fall in this position and have their guns so, as they passed the communists, they'd be ready to shoot. That's the way I would do it if I was gonna do it. That's why I analyzed this thing so carefully. And by not going to trial -- if I thought for one minute that they were guilty or that they actually *planned* to shoot, I would have gone to the trial. I would have cared less what the hell the Klan wanted to do or the Nazis wanted to do or anyone else. I just firmly believe that it wasn't planned. If it ever came out that it was, I'll be the first one to be shocked. But the set-up was not proper, you just don't do things like that. I know I don't

personally. No matter how dumb you are, if you're smart enough to know you're gonna kill somebody or shoot at somebody, you're going to work things out. And never once was there any indication — I didn't hear everybody's conversation, of course — there was all this talk, of course, but it was all small talk, anything that I could hear.

That was a gruesome sight. The FBI called me on Tuesday night, I think it was, to go down to the office there. They said they were going to show me some pictures. And they pulled out the videotape and asked me did I know any of them, what part this one played. And all they showed at first was the dead communists, you know, the face blown off — the shot from right on top of him. And my back was hurting that day, and he offered me a seat, but I wanted to stand. The FBI agent sits there looking at the thing, and I'm sort of kneeling down beside of him. All I could say was, "That's a damned gruesome thing, that's terrible." When I left, I thought why the hell did they show me that. Reaction, I think. Cause they knew damn well, they *knew* them. What the hell difference would it make if I knew em, the dead people?

I'd rather not talk about the police at this time. I got some good answers for you. You know, the dates and a couple of calls, I'm not going to disclose to anybody. But I got tapes on three of them. You know, they said it would be their word against my word on some of this stuff. You know, life's funny. There are people on the police department that you don't think *shouldn't* be exposed. I mean, they're not looking out for me. And of course, I said this to one guy, and he said, "Eddie, we gotta stay away from you. You're like poison, we couldn't afford to talk to you." Because any time they talked to me, they gotta make a report on it. Same with the FBI. They'd say, "Sorry the way it went down." And I'd say, "Bull shit. Don't give me any of that crap. You never contacted me." He said, "We *couldn't*." Because any time I came over to talk with them, they had to report it, had to put it down. So all those records of the times I talked with the police should be somewhere in the police department.

Now, during the trial, Coman [the assistant district attorney] wanted me to take the stand, to contradict some

of the lies some of these guys were telling. Little things, nothing big. So I met with Coman and this other DA, Greeson, and this police captain. We're sitting in a hotel, and Coman — he's got a terrible reputation. He'll nail you to the cross. So I said to him, "I hear you're a sonofabitch as a DA." He says, "Well, you have to be. I won't be that way on you, though."

Well, of course, there were six damn defense attorneys who would chop the shit out of me and even if the judge might object or whatever, the whole story would have hit the fan. But Coman didn't care, he didn't give a damn. He said they could subpoena me, and I said, "Then I could do the 30 days." Refuse to testify, you know. Well, Greeson said, "I don't think it will come to that. Let's leave it go now. Go home, think about it. Call the captain here tomorrow morning, let him know your answer. I gotta know by 10 in the morning."

So next morning I called the captain. He didn't say hello or kiss my ass or nothing — just, "Very good, Ed. I knew we could depend on you." I said, "Whoa! How do you know what my answer is going to be?"

"Well," he said, "we figured you'd stay with last night's decision." I said, "Yeah. I'm not coming." I just wanted to make sure that we understood one another cause he caught me off guard. Just, "Good decision, Ed." But I got it on tape. I got lots of stuff on tape cause they said it would be my word

against theirs.

I took a real chance for the city of Greensboro. If I'd been found out by the Klan, I'd have been in real trouble. And this is what I tried to tell Chief Swing, and he got very hostile with me. Now, Swing, I went to see him two or three times and he was very, very nice. But when I went down with that, about the police providing me with a lawyer for the CWP suit, he says, "No, no." Like, get the hell out of here. It got out of hand. No more friendship.

I'd be stupid if I said I wasn't afraid. But I'm very fortunate in my life. . . . I don't care. So I think that helps a lot. I just don't give a damn no more. I look at it, if you gotta die, you gotta die. But I know these people, if you're referring to whether they'd do bodily harm or not. I got a pretty good wife. And I do look over my shoulder constantly, yeah.

You know the risks you're taking when you join the Klan. It's not a boy scout outfit. I told that to Robert Shelton once. He made a remark about how this trouble's gotta stop in the Klan — we can't afford all this trouble with Klansmen going out and shooting up and burning crosses and getting caught. I said, "Don't tell me that shit. This ain't no boy scout outfit. You're not running no boy scouts, you're running the Ku Klux Klan." So you wanta be big, you gotta act big. But deep down, yeah, I'm scared. It's the bottom line. □

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CONCLUSION

From the evidence gathered in this report, there should be no doubt that Klan and Nazi members planned an assault on militant anti-racists who were peacefully assembled under the terms of a parade permit at a black housing project. The infringement on the demonstrators' legal rights and the resulting deaths of five human beings ultimately led the U.S. Attorney in Greensboro, H.M. Michaux, Jr., to recommend "strong, decisive action" from the Justice Department, namely federal prosecution of the Klan and Nazis under 18 U.S.C. 241 and 245(b) (4) for "conspiracy against the rights of citizens." At this writing, nearly five months after that recommendation, there has been no federal action whatsoever against those responsible for the November Third assault and killings.

The failure of the U.S. Government to act cannot be excused by the Justice Department's statements that it is still "studying the matter" or that it "needs to determine its jurisdiction" in the case. Since the basis for action is compelling, continued inaction can only give rise to speculation about the political motivation of the Department or its double standard in choosing which citizens to protect and which to prosecute. As U.S. Attorney Michaux wrote in his recommendation to the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department six weeks before he resigned to make way for a Reagan appointee, "It would indeed be hypocritical for the Administration to express concern about the rise of violence and its effects on our citizens, or the right to life of the unborn, yet stand idly by when five human beings are gunned down in front of television cameras by fanatical members of hate groups solely because of their ideology."

On behalf of the FBI and BATF, the Justice Department has, however, responded to the CWP's massive civil suit against all parties involved in the November 3 killings: "Reduced to it's (sic) simplest terms, the plaintiffs' claim can only be that, when federal investigative officials become aware of a purportedly calculated nonfeasance

on the part of local law enforcement authorities, they have some duty to act so as to prevent or mitigate the resulting damage. This view does not comport with the duties of federal officers as established by law, nor does it comport with sound notions of federalism." In other words, even if the BATF or FBI knew that the Greensboro police planned to allow a violent confrontation to occur in a highly-populated residential area, it was not the federal government's responsibility to protect either the intended victims or the innocent by-standers.

Historically, the Justice Department has proven a fickle friend of politically unpopular radicals. In fact, many aspects of this case bear disturbing similarities to attacks on civil rights activists during the 1960s: in repeated incidents, FBI and police informants became leaders in organizations which attacked civil rights demonstrators while police and federal authorities stood by or were purposefully absent. This report documents that Greensboro police informant Ed Dawson recruited participants for the planned attack on the CWP demonstrators, warned his police contact of a planned confrontation, and personally led the caravan to the demonstrators' assembly point. Furthermore, we now know that police had the caravan under surveillance from its formation point, knew it was heavily armed, followed its route for 17 minutes, yet did not dispatch a single officer to intercept it, warn its intended victims or move to protect residents of the Morningside housing project. The police and prosecutor later encouraged the suppression of Dawson's possible testimony in court, and in other ways diverted attention from and covered up the central question of the police department's knowledge of and participation in the KKK-Nazi attack.

We cannot in good conscience allow the police, prosecutor, city officials and Justice Department to duck this central question by insisting that the CWP's ideology and disruptive tactics justified their actions. In a democracy, that excuse only points up the racism, anti-communism and double-standard underlying the government's approach to this entire case. It is unimaginable, for example, that these same authorities would have acted the same had the tables

been turned and a group of gun-toting communists formed a caravan and headed into a white neighborhood to assault a group of self-proclaimed "patriots."

Whether or not we disagree with the CWP's actions and rhetoric is beside the point: we feel free to criticize them as we would any other political organization. The critical issue is what those in charge of enforcing our society's laws did to diminish all our rights. For if the government does not provide equal protection under the law, then no citizen or organization is safe from being selected out for special treatment — or mistreatment.

Because justice must be done, because we must have a public accounting of the extent of the intimate relationship between the police and KKK-Nazi caravan, and because we must know the degree to which local officials, the prosecutor and federal agents covered up and/or furthered the essential injustice of the November Third confrontation, we strongly recommend:

- The Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Justice Department move immediately on the advice of the U.S. Attorney to prosecute the KKK and Nazi attackers.

- A Congressional investigation be launched into the Justice Department's handling of the Greensboro case; into the role of Treasury Department agents, and all other relevant public officials and agencies in planning, executing and covering up the KKK-Nazi caravan's organization and mission; and into the adequacy of federal statutes to protect citizens when local officials fail to uphold the exercise of their constitutional rights.

- Greensboro citizens be encouraged to pursue an independent investigation into the role of city, state and federal officials in thwarting their effective self-organization and to demand a public accounting of the city officials' actions through a citizens review commission or whatever mechanism they feel appropriate. □

Additional copies of this report are available by sending a check for \$3 to the Institute for Southern Studies, P.O. Box 531, Durham, NC 27702. Ask for the Third of November report.

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ ~~AIRTEL~~

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 12/15/81

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (44A-81521)
 ATTENTION: SUPERVISOR [REDACTED]
 CIVIL RIGHTS UNIT
 ROOM 5131

FROM: SAC, CHARLOTTE (44A-3527)

GREENKIL

Enclosed herewith are three (3) copies each of FD-302s
 with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Two (2) copies of these FD-302s should be made available
 immediately to Attorney [REDACTED] Civil Rights Division,
 United States Department of Justice.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6-12-84 BY SP2TAP/JAC

3 ENC - CRR
 6 ENC - TO DOJ, CRR.
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44-81521-206

5 DEC 21 1981

② - Bureau (Encs. 9)

1 - Charlotte

HPB:swl

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Approved: [Signature]

Transmitted (Number) (Time)

Per

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PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
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CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
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☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 12/23/81

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (44A-81521)
ATTENTION: SUPERVISOR [REDACTED]
CIVIL RIGHTS UNIT
ROOM 5131

FROM: SAC, CHARLOTTE (44A-3527)

GREENKIL

Enclosed herewith are six (6) copies each of two (2) FD-302s with [REDACTED] Three (3) copies of these FD-302s do not have the bottom portion of the first page or the file number on each page.

It should be noted the FD-302s without the administrative material indicated above has been the form used in the past in making the interview results available to CWP Attorneys.

Appropriate copies of these FD-302s should be made available immediately to Attorney [REDACTED] Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice.

4 ENC - [unclear] dated 1/4/82
2-ENC - CRD, USD 0.703 1/4/82
2-CRW

(2) - Bureau (Encs. 12)

1 - Charlotte

HPB:swl
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ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

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Approved: [Signature]

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Per

JAN 25 1982

ENCLOSED TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (44A-81521)
ATTENTION: SUPERVISOR [REDACTED]
CIVIL RIGHTS UNIT
ROOM 5131

FROM: SAC, CHARLOTTE (44A-3527)

GREENKIL

Enclosed herewith are six (6) copies each of two
(2) FD-302s with [REDACTED]
(Encs. 12)

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DATE 6-12-84 BY SP2 TAP/JAC

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 10/30/81 & 12/17/81

[redacted] was interviewed at the New York Office of the FBI, 26 Federal Plaza, New York City, New York. Present during the interview besides the interviewing Agents were [redacted] Attorney, U. S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, and [redacted] was accompanied by his attorneys, [redacted] and [redacted]

At the outset of the interview, Departmental Attorney [redacted] advised [redacted] and his counsel that this interview was being conducted by agreement between [redacted] another attorney of [redacted] and with the understanding that the purpose of the interview was to assist the Department of Justice in its continuing investigation into the shooting incident which occurred on November 3, 1979, at Greensboro, North Carolina. [redacted] was advised that the interviews would be conducted by the Special Agents of the FBI who were identified to [redacted] by name, and that copies of the reports filed from these interviews would be furnished to [redacted] [redacted] through his counsel for review and concurrence.

[redacted] advised that it came to his attention, as well as other members in his organization, that there was an increase in the growth of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), not only in the State of North Carolina, but in other states in the United States. [redacted] stated that through the public news media, he became aware of the fact that a recruiting drive was being contemplated by members of the KKK at China Grove, North Carolina, and that they planned to show their recruiting movie, "The Birth of a Nation," on July 8, 1979, at China Grove.

It became known to members of the Workers Viewpoint Organization (WVO) that the citizens of China Grove and the local community were against the showing of this movie and the recruiting efforts of the KKK, however, the local administration refused to deny a permit to the KKK as they felt this would be a violation of the rights of this organization.

Because of popular support in the community, which was determined by interviews of various people in the local community of China Grove, as well as some of the comments made

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6-12-84 BY SP2TAP/AC

Investigation on 10/19/81 at New York City, New York File # CE 44A-3527

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted]
TJB:jat/swl Date dictated 10/26/81

by members of the City Council, [redacted] and members of his organization believed that the people were against this recruiting drive by the KKK and, therefore, they went about rallying popular support from the local community to have a protest at the time of the recruiting drive by the KKK.

[redacted] advised that an ad hoc committee, which was composed of different groups to include members of the WVO and local members of the community of China Grove, gathered together and supported a demonstration to show the KKK the people of this community were against their organization.

[redacted] advised that the resurgence of the KKK in the United States, and in North Carolina, was an effort of the power structure of this country to keep a division between Blacks and whites. Historically, according to [redacted] the KKK was used by the power structure to keep this racial bigotry in existence so that the white and Black working classes of the community could not unite together. It was through this racial antagonism that the power structure obscured the real economic issues and if this poisonous philosophy was allowed to spread, it would further drive a wedge between the Black and white workers of the country.

[redacted] cited an example of the J. P. Stevens Company in which he alleged that racism and anti-Black propaganda which was spread by the KKK, was used to "throw dust in people's eyes," and that whites believed that if unions were accepted, Blacks would be taking the jobs from the whites.

Because of this, [redacted] advised that in July, 1979, the focus of the WVO did center upon the KKK and its resurgence in North Carolina and other states.

It was, therefore, decided by this coalition of various members of the China Grove area that there would be a march or demonstration against the KKK when they had a recruiting drive at China Grove.

[redacted] advised he drove to China Grove on July 8, 1979, by himself after he had finished his duty

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[redacted] North Carolina. He advised that he went to the assembly area where he met with other marchers, but could not recall exactly where this was.

The subject matter of this assembly was to encourage the people in attendance to oppose the KKK.

[redacted] advised that he did not carry a sign or any posters, but others in the march might have. [redacted] advised that he went to where the KKK was having their meeting and recognized some of the KKK participants by the fact that they were wearing uniforms and some were heavily armed. [redacted] could not recall what the uniforms were, but indicated it was his belief that some were wearing the KKK security force uniform, and that later he was able to identify ROLAND WOOD as having attended this meeting although at the time he did not know who ROLAND WOOD was.

[redacted] advised that approximately 10 minutes of chanting started from this group which went to the meeting place of the KKK and the chants were generally in the area of down with the Klan, smash the Klan, and a chant which he had not heard before, "Decease - decease - decease the rotten beast."

After about 10 minutes of chanting, the KKK, which was in front of the building, went inside the community center and at that time, some of the demonstrators in his group seized the Confederate flag and burned it. [redacted] defined the Confederate flag as being the symbol of racism and that is why it was burned by the demonstrators.

[redacted] advised that the size of the crowd at this China Grove Community Center were about 25-50 members of the KKK, and approximately 100 members of their group.

[redacted] advised that he did recall seeing two or three uniformed police officers, believed to be city policemen, at the community center and he understood that possibly there was a State Trooper parked outside the area.

[redacted] advised that he later learned that there was an assembly of policemen somewhere outside the area, but he actually never saw them.

In regard to the police officers being there, [] advised that he felt there was some kind of collusion between the police and the KKK that were at the China Grove Community Center because he would periodically see the police officers talking with various members of the KKK.

During this demonstration, [] advised the only statements he recalled coming from members of the KKK were statements such as "M.F., Nigger lovers," and obscene gestures by members of the KKK, raising their middle finger to the demonstrators.

[] described the characteristics of the two groups as his group, the WVO, and community demonstrators as being a bi-racial group, that is, a mixture of Black and white citizens, and described the KKK and their sympathizers as being all white.

[] advised that he did not know whether or not EDDIE DAWSON, or [] were present at the China Grove meeting and advised that he did not see them, however, at that time he did not know them or what they looked like.

After this China Grove incident, the local news media in Charlotte, Durham, Salisbury, and [] believes Channel 2 TV from Greensboro, North Carolina, had stories of and articles relative to the protest at China Grove, North Carolina, on July 8, 1979. Also following that, leaflets published by the WVO did stress the theme of Death to the Klan in North Carolina.

[] was asked whether or not he observed in addition to the weapons being carried by the members of the KKK, any weapons being carried by any members of their group, and he acknowledged that some people in their group were carrying weapons which were visible.

[] advised that after the China Grove incident, a great deal of interest was gathered by the public into the WVO's anti-Klan campaign. [] advised that there were numerous incidents which showed there was a lot of interest in the public for an anti-Klan movement.

It was because of this public interest, that a November 3 rally in Greensboro, North Carolina, was planned and the theme of it would be "Death to the Klan."

[] was asked to describe what was meant by the theme, "Death to the Klan," and he advised that "Death to the Klan" was meant to be the destruction of the KKK as a racist organization in the United States and that through public knowledge of what the KKK was really like, that there would not be popular support for such an organization, and therefore, the Klan as an organization would cease to exist.

[] also alleged that the KKK was, in fact, a political arm of various groups to include the police and the FBI and that these organizations used the KKK and their racist activity for their own purposes.

In regard to the meetings for the November 3, 1979, rally at Greensboro, North Carolina, [] advised that there was no broad open meeting. [] advised that various organizations were highly supportive of their plans to have a rally in Greensboro, North Carolina, but he did not recall any coalition type group being organized for the planning purpose of this rally.

In regard to the November 3, 1979, rally at Greensboro, North Carolina, [] advised that this was not to be a confrontation between the KKK and the WVO. If anything, [] advised they were more concerned about police and FBI tactics than they were over the KKK. [] advised that at that time, he did not know what extent people would go to silence those opposing them.

[] advised that the first time he saw [] was at a press conference in Greensboro, North Carolina.

[] advised that the KKK and Nazis worked with and were used by the police, and further stated that the KKK was a terrorist organization which acts as a surrogate for the powers to be.

[] advised that the first press conference relative to the November 3rd rally and march at Greensboro occurred at Kannapolis, at Cannon Mills, in mid

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[redacted] advised [redacted] [redacted] were present, and approximately 6 to 8 media representatives were also there. At this conference, various literature was distributed to the people of Cannon Mills and [redacted] advised that he did not know whether or not he had any of these documents left at this time or who did. [redacted] lawyers advised that they would check to determine whether or not any of this literature which was distributed at this meeting was available and copies would be furnished to the Department of Justice.

[redacted] advised the next press conference was held on November 1, 1979, at Greensboro, North Carolina, in the front of the Greensboro Police Department. The purpose of the press conference was to draw attention to the public of the November 3rd march and also to bring out to the public's attention the obstruction by the police of their efforts to have this march and rally. [redacted] advised that the police had torn down their posters which advertised the march, they had intentionally stalled on the granting of a permit, however after the press conference. [redacted]

[redacted] advised that it normally takes 72 hours for the process to obtain a parade permit and in this instance it had taken over two weeks. [redacted] was questioned as to whether or not he knew the names of these individuals who were attempting to disrupt the organization for the march, and he said he did not, but thought [redacted] might know.

[redacted] advised that [redacted] at the press conference and that this press conference at Greensboro on November 1, 1979, had between 20 and 25 reporters and approximately two TV stations covering it. [redacted] at the press conference accused the police of attempting to inhibit this march against the KKK and reiterated that the theme of the march would be "Death to the Klan." [redacted] advised that "Death to the Klan" meant that the Klan would cease to exist as a political organization and that through a combination of public pressure, self defense, knowledge, and that the Klan does not serve the interest of the people, the Klan as a political organization would cease to exist.

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At this press conference, literature and pamphlets were also distributed, expressing the purpose of the rally and furnishing information to the public about the march and subsequent meeting afterwards.

Again, [] advised that he did not believe he had any of these pamphlets or leaflets in his possession at this time, and that if there were any such leaflets still available, the attorneys for [] would make them available to the Department of Justice.

[] advised this was the last public meeting before the November 3, 1979 march and following the meeting the information regarding the march and rally was passed through individuals speaking to individuals.

[] advised that it was his understanding at first that the march would be concluded at the All Nations Penecostal Church and it was there that they would have their rally. however, the [] had advised [] that this facility could not be used, and that other arrangements would have to be made. [] advised that [] would know the reasons why the church was not available.

[] advised that after the shooting incident, he had heard that Lieutenant [] had stated that he did not know the assembly area was at Everitt and Carver Street, and that to him this was shocking information.

[] advised the parade permit had specified the assembly area as being Everitt and Carver Street, and that the public announcements as to a gathering area at the Windsor Community Center was for the purpose of permitting people who were coming in from out of town to have access to an area easily identifiable. He stated that there was a complete understanding between the police and [] that the group would follow the parade permit in detail, and the parade permit specified the assembly area would be Everitt and Carver Street. Despite the public announcements which was made about the assembly area being at the Windsor Community Center, [] advised that [] had told him that he had been naively honest with the Police Department and that the Police Department fully understood that the assembly area would be Everitt and Carver Street and this was the location from where the group would begin their march on November 3, 1979.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 11/2/81 & 12/17/81

[redacted] was interviewed at the New York Office of the FBI, 26 Federal Plaza, New York City, New York, relative to his knowledge and observation of the shooting incident which occurred on November 3, 1979, at Greensboro, North Carolina. This was a continuation of an interview which had commenced on October 19, 1981, and due to a prior appointment, concluded at approximately 4:00 P.M. on that date.

Present during this interview were the interviewing Agents, and [redacted] Departmental Attorney, Civil Rights Section, U. S. Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., and [redacted] attorneys, [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] who had accompanied [redacted] on October 19, 1981, was not present and had forwarded his apologies through [redacted] that he would be unavailable to attend this interview.

At the beginning of the interview, [redacted] advised [redacted] and his attorneys of the nature of the interview and that the inquiry was being conducted at the request of the Department of Justice relative to their on-going investigation into the shooting incident which occurred on November 3, 1979.

[redacted] advised that on November 2, 1979, the evening prior to the march and rally at Greensboro, there was a meeting of approximately 15 to 20 people in Durham, North Carolina, relative to discussions involving the parade route, the making and preparation of the signs, the cutting of the sticks in accordance with the parade permit stipulations, and the preparation of leaflets for distribution. [redacted] advised this meeting took place at what is now being designated as the Caesar Cauce and Mike Nathan Bookstore at Durham, North Carolina.

[redacted] recalled that CAESAR CAUCE was present but could not recall the names of all the individuals who participated.

[redacted] advised that he did not know whether or not there was a similar meeting being conducted at Greensboro,

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DATE 6-12-84 BY SP2 TAC/KAC

Investigation on 10/26/81 at New York City, New York File # CE 44A-3527

SAs [redacted]
by [redacted] RUB:jat/swl Date dictated 10/29/81

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North Carolina, on this same date relative to organization for the rally and parade in Greensboro.

In regard to his knowledge as to where to meet in Greensboro, he advised that CAUCE was the contact with the groups at Greensboro, and it was his understanding that the assembly area would be at Everitt and Carver Street in Greensboro, North Carolina. Some of the people coming to the rally would meet at the Windsor Community Center and then as the group marched by from Everitt and Carver Street, they would pick up the other people at the Windsor Community Center.

[redacted] advised that his understanding for the assembly at the Windsor Community Center was because this was a more identifiable location in Greensboro, just off Lee Street, and therefore, people coming in from out of town would have less difficulty locating that area rather than the Everitt and Carver Street location. [redacted] advised that he did not recall seeing any written information regarding the exact route nor did he have a copy of the parade permit on that date, however, knew on November 1, 1979, that they had a legal parade permit although he had not personally seen it.

On the morning of November 3, 1979, [redacted] advised that [redacted] traveled to Greensboro, North Carolina, in their [redacted] which at that time had North Carolina license [redacted] [redacted] advised that he could not recall the middle number of the license plate numbers.

[redacted] advised that he arrived at WALLER's residence somewhere between 10:00 and 11:00 AM on the morning of November 3, 1979, and that they stayed at that location a short period of time. Other individuals who came from Durham also went to WALLER's house as an initial meeting place.

[redacted] advised that he talked to WALLER on that date but it was just casual talk as they were friends and he believes they may have had coffee with him at the residence. [redacted] could not recall whether or not CAUCE was at Dr. WALLER's house at the same time.

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[redacted] advised that following their visit to WALLER's house, they then left and went to the Summit Shopping Center at approximately 10:30 A.M. The purpose of going to the shopping center was to buy some batteries for the small walkie-talkies they were carrying and they also stopped and had some coffee.

[redacted] advised that it was his understanding that they were to meet approximately one-half hour before the march, that is at approximately 11:30 A.M. on the morning of November 3, 1979, at Everitt and Carver Street and that the march would start at approximately 12:00 noon.

In regard to a question as to whether or not he knew of any information regarding an invitation extended to the KKK to attend the rally and march being sponsored by the WVO at Greensboro, [redacted] acknowledged that he did. He stated it was his understanding that on the back of a leaflet, some individual who he did not know, wrote an open letter to the leadership of the KKK. This open letter was an invitation to the KKK to come and face the wrath of the people, however, since he was not personally involved, he does not know who was the author of this letter.

This letter was in response to the formation by the Klan and the Nazis of a group designated as the United Racist Front. According to the Raleigh News and Observer, the formation of this United Racist Front took place sometime between September 20 and 22, 1979, at a combined meeting held on the outskirts of Raleigh, North Carolina. As a result of the efforts by the Klan and Nazis to form this United Front the new group issued public statements. The letter was prepared after the issuance of these public statements and served as the WVO's answer. [redacted] did not know if the letter was actually delivered to the leadership of the Klan or Nazis. It may have just been delivered to the public news media.

[redacted] advised it was his understanding from public statements made by [redacted] leaders of the Klan, that they had no intentions of coming to the November 3 rally and march in Greensboro.

[redacted] advised that after China Grove, the Klan had made no public announcements relative to their activities, except that he specifically recalls that the Klan leaders stated in the public media that they would not attend the November 3rd rally. He believes that [redacted] made such statements.

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[redacted] was asked whether or not he was aware of the different Klan groups in existence and he advised that from reading in the public news media and from personal research at the library, and other reading, he had become familiar with the history of the Klan and of its various factions. He identified those factions as being the Federal Knights of the KKK, the White Knights of Liberty, and others to include the Nazis and other break-away units.

[redacted] was also familiar with the leadership of the Klan and the names of [redacted] and VIRGIL GRIFFIN.

[redacted] also advised the interviewers that it was reported by the news media, the Greensboro Daily News, in an article on June 28, 1980, that the Treasury Agent who was undercover with the Nazi Party, had offered to drive the [redacted]

[redacted] advised that he had no idea that an undercover Agent was in the Nazis and the KKK on November 3, 1979.

[redacted] advised that he expected this rally and march to be a non-violent march and to be basically an educational and organizing conference to educate people against the racism of the KKK.

[redacted] advised it was his understanding initially that the All Nations Penecostal Church would be used as the conference area after the finish of the march, however, [redacted]

[redacted] did not know the reasons for the cancellation and indicated that this information had been given by [redacted] to [redacted] on November 1, 1979. [redacted]

[redacted] advised that they left WALLER's home at approximately 10:30 A.M. and traveled in [redacted] to the Summit Avenue Shopping Center where they bought some batteries for their walkie-talkies and had some coffee. Shortly thereafter, they arrived at the Morningside Homes and estimated that at the time they arrived at Everitt and Carver Street, there was a racially mixed group of between 50 and 60 people in the area.

[redacted] advised that [redacted] was standing near the Community Center with a group of people and children singing, and some of the people were helping put posters on and around the sound truck.

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[redacted] advised that he had a brief conversation with reporters at this location, and recalls that shortly thereafter, SANDY SMITH made a comment to them that she was surprised there was no police in the area.

[redacted] advised that he expected to see a number of police in this assembly area and throughout the parade route. He stated that they did not anticipate trouble and what trouble they did anticipate, he believed would have come from the police. [redacted] advised that the police had already attempted to disrupt their organization of this march by tearing down posters and, therefore, he was surprised by not seeing the police present at Everitt and Carver Street on that morning. [redacted] stated that the police should have anticipated trouble and that in most other cities that he is familiar with, the police are usually at the location of such a demonstration an hour or so in advance of the assembly time.

[redacted] advised that he could recall making no statement regarding the police being there or not being there in the public media and that while it was his expectation they would be there an hour or so prior to the march, he had no prior experience in dealing with the Greensboro Police Department. [redacted] advised that he expected if there would be any trouble, it would probably be after the march and not prior to it.

In regard to the statements made by [redacted] that the police were the disruptive force and they did not want the police disrupting their march on November 3, 1979, he stated that [redacted] did make such statements to the Police Department in the public media. He further stated that he heard [redacted] state on television that "The police never do what I say do."

[redacted] advised that he never recalled seeing any police officer come to the Everitt and Carver Street location, prior to this shooting incident.

[redacted] advised that as he was standing on Everitt Street, near the intersection of Carver, he became aware of a line of vehicles starting to pass the area where they were assembling. The vehicles were occupied by white people and he recalled that one of the individuals leaned out of the window and shouted something about China Grove.

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[redacted] advised he also recalls seeing EDDIE DAWSON in one of these vehicles and believes he was a passenger sitting in the passenger side in one of the sedans that passed him. When asked how he recognized EDDIE DAWSON, [redacted] advised that he first recalled seeing DAWSON on the November 1, 1979, press conference. He stated he did not know his name at that time but did recall his face as he seemed out of place at the press conference.

[redacted] advised that after the press conference on November 1, 1979, he walked over to DAWSON and engaged with him in conversation. DAWSON identified himself as being a local business contractor and made the general statement that he could not believe that the KKK would still be present and active in a city like Greensboro in this day and age. From this conversation, [redacted] advised that he believed DAWSON was giving the impression that he was on their side on that particular date. He stated, however, he was very skeptical of him and that something was definitely fishy about him when he was talking to him. He stated that [redacted] also joined them for a couple of minutes and then left.

Shortly after DAWSON left his location, he recalled seeing DAWSON talking to an individual who had come from the Police Department Headquarters and described this individual as wearing a gold trench coat but could not further identify him. He stated that he was approximately the same height as DAWSON and that he was of a more stocky build. He also recalled this individual had sandy brown hair, and was possibly wearing metal frame glasses because of the reflection of the sunlight off the edges of them. This individual gave DAWSON a pink sheet of paper.

[redacted] advised that the next time he saw DAWSON was in the line of vehicles, which was part of the KKK caravan on November 3, 1979.

[redacted] advised that after the person in one of these vehicles yelled something about China Grove, others started yelling, Kill the Kikes, Kill the Niggers, and he recalled looking down the street and saw an individual leaning out of a pick-up truck. He stated this individual had a hand gun in his hand, and fired a single shot into the air.

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[redacted] advised that just prior to that incident, the group that he was with had been chanting, Death to the Klan, however, he, himself, did not see any disturbance prior to this incident where the shot was fired. He stated following that shot, some people in the crowd did hit one or two of the vehicles with sticks or their feet.

[redacted] advised shortly after that, there was more gunfire and all the people were running up Carver Street. [redacted] advised that he ran back up Carver Street, and across the street and sought cover near one of the buildings.

[redacted] advised that all this happened in a matter of a few seconds, and therefore, he cannot be specifically detailed as to exactly what happened in each instance. He stated that all he could recall was the volume of gunfire, and the fact that he ran across Carver Street and then stood against the buildings on the opposite side of the street.

[redacted] advised the next thing he recalled was he remembered CESAR CAUCE on the lawn section near where he was standing and there were five or six people around him beating him. He recalls one hit him with a very large stick, and at approximately this time, he began to run towards CAUCE to assist him. [redacted] advised that at this time, he did have a placard in his hand but nothing else and as he was moving to assist CAUCE, something hit him and knocked him off his feet.

[redacted] advised at that time he did not know CAUCE had already been shot, but later learned from watching the films of the shooting incident.

[redacted] advised that after he was knocked off his feet, he tried to but he could not get up. He stated that he heard shooting around him, but could not recall anybody being nearby or around him. He stated that he learned afterwards that WALLER [redacted]

[redacted] advised that he recalls hearing a tremendous amount of gunfire, and when it stopped, he kept thinking that he wanted to get up and help. He stated that

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he heard people [redacted]
he wanted to help the others but initially could not understand why he could not get up to assist them. He stated at that time, he began to realize that he may have been shot but did not know the extent of his injuries.

He stated he heard conversations around him clearly to the effect that JIM was dead, that SANDY was dead, and then he recalled [redacted] and began talking to him. [redacted] advised that after a period of time his vision became blurred because of the swelling around his eyes from the injury he received, and he could no longer see what was taking place. [redacted] described his injuries as being a [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] also displayed
to the interviewers the area of another gunshot wound to his [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] advised that while he was laying on the ground, during the large volume of firing, he did see and hear [redacted] fire some shots towards the KKK who had shot down CAUCE and the others. He stated that he did not know how many shots she had fired, however, did know she fired with a handgun. [redacted] advised that also from conversation he recalls that [redacted] also fired some shot from a Derringer and then the gun jammed. It was his understanding from their conversation that he was across the street near one of the TV cameramen when he fired that one shot in the direction of the KKK vehicles that were then fleeing the area.

[redacted] advised that while he was at the assembly, neither he [redacted] any weapons in their possession. He advised that he did own a weapon, a .12 gauge shotgun and also a .38 caliber revolver but these were at his residence in [redacted] North Carolina, and that he did not bring them with him to this assembly.

[redacted] advised that to his knowledge, Dr. WALLER, with whom he went to this assembly area at Everitt and Carver Street, also had no weapons. He stated that he was not aware that anybody at this assembly had weapons, either opened or concealed. He stated that he did not see any shotgun in [redacted] pickup truck and did not know that [redacted] had brought a weapon with him until after this incident had occurred.

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[redacted] advised that he also became aware of the fact after the shooting incident that WILLIAM SAMPSON had fired in the direction of the KKK and that he was shot in the chest when he was standing near the Channel 12 News truck. According to statements he had heard, WILLIAM SAMPSON was firing at the KKK at the time he was struck, and understood that [redacted] had taken the gun after SAMPSON was struck. He stated he did not know whether or not [redacted] had fired.

In examining the possible number of gunshots fired by members of his group, [redacted] advised that if the three individuals who had fired a weapon, [redacted] and SAMPSON, could not have fired more than 13 shots. [redacted] advised that at no time did he see any members of his group in possession of a shotgun or rifle, and at no time in conversation after the shooting incident did anybody in their group ever discuss firing a shotgun or a rifle in the direction of the KKK.

In reviewing the films with [redacted] [redacted] advised that he had no recollection whatsoever of the street fight which occurred in the intersection of Everitt and Carver Street. In reviewing the films [redacted] advised that the white male with the dark hair which appears on the slow motion films in the center of Carver Street, does appear from the coloring to be him, however, he does not recall that incident whatsoever and cannot be sure whether that is him or not. [redacted] also advised in reviewing the films with the interviewers, that he did not recall the incident nor did he observe the incident where demonstrators struck vehicles of the KKK after passing by in the caravan. He stated his first recollection of that was after the first shot was fired by the individual who leaned out of the pickup truck.

[redacted] in viewing the films, identified himself standing adjacent to the building on Carver Street in the vicinity where CAUCE was involved in a fight with three or four members of the KKK. [redacted] advised that this was the incident that he recalled and it was at this time that he was attempting to come to CAUCE's assistance when he got shot. [redacted] advised that he does not know who shot him, nor can he recall any incident prior to it where a man was running by him with a shotgun pointed in his direction.

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In regard to the question as to the blue construction type hats being worn by some of the demonstrators of his group, [] advised that it was his understanding that they used these construction hats as protection as they were afraid they might be attacked by the police during the march.

[] advised that it was also his understanding that people who had viewed these films carefully had identified one of the members of the KKK and Nazis as pointing out individuals to be shot, and then this was followed by a large volume of gunfire.

That portion of the film was played for [] [] In each instance, he identified the individual pointing up the street as being [] He stated this was the part of the film in which he understood [] was pointing at individuals as possible targets.

In viewing the film and listening to the sound track, [] concurred that at this time, there was no large volume of fire, but it was near the end of the shooting incident and there were but two or three additional shots fired at that time. Also, in viewing the film, it could be noted that the individuals slain on that date were already wounded and on the ground at the time of this pointing incident.

At the conclusion of the interview, [] was asked if there was anything further which he wished to add to his interview and he advised that he wished to see the government conduct a thorough and detailed investigation of the shooting incident which occurred on November 3, 1979, and not to have any cover-ups. [] was asked what specific investigation he would suggest be conducted by the Department of Justice into this area and he suggested the following:

1. A detailed interview of EDDIE DAWSON and the association of EDDIE DAWSON with the Greensboro Police Department and the FBI.

2. Detailed interview of Agent [] from the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agency and his dealings with the Nazi Party.

3. The cover-up where a portion of the statement furnished by [redacted] to the FBI and police was erased by the agents interviewing him.

4. The fact that MIKE SCHLOSSER, District Attorney, Guilford County, did not aggressively pursue the prosecution of these Klan members and also that an FBI Task Force leader, who had come from Washington, D.C., to control the task force initially had recommended the dismissal of all conspiracy charges against the KKK. [redacted] could not be specific as to what task force from the FBI he was discussing, but he indicated he understood that the head of the task force which had come from Washington had recommended to the local authorities that the conspiracy charges charging first degree murder against members of the KKK be dismissed.

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FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS.

Date 12/17/81

b6
b7C

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (44A-81521)
 ATTENTION: SUPERVISOR [REDACTED]
 CIVIL RIGHTS UNIT
 ROOM 5131

FROM: SAC, CHARLOTTE (44A-3527)
 GREENKIL

Enclosed herewith are six (6) copies of an FD-302 with [REDACTED] Three (3) copies of the FD-302 do not have the bottom portion of the first page or the file number on each page.

It should be noted the FD-302s without the administrative material indicated above has been the form used in the past in making the interview results available to CWP Attorneys.

Appropriate copies of this FD-302 should be made available immediately to Attorney [REDACTED] Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice.

2 Enc to New York
 Bureau 1/4/81
 1 Enc to CORD, USDO 0-70B 1/4/81
 1 CRU #

② - Bureau (Encs. 6)

1 - Charlotte

HPB:swl
(3)

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6-12-84 BY SP2TAP/JAC

44-81521-208
23 JAN 7 1992

Approved: P/HMB

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

JAN 20 1982
9V

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (44A-81521)
ATTENTION: SUPERVISOR [REDACTED]
CIVIL RIGHTS UNIT
ROOM 5131

FROM: SAC, CHARLOTTE (44A-3527)

GREENKIL

Enclosed herewith are six (6) copies of FD-302
with [REDACTED]

(Encs. 6)

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b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-12-84 BY SP2TAP/JAC



ENCLOSURE

44-3527-208

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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10/23/81 & 12/16/81

Date of transcription

[redacted] was interviewed at the Manhattan Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 26 Federal Plaza, New York City, New York. [redacted] was accompanied by her attorneys, [redacted] of Chicago, Illinois, and [redacted] of New York City, New York. Also present during the interview, in addition to the two interviewing Special Agents of the FBI, was Attorney [redacted] of the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Washington, D. C.

At the initiation of the interview, [redacted] was advised of the identity of the two interviewing Agents as Special Agents of the FBI and [redacted] advised that the purpose of the interview was to obtain from [redacted] any information, knowledge, and observations she had as it relates to the shooting incident at Everitt and Carver Streets on November 3, 1979, at Greensboro, North Carolina.

[redacted] advised that prior to the China Grove incident, which occurred on July 8, 1979, to her knowledge, there had been no prior confrontation between representatives of her group, the Worker's Viewpoint Organization (WVO); and members of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and Nazi Party. [redacted] advised that she and [redacted] did not demonstrate at the China Grove incident on July 8, 1979, as they were attending the [redacted]

[redacted] advised that from her personal efforts in Union organizing at the White Oak Plant, during the Spring of 1979, she knew the KKK was against their efforts to unionize the employees of that firm. She stated that the KKK attempted to disrupt their Union organizing efforts and that she had heard that Klan leaflets had been passed out in the plant but she, herself, had not seen any.

[redacted] described her efforts and her committee's efforts in the White Oak Plant as being an effort to build rank and file democracy in the existing Union and that she knew historically that the KKK was against Union activity. [redacted] advised that the Union organizing efforts were associated with the WVO, an organization she was associated with at that time.

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DATE 6-12-84 BY SP 27AP/BAZ

[redacted] advised that sometime after the incident, which occurred at China Grove, the WVO began planning for a rally to be sponsored at Greensboro, North Carolina, with the theme to be anti-Klan. During the month of October, 1979, she was involved in passing out leaflets and in posterizing which were calling for the support of the WVO's effort to do educational work in exposing the nature of the Klan, and its links with the government and corporations. Through this education and the demonstration, it was hoped that the Klan as an organization would not be able to organize in the State of North Carolina and elsewhere. [redacted] advised that the leaflets being passed out to the community during this period were calling for a march by the people at Greensboro, North Carolina, on November 3, 1979, to show the people's opposition to the KKK.

[redacted] also advised that during this period, October, 1979, she went throughout the Morning Side Neighborhood, and adjacent neighborhoods, and discussed with the residents of that community the forthcoming rally and march to be held in Greensboro on November 3, 1979. In the discussions with the residents of these neighborhoods, she discussed the purpose of the march and that the KKK was a racist organization that was anti-black, anti-Semitic, and that the Klan as an organization was increasing in its activity not only in North Carolina but throughout the United States. The march, which was to be held in Greensboro, North Carolina, on November 3, 1979, was to be a demonstration of popular support against Klan activity and also later to be an education and discussion session of those attending the rally and march. [redacted] advised that in these efforts, she talked both to black and white members of the community and that the purpose of selecting the Morning Side District, as well as other adjacent districts, was that these individuals and communities have historically been attacked by the Klan, and represented the working people in various industries around Greensboro, North Carolina.

[redacted] advised that she estimates that in talking with the people in these neighborhoods, she talked with approximately a 60 percent black ratio and a 40 percent white ratio. In addition to talking about the reasons for the march, she also consulted with these people in these neighborhoods as to not only their participation but also security which would be provided for them or which they could help in during this demonstration.

[redacted] advised that she did not directly become involved in the plan for the parade nor in planning the route for the parade. She advised that the people who handled this segment of the demonstration were the people who were killed on November 3, 1979, and they included but were not limited to WILLIAM SAMPSON [redacted] JIM WALLER, and others. [redacted] identified [redacted] as also having been involved in the planning for and the route for the march.

[redacted] advised that on November 2, 1979, in the evening, there was a planning meeting conducted at the home of JIM WALLER and that this meeting was basically related to the necessary preparations for the sound truck, planning of the singing, the assembly area, and the parade route, and the parade permit. All these matters were discussed by those attending the meeting, and it was basically a final organization effort prior to November 3, 1979, planned march.

[redacted] advised that as of that date, it was known that the assembly area for this march would be at the intersection of Everitt and Carver Street in Greensboro, North Carolina, and that some public announcements had been made that the assembly area would be at Windsor Center. The purpose for these announcements that it would be Windsor Center as the original starting point was mainly one for security to prevent an incident like what happened from occurring, and also to have a location for out-of-towners to meet. It was also planned that the group at Everitt and Carver Street, which would be the main assembly area, would march by and pickup the groups at Windsor Center and therefore avoid having the groups at Windsor Center march over to Everitt and Carver Street and then back again past the Windsor Center. [redacted] advised that it was her understanding from this planning meeting and from the statements of [redacted] that the parade route and the parade permit properly identified the assembly area as being Everitt and Carver Street in Greensboro, North Carolina.

[redacted] advised that on November 2, 1979, she does not recall nor did she participate in any of the press conferences that were called just prior to the November 3, 1979, planned rally.

In regard to the slogan "Death to the Klan," [redacted] [redacted] advised that it was her understanding that this was a strong statement denouncing the KKK's racism, anti-Semitic attitude, and their anti-Union stance.

[redacted] advised that she understood "Death to the Klan" to mean a destruction of the KKK as an organization and this demise would come through the people knowing what the Klan was really about and through this knowledge and public pressure, the KKK as an organization would cease to exist.

[redacted] advised that the Morning Side Community and similar communities, the Hampton Homes and Smith Homes, were selected in part because of the fact that they had been areas of anti-racist organizing work in the past and areas where work against police brutality had taken place.

[redacted] advised that the planned rally after the march was originally scheduled to be at the Pentecostal Church; however, due to external pressures, [redacted] and the Board of the Church denied them the right to use the church for their gathering. [redacted] advised that she understood from conversations with [redacted] that [redacted] and members of the Board of the Church, had complained that the church had received threatening telephone calls and that if the church was used as a meeting place for their organization, it would be blown up. In addition, other telephone calls exerting pressure on the church finally convinced its board members not to allow the church to be used for the gathering. [redacted] advised that the members of the church made a statement that they supported the WVO's anti-Klan rally but because of external pressures could not permit the WVO to use their church as their facility. [redacted] also advised that these telephone calls were anonymous telephone calls and no one was identified as having made them, and there was also allegedly some pressure brought upon the church by the police, but she knew no specifics. [redacted] advised that she was not present at this meeting where the church denied the use of their facilities and indicated [redacted] was.

On November 3, 1979, [redacted] advised that she [redacted] arrived in the vicinity of the Cosmos Club in Greensboro, North Carolina, at approximately 9:30 A.M. It was their responsibility to set up the building to be used for the conference and that she [redacted] with others, worked upon setting the chairs up, and bringing in the food.

En route to Everitt and Carver Street, [redacted] advised that she [redacted] picked up a young girl, who lived at Smith Homes, and then drove directly to Everitt and Carver Street. [redacted] advised that they went to that location in their car which she described as a [redacted] with North Carolina license [redacted]. [redacted] advised this vehicle was parked along Everitt Street and stated that they did not bring in the vehicle any equipment for the planned march.

[redacted] advised that when they arrived at the location, she recalled that JIM WALLER, [redacted] MIKE NATHAN, and about 50 other people were present. [redacted] advised that [redacted] to her understanding was at the Windsor Center in the morning.

[redacted] advised that when they arrived at Fveritt and Carver Street that people were singing with children and that others were working putting up posters and working on the sound truck. [redacted] identified [redacted] as working on the sound truck and CAESAR CAUCE was taking posters out of the truck.

[redacted] advised that Mr. CAUCE and [redacted] were not from the Greensboro area but had come over from Durham, North Carolina.

[redacted] advised that between 10:30 A.M. and 11:15 A.M., most of their time was spent in preparing for the march and that they worked on the sound truck, and preparing placards, and passing out leaflets.

[redacted] advised that several members of the WVO had been selected to be marshals to help with the security in the parade and to help keep it orderly [redacted] as being one of the individuals which had been [redacted] later when viewing newsreel footage taken on November 3, 1979, identified those individuals wearing the blue or white construction type helmets as being designated marshals.

[redacted] advised that neither she, nor members of her group, were mainly concerned or fearful that their rally, march, and demonstration would be disrupted by the KKK, or Nazis. She advised they were more concerned about harassment by the police because in the past, their organization had been harassed by the police, and other demonstrations in North Carolina were often harassed by the police.

[redacted] advised that she did not have any personal knowledge of the contents of a letter which was afforded to the leadership of the Nazi and Klan organizations but did know of it through the release from public media. She advised that it was her interpretation that that was not a letter invitation for a confrontation between the opposing groups in Greensboro on November 3, 1979, but viewed it as a public denouncement of the Klan through the news and television media.

[redacted] advised that prior to the shooting incident at Everitt and Carver Street, she had only seen one police cruiser in the vicinity between 10:30 and 11:15 A.M. on November 3, 1979. She stated that it was her understanding from [redacted] that [redacted] was to be met at the Morning Side Homes by a Police Captain who was to coordinate with [redacted] prior to the assembly and the march. She stated that it was her understanding that this Police Captain never showed up.

[redacted] advised that she had no personal knowledge nor did she observe any police cruiser come into the area and officer making inquiries to locate [redacted] prior to 11:15 A.M. on November 3, 1979.

[redacted] advised that it was her understanding that police protection would be afforded and would start at approximately 11:00 A.M. on November 3, 1979, and that the people would assemble and start their march at approximately 11:30 A.M.

[redacted] advised that shortly after 11:15 A.M., on November 3, 1979, [redacted] SANDY SMITH [redacted] of Carver and Everitt Street and were near [redacted] who had been singing with several of the neighborhood children. [redacted] advised that her first attention to a caravan of cars which was driving by on Everitt Street came when she heard shouts from the rear of one of the vehicles and the person was yelling, "Niggers, Commies, Kikes." [redacted] advised that she thought this vehicle was a large vehicle, green in color, and that the back window was open and there was a man shouting out the window. She advised that at that time she did not know who this individual was but as a result of later press coverage and identification of photographs, she knows the person to be RAEFORD CAUDLE. [redacted] advised that the vehicle was a second or third vehicle in this line and that CAUDLE was in the back seat shouting toward the crowd. She stated that she did not recall any reference to China Grove.

[redacted] advised that the first vehicle she could remember passing by that was part of that caravan was a pickup truck.

[redacted] advised with the shouting from the occupant of this vehicle in the caravan, the people on the street began chanting, "Death to the Klan." She advised [redacted] SANDY SMITH were looking down Everitt Street where these vehicles were proceeding when she heard the screeching of brakes and a noise which sounded like a car had hit another car. She stated prior to this time, she had not seen anybody in the crowd strike or kick at any of the vehicles which were proceeding by her.

As she heard the sound of the screeching vehicle and looked in that direction, she advised that she observed a man leaning out the window of a pickup truck which was in front of this caravan and that he had a large, long barreled pistol in his hand. [redacted] advised it was from this area and it was this individual that she heard the first shot and could see the smoke coming from his weapon. She stated this shot was into the air.

At this time [redacted] viewed two photographs of the incident which she had described to the interviewers, and she identified [redacted] as being the individual standing with the anti-Klan placard as the caravan began to pass; and the black male directly to his right as being [redacted] who was a supporter of the WVO but not a member who lived in or near the Morning Side Community.

[redacted] advised that after she heard the shot, and almost the same instance, she heard a fight break out behind them in the intersection of Carver and Everitt Street, and saw [redacted] as one of the individuals involved in the street fight. She advised that a number of the Klan and Nazi demonstrators had left their cars and had run up into the intersection and were beating the people with clubs and sticks.

She stated [redacted] the area and were fleeing up Carver Street, when [redacted] ran behind SANDY SMITH and struck SANDY SMITH across the back of the head with a big stick, and she slammed into the ground. [redacted] advised she watched [redacted] strike SMITH across the back of the head with this big stick and that she knew it was [redacted] after he had been identified through the news media. She advised that prior to that, she only knew it was a very large, white male with red hair, wearing a blue jean jacket and blue jeans. Later, he was identified in photographs as being [redacted]

[redacted] advised that SMITH fell to the ground [redacted] the arm and helped her to move back toward the Morning Side Center.

As they were moving back toward the Morning Side Center, she advised most of the Klansmen had left the intersection of Carver Street and were running back to their cars. She stated at this time she had not heard any additional shots other than the one she had described earlier [redacted]

[redacted]
Community Center. She heard shots and as they passed the I.V. car she could observe [redacted] lying in the street and [redacted] were helping to pull her to a safe place.

[redacted]
[redacted] MS. SMITH sitting on the walkway of the Community Center, not adjacent to the building, but near the front entrance. She stated that she then continued to run up Carver Street and was attempting to assist the children in front of her to find safety. She stated at this time, she was able to observe several members of the KKK and Nazi group armed with shotguns and pistols, approaching the people remaining in the intersection. She stated that from later identification, she could identify ROLAND WOOD as coming up Everitt Street toward Carver Street with a shotgun and knew he was firing the shotgun from the pump and action and also from the recoil of the weapon. She advised she also saw another individual but she could not recall his name, as running up the street with two pistols, acting like a cowboy, shooting with both hands.

[redacted] advised that neighborhood people then began to pull her, and the children who were running with her, into their houses and brought them to safety. She stated with her was [redacted] and other children who were taken into the homes of the people who offered them shelter.

[redacted] advised that the last time that she saw Ms. SMITH alive, Ms. SMITH was sitting behind the building near the entrance to the Morning Side Community Center entrance.

[redacted] advised that she believes she saw between five or six men with guns coming up Everitt Street shooting into the remaining people who were at the intersection on Carver Street and that after she was taken to safety inside the building, she did not observe anymore of the shooting incident.

[redacted] advised that she did not personally observe any members of her organization or demonstrators with their group fire a weapon on that date.

[redacted] advised that in conversation with [redacted] whom she described as a friend of herself and [redacted] told her that he was with [redacted]

She stated that [redacted] had kept a .38 caliber revolver [redacted] and that this was a licensed weapon registered [redacted] on November 3, 1979, and that [redacted] did not find this out until later when [redacted] was arrested in possession of [redacted]

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[redacted] told her after the shooting incident and after he had been released on bond from his arrest, that [redacted] had given him the weapon after he had been shot. [redacted] had told [redacted] that he and [redacted] were standing behind a T.V. truck and they had observed MIKE NATHAN shot down on Craver Street when he was running to assist the people who were helping [redacted]. She stated that [redacted] also advised they had seen JIM WALLER shot down and also [redacted] and it was [redacted]

[redacted] Street who were shooting at the remaining people in the intersection. [redacted] advised that [redacted] was shot during a large volume of fire which came toward the T.V. truck. The truck was parked on Carver Street. After [redacted] to [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] did not state to her whether or not he had fired any shots after [redacted] had given him the weapon, and she did not recall whether or not all the rounds in the weapon had been discharged at the time [redacted] had been arrested.

[redacted] advised that she at no time had seen any shotgun in possession of [redacted] nor did she see a shotgun in his vehicle which was parked at the corner of Everitt Street in the intersection of Carver Street.

[redacted] advised that [redacted] after the shooting incident [redacted] at some of the KKK and Nazis who were on Everitt Street after they had been shooting into the people in the intersection of Carver Street. [redacted] also advised that [redacted] one shot toward the KKK and Nazis and that was when he was across the street adjacent to and near a T.V. cameraman. She stated he only fired one shot because his weapon, which she believed to be a Darringer had jammed and he could not fire again.

In regards to [redacted] firing her weapon, she stated that [redacted] had told her that JIM WALLER had been shot and was on the ground when [redacted] the direction of the KKK and demonstrators on Everitt Street. [redacted] advised she could not recall any other member of her group acknowledging to her

that they had fired a weapon during this shooting incident on November 3, 1979. [] advised she did not know how many shots were fired other than what she [] She acknowledged this could be anywhere from six to ten shots as two of the weapons were revolvers and one was a Darringer.

[] advised that she also did not know nor did she observe or hear about any incident in which JIM WALLER was involved in a fight over possession of a shotgun with members of the KKK or Nazi group.

[] also advised that in her conversations with [] that he had not given her any information as to his observation of this shooting incident. [] advised that she had received information from some person, that they believe SANDY SMITH was struck by a bullet when she had put her head around the corner of the building at the Morning Side Community Center, but she could not recall where this information came from.

From a review of photographs of the scene, [] identified [] as being one of the first individuals who came to the aid of SANDY SMITH after the firing had stopped.

[] reviewed the T.V. films recorded on November 3, 1979, by Channel 11, Channel 12, and Channel 2. [] identified the various individuals she recognized in this film as to their location at the time just prior to and during the shooting incident. [] advised after reviewing these films that she apparently had not run directly on Carver Street in seeking safety in the Morning Side Center area but had apparently cut across the grass. She stated that she did not observe [] Ms. SMITH toward safety. She also stated that she could not observe Ms. SMITH being struck with a stick in the film footage. From the film footage, [] was also able to identify ROLAND WOOD as being the individual she observed walking up Everitt Street, toward Carver, firing a shotgun; and also identified [] who was standing in Everitt Street, firing a rifle as being the individual who struck Ms. SMITH.

After reviewing the film footage, interview of [] came to a conclusion.

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 1/11/82b6
b7C

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: P/O SAC, CHARLOTTE (44A-3527) (P)GREENKIL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6-12-84 BY SP2 TAP/JAC

Per request of Departmental Attorney, [redacted] U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Section, the records and reports of the Greensboro, N.C. Police Department were inventoried, in addition to the physical evidence which is in the custody of the Clerk of the Superior Court of Guilford County, Greensboro, N.C. The Property Room of the Greensboro, N.C. PD contains approximately 24 large boxes of records, documents and reports which have been accumulated by the police department during the course of their investigation into captioned matter. In addition, there are numerous schematics, diagrams, crime scene sketches and photographs, some of which cover the entire length of an average 12x9 wall.

The majority of the artists conceptions were completed by the FBI Exhibits Section, Washington, D.C.

[redacted] has advised that all of this material and physical evidence obtained by the Greensboro, N.C. PD would be pertinent to the Department's investigation and at some date in the near future, he and another Departmental Attorney will be required to view all of the above material for possible presentation to a Federal Grand Jury.

② - Bureau
 2 - Charlotte
 TJB:jat
 (4)

*1/21/82
 Tel call from CE
 advised to disregard
 this airtel -
 no further action necessary
 file*

44-81521-209
SIX

JAN 27 1982

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ Per _____
 (Number) (Time)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ _____

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

CE 44A-3527

Date _____

[redacted] at this time cannot advise whether the Department of Justice, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division, will authorize a FGJ inquiry, however, [redacted] expects in the near future that a decision will be made.

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The course of this investigation to date strongly indicates that a FGJ will be impaneled to hear evidence on this matter and if it does, a substantial logistical burden will be placed upon the Greensboro Office of the FBI to assist in the preparation of this presentation.

The Greensboro Resident Agency is located at the Guilford-Jamestown Road, off I-40, Greensboro, N.C., and is centrally located between Winston-Salem and Greensboro, N.C. It is presently staffed by 10 agent personnel to include one supervisor, one Special Clerk and two stenographers. The space available is adequate for the needs of the above personnel, however, it is not capable of supporting and storing the records and documents and physical evidence which will necessarily be accumulated during the course of any FGJ inquiry into this incident.

As a matter of course, Federal Grand Juries in the Middle District of N.C., alternate each month and hear evidence between Greensboro and Winston-Salem, N.C. Therefore, any additional space required would be ideally situated at the Greensboro RA present location.

At present, there is additional space adjacent to and sharing a joint wall with the Greensboro RA at the Friendship Center where it is located.

The use of this space, which is approximately 450 square feet, would facilitate the implementation of security devices as it shares an adjoining wall, and security system as well as telephone system can be connected with nominal additional expense.

Inquiry has been conducted into the expenses which would be incurred for the rental of this adjacent space for the

Approved: _____

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Per _____

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CLASSIFICATION:

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☐ UNCLAS

CE 44A-3527

Date _____

purpose of setting up an additional office, specifically for the preparation and presentation of this investigation to a FGJ.

The following is a summary of expenses which would be incurred:

Space rental, 450 square feet

3 desks -

2 credenzas -

2 legal fireproof cabinets -



Phones and security would be established with existing office, and would be a nominal additional expense.

It is expected that the total cost of operation for the additional space would not exceed _____ per month and if a FGJ was convened, and an indictment returned, it is estimated that this would take approximately one year.

Therefore, the total expenses which would be incurred for a FGJ inquiry and subsequent prosecution is expected to be an additional _____ for the year 1982.

The above information is being furnished FBIHQ for discussion with USDJ Departmental Attorneys as to the appropriateness of obtaining such space, based upon their ultimate decision as to whether or not to proceed with this matter to a FGJ.

It is the recommendation of SAC Charlotte that the above expenses to be incurred for a FGJ inquiry and subsequent prosecution be paid for by the Department of Justice rather than by FBIHQ or the Charlotte Division.

3*

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ (Number) _____ (Time) Per _____

b2
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AIRTEL

1/4/82

Director, FBI (44-81521)

1 -

b6
b7C

SACs, Charlotte (44-3527)
New York (100-182893)

GREENKIL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-12-84 BY SP2TAP/JAC

Enclosed for New York are two copies each of the following:

1. FD-302 reflecting interviews of [redacted] indicating transcription dates of 10/23/81 and 12/16/81.
2. FD-302, Number 1, reflecting interview of [redacted] indicating transcription dates of 10/30/81 and 12/17/81.
3. FD-302, Number 2, reflecting a second interview of [redacted] indicating transcription dates of 11/2/81 and 12/17/81.
4. Letter dated 12/22/81 from the Civil Rights Division, USDJ to [redacted] Greensboro Defense Fund.

b6
b7C
b7D

Enclosed for Charlotte are two copies of the Departmental letter to [redacted]

For information of New York, SA's of the Charlotte Division interviewed [redacted] on 10/20/81 at the New York Office. Her interview was reduced to an FD-302 and forwarded by the Department to [redacted] for review and any necessary revisions. Revisions have been made and the FD-302 has been retyped. The enclosed FD-302 has had the administrative information deleted at the bottom. The original FD-302 with administrative information at the bottom is in possession of the Charlotte Division.

MAILED 5
JAN - 4 1982

Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

2 - Charlotte (Enclosures)
2 - New York (Enclosures)

EEH/mst (6)

MAIL ROOM

5 JAN 6 1982

Airtel to SACs Charlotte and New York
RE: GREENKIL

[redacted] was interviewed on two occasions, 10/19/81 and 10/26/81. Separate FD-302's were prepared and forwarded to [redacted] for review and any revisions. These FD-302's have been retyped as above.

New York contact [redacted] through Attorney [redacted] Greensboro Defense Fund, 252 Broadway, New York, New York 10003, telephone number [redacted] or [redacted] American Civil Liberties Union, telephone number [redacted] [redacted] should review and initial each page of the enclosed FD-302's. Request of both that they add a handwritten statement to the effect that they have reviewed the reports of their interviews and concur with the information contained in the report. Last minute changes or corrections may be made and initialed. Handle as you would a signed statement.

Furnish a copy of the signed interview report to both Sampson and Bermanzohn.

New York complete investigation within 7 days of receipt of this communication and su LHM to FBIHQ and Charlotte. Forward original signed report forms to Charlotte for retention in 1A file.

b6
b7C
b7D

AIRTEL

1/27/82

Director, FBI (44-81521)

SACs, Charlotte (44-3527)
New York (44-3149)

1 -

b6
b7C

GREENKIL

OO: CHARLOTTE

Re Bureau airtel to Charlotte, 1/4/82.

The Civil Rights Division, U. S. Department of Justice has advised that Attorney [redacted] Greensboro Defense Fund, representing [redacted] has contacted the Department concerning the request by the New York Office to have [redacted] sign the statements prepared by the Charlotte Office. Attorney [redacted] has requested that copies of the final statements be forwarded to him at the Greensboro Defense Fund Offices, 853 Broadway, Room 1912, New York, N. Y.


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The Department has no objection to forwarding copies of the statement to Attorney [redacted] however the signing of the statements by [redacted] must be witnessed by a Special Agent. *Jam*

New York forward copies of the [redacted] statements to [redacted] for review. Thereafter, arrange for the signing of the statements pursuant to instructions set forth in referenced airtel.

Promptly advise FBIHQ when statements are signed.

44-81521-2111



DEH/mst (6)

MST

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-13-84 BY SP2TRP/c

FEB 1 1982

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Public Affs. _____
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Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM

60 FEB 10 1982

NYO 855 0330422Z

RR HQ

DE NY 046

R 010153Z FEB 82

FM NEW YORK (100-182893) (M-11)

TO DIRECTOR (44-81521) ROUTINE

BT

U N C L A S

GREENKIL.

REBUREAU AIRTEL TO NEW YORK, DATED JANUARY 4, 1982.

ON JANUARY 25, 1982, AND AGAIN ON FEBRUARY 1, 1982,

[REDACTED] AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ADVISED THAT SHE HAS BEEN TRYING TO CONTACT [REDACTED] TO ARRANGE FOR THEM TO REVIEW THEIR RESPECTIVE FD-302S.

[REDACTED] ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] HAS BEEN OUT OF TOWN AND THAT HE IS DUE BACK ON FEBRUARY 1, 1982, THEREFORE SHE ANTICIPATES THAT BOTH [REDACTED] WILL APPEAR AT THE NYO OF THE FBI DURING THE WEEK OF FEBRUARY 1, 1982.

NEW YORK WILL COMPLETE INVESTIGATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND SUBMIT LHM TO FBIHQ AND CHARLOTTE.

BT

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

2 FEB 82 04 23z

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

Exec. AD-Adm.	_____
Exec. AD-Inv.	_____ b6
Exec. AD-LES	_____ b7C
Asst. Dir.:	_____ b7D
Adm. Servs.	_____
Crim. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
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Tech. Servs.	_____
Training	_____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

[REDACTED]

44-81521-212

FEB 8 1982

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FEB 1 1982

FEB 8 1982

NYO 461 0480152Z

RR HQ

DE NY 022

R 162100Z FEB 82

FM NEW YORK (44-3149) (H-11)

TO DIRECTOR (44-81521) ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

GREENKIL, OO: CHARLOTTE.

REBUREAU INTEL TO CHARLOTTE, DATED JANUARY 27, 1982.

ON FEBRUARY 12, 1982, [REDACTED], AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

UNION, 132 WEST 43RD STREET, NEW YORK, NEW YORK, ACCEPTED RECEIPT.

OF ONE COPY EACH OF FD-302 INTERVIEWS OF [REDACTED] ON

OCTOBER 19, 1981, AND OCTOBER 26, 1981, AND ONE COPY OF FD-302

INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ADVISED THAT SHE WOULD EXPEDITIOUSLY REVIEW ABOVE
DOCUMENTS AND ARRANGE FOR INTERVIEWEES TO COME TO THE NYO OF
THE FBI TO SIGN THE DOCUMENTS IN THE PRESENCE OF A SPECIAL AGENT.

THE NYO WILL ADVISE FBIHQ WHEN DOCUMENTS ARE SIGNED.

BT

44-81521-2135
FEB 17 1982

251
50 MAR 12 1982

Exec. AD-Adm.	_____
Exec. AD-Inv.	_____
Exec. AD-LES	_____
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Adm. Servs.	_____
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Tech. Servs.	_____
Training	_____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

1 28
2/26/82 UNCLAS PRIORITY

FM DIRECTOR FBI {44-81521}
TO FBI CHARLOTTE {44-3527} PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS

GREENKIL: 00: CHARLOTTE

ON FEBRUARY 26, 1982, ATTORNEY [REDACTED] CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REQUESTED THAT SA [REDACTED] ATTEND A MEETING WITH DEPARTMENTAL ATTORNEYS, AUSA [REDACTED] GREENSBORO, N. C., AND FBIHQ SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL TO DETERMINE THRUST OF FEDERAL GRAND JURY SCHEDULED [REDACTED] AND FURTHER INVESTIGATIVE STEPS IN CAPTIONED MATTER. MEETING IS SCHEDULED FOR 9:00 A.M., MARCH 3, 1982, AT U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FBIHQ CONCURS WITH REQUEST AND APPROVES TRAVEL FOR SA [REDACTED]

BT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6-13-84 BY SP2 TRP/ie

15/A
EEH:DJW{21} 2/26/82 5131/6 4272

PLEASE RETURN TO [REDACTED] ROOM 5131

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

16237 ml
FEB 26 1982

44-81521-2141
MAR 3 1982

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 2/23/82b6
b7c

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM: SAC, CHARLOTTE (44A-3527)
 GREENKILL

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies of City of Greensboro, North Carolina Police Department letter dated 2/8/82.

The Bureau is requested to furnish this bill to Attorney USDJ, for payment.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6-13-84 BY SP2TAP/ici

ENCLOSURE

2-Bureau (Enc. 2)
 2-Charlotte (44A-3527)
 TJB/jmg
 (4)

612-Pay attached bill
 needed in civil rights
 investigation

44-81521-2155

MAR 1 1982

3/ah
 DRO III
 Room 3865
 SIV
 W. FIELD

Approved: 3/3/82

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per 3/ah

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype☐ Facsimile☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate☐ Priority☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET☐ SECRET☐ CONFIDENTIAL☐ UNCLAS E F T O☐ UNCLASDate 2/26/82

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (44-81521)

FROM: ADIC, NEW YORK (44-3149) (RUC) (M-11)

SUBJECT: GREENKIL
CIVIL RIGHTS
OO: CEALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-13-84 BY SP2 JAP/UCReBureauairtels to New York, dated 1/4/82 and 1/27/82,
and NYtelcal to the Bureau, on 2/22/82.Enclosed for Charlotte are the signed copies of
two FD-302 interviews of [redacted] on 10/19/81
and 10/26/81 and signed copy of FD-302 interview of [redacted]
on 10/20/81. Enclosed for the Bureau are xeroxed
copies of above statements.On 2/19/82, [redacted]
appeared at the NYO of the FBI, 26 Federal Plaza, New York,
New York, accompanied by their attorney, [redacted] Greensboro
Defense Fund, 853 Broadway, New York, New York.After reviewing FD-302 statements and making
minor changes, [redacted] signed their respective
interviews in the presence of SA [redacted] of the
NYO.No further investigation remains in the NYO, therefore,
this case is being RUC'd.2-Bureau (Encls. 7) ENCLOSURE
2-Charlotte (44-3527) (Encls. 4)
1-New YorkHC:mp
(6)4 ENCL
CR UNIT
3/2/82

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Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ (Number) _____ (Time) Per _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 11/2/81 & 12/17/81

[redacted] was interviewed at the New York Office of the FBI, 26 Federal Plaza, New York City, New York, relative to his knowledge and observation of the shooting incident which occurred on November 3, 1979, at Greensboro, North Carolina. This was a continuation of an interview which had commenced on October 19, 1981, and due to a prior appointment, concluded at approximately 4:00 P.M. on that date.

Present during this interview were the interviewing Agents, and [redacted] Departmental Attorney, Civil Rights Section, U. S. Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., and [redacted] attorneys. [redacted] and [redacted] who had accompanied [redacted] on October 19, 1981, was not present and had forwarded his apologies through [redacted] that he would be unavailable to attend this interview.

At the beginning of the interview, [redacted] advised [redacted] and his attorneys of the nature of the interview and that the inquiry was being conducted at the request of the Department of Justice relative to their on-going investigation into the shooting incident which occurred on November 3, 1979.

[redacted] advised that on November 2, 1979, the evening prior to the march and rally at Greensboro, there was a meeting of approximately 15 to 20 people in Durham, North Carolina, relative to discussions involving the parade route, the making and preparation of the signs, the cutting of the sticks in accordance with the parade permit stipulations, and the preparation of leaflets for distribution. [redacted] advised this meeting took place at what is now being designated as the Caesar Cauce and Mike Nathan Bookstore at Durham, North Carolina.

[redacted] recalled that CAESAR CAUCE was present but could not recall the names of all the individuals who participated.

[redacted] advised that he did not know whether or not there was a similar meeting being conducted at Greensboro,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-13-84 BY SP2-TK/PC

ENCLOSURE

44-81521-216

North Carolina, on this same date relative to organization for the rally and parade in Greensboro.

In regard to his knowledge as to where to meet in Greensboro, he advised that CAUCE was the contact with the groups at Greensboro, and it was his understanding that the assembly area would be at Everitt and Carver Street in Greensboro, North Carolina. Some of the people coming to the rally would meet at the Windsor Community Center and then as the group marched by from Everitt and Carver Street, they would pick up the other people at the Windsor Community Center.

[redacted] advised that his understanding for the assembly at the Windsor Community Center was because this was a more identifiable location in Greensboro, just off Lee Street, and therefore, people coming in from out of town would have less difficulty locating that area rather than the Everitt and Carver Street location. [redacted] advised that he did not recall seeing any written information regarding the exact route nor did he have a copy of the parade permit on that date, however, knew on November 1, 1979, that they had a legal parade permit although he had not personally seen it.

On the morning of November 3, 1979, [redacted] advised that [redacted] traveled to Greensboro, North Carolina, in [redacted] which at that time had North Carolina license [redacted] advised that he could not recall the middle number of the license plate numbers.

[redacted] advised that he arrived at WALLER's residence somewhere between 10:00 and 11:00 AM on the morning of November 3, 1979, and that they stayed at that location a short period of time. Other individuals who came from Durham also went to WALLER's house as an initial meeting place.

[redacted] advised that he talked to WALLER on that date but it was just casual talk as they were friends and he believes they may have had coffee with him at the residence. [redacted] could not recall whether or not CAUCE was at Dr. WALLER's house at the same time.

[redacted]

[redacted] advised that following their visit to WALLER's house, they then left and went to the Summit Shopping Center at approximately 10:30 A.M. The purpose of going to the shopping center was to buy some batteries for the small walkie-talkies they were carrying and they also stopped and had some coffee.

[redacted] advised that it was his understanding that they were to meet approximately one-half hour before the march, that is at approximately 11:30 A.M. on the morning of November 3, 1979, at Everitt and Carver Street and that the march would start at approximately 12:00 noon.

In regard to a question as to whether or not he knew of any information regarding an invitation extended to the KKK to attend the rally and march being sponsored by the WVO at Greensboro, [redacted] acknowledged that he did. He stated it was his understanding that on the back of a leaflet, some individual who he did not know, wrote an open letter to the leadership of the KKK. This open letter was an invitation to the KKK to come and face the wrath of the people, however, since he was not personally involved, he does not know who was the author of this letter.

This letter was in response to the formation by the Klan and the Nazis of a group designated as the United Racist Front. According to the Raleigh News and Observer, the formation of this United Racist Front took place sometime between September 20 and 22, 1979, at a combined meeting held on the outskirts of Raleigh, North Carolina. As a result of the efforts by the Klan and Nazis to form this United Front the new group issued public statements. The letter was prepared after the issuance of these public statements and served as the WVO's answer. [redacted] did not know if the letter was actually delivered to the leadership of the Klan or Nazis. It may have just been delivered to the public news media.

[redacted] advised it was his understanding from public statements made by [redacted] that they had no intentions of coming to the November 3 rally and march in Greensboro.

[redacted] advised that after China Grove, the Klan had made no public announcements relative to their activities, except that he specifically recalls that the Klan leaders stated in the public media that they would not attend the November 3rd rally. He believes that [redacted] made such statements.

[redacted]

[redacted] was asked whether or not he was aware of the different Klan groups in existence and he advised that from reading in the public news media and from personal research at the library, and other reading, he had become familiar with the history of the Klan and of its various factions. He identified those factions as being the Federal Knights of the KKK, the White Knights of Liberty, and others to include the Nazis and other break-away units.

[redacted] was also familiar with the leadership of the Klan and the names of [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] also advised the interviewers that it was reported by the news media, the Greensboro Daily News, in an article on June 28, 1980, that the Treasury Agent who was undercover with the Nazi Party, had offered to drive the [redacted]

[redacted] advised that he had no idea that an undercover Agent was in the Nazis and the KKK on November 3, 1979.

[redacted] advised that he expected this rally and march to be a non-violent march and to be basically an educational and organizing conference to educate people against the racism of the KKK.

[redacted] advised it was his understanding initially that the All Nations Penecostal Church would be used as the conference area after the finish of the march, however, [redacted]

[redacted] did not know the reasons for the cancellation and indicated that this information had been given by [redacted] to [redacted] on November 1, 1979. [redacted] advised that they left WALLER's home at approximately 10:30 A.M.

[redacted] to the Summit Avenue Shopping Center where they bought some batteries for their walkie-talkies and had some coffee. Shortly thereafter, they arrived at the Morningside Homes and estimated that at the time they arrived at Everitt and Carver Street, there was a racially mixed group of between 50 and 60 people in the area. [redacted] advised that [redacted] was standing near the Community Center with a group of people and children singing, and some of the people were helping put posters on and around the sound truck.

[redacted]

[] advised that he had a brief conversation with reporters at this location, and recalls that shortly thereafter, SANDY SMITH made a comment to them that she was surprised there was no police in the area.

[] advised that he expected to see a number of police in this assembly area and throughout the parade route. He stated that they did not anticipate trouble and what trouble they did anticipate, he believed would have come from the police. [] advised that the police had already attempted to disrupt their organization of this march by tearing down posters and, therefore, he was surprised by not seeing the police present at Everitt and Carver Street on that morning. [] stated that the police should have anticipated trouble and that in most other cities that he is familiar with, the police are usually at the location of such a demonstration an hour or so in advance of the assembly time.

[] advised that he could recall making no statement regarding the police being there or not being there in the public media and that while it was his expectation they would be there an hour or so prior to the march, he had no prior experience in dealing with the Greensboro Police Department. [] advised that he expected if there would be any trouble, it would probably be after the march and ~~not~~ prior to it. []
R.

In regard to the statements made by [] that the police were the disruptive force and they did not want the police disrupting their march on November 3, 1979, he stated that [] did make such statements to the Police Department in the public media. He further stated that he heard [] state on television that "The police never do what I say do."

[] advised that he never recalled seeing any police officer come to the Everitt and Carver Street location, prior to this shooting incident.

[] advised that as he was standing on Everitt Street, near the intersection of Carver, he became aware of a line of vehicles starting to pass the area where they were assembling. The vehicles were occupied by white people and he recalled that one of the individuals leaned out of the window and shouted something about China Grove.

[redacted] advised he also recalls seeing EDDIE DAWSON in one of these vehicles and believes he was a passenger sitting in the passenger side in one of the sedans that passed him. When asked how he recognized EDDIE DAWSON, [redacted] advised that he first recalled seeing DAWSON on the November 1, 1979, press conference. He stated he did not know his name at that time but did recall his face as he seemed out of place at the press conference.

[redacted] advised that after the press conference on November 1, 1979, he walked over to DAWSON and engaged with him in conversation. DAWSON identified himself as being a local business contractor and made the general statement that he could not believe that the KKK would still be present and active in a city like Greensboro in this day and age. From this conversation, [redacted] advised that he believed DAWSON was giving the impression that he was on their side on that particular date. He stated, however, he was very skeptical of him and that something was definitely fishy about him when he was talking to him. He stated that [redacted] also joined them for a couple of minutes and then left.

Shortly after DAWSON left his location, he recalled seeing DAWSON talking to an individual who had come from the Police Department Headquarters and described this individual as wearing a gold trench coat but could not further identify him. He stated that he was approximately the same height as DAWSON and that he was of a more stocky build. He also recalled this individual had sandy brown hair, and was possibly wearing metal frame glasses, ~~because of the reflection of the sunlight off the edges of them~~. This individual gave [redacted] a pink sheet of paper, which they exchanged several times. [redacted]

[redacted] advised that the next time he saw DAWSON was in the line of vehicles, which was part of the KKK caravan on November 3, 1979.

[redacted] advised that after the person in one of these vehicles yelled something about China Grove, others started yelling, Kill the Kikes, Kill the Niggers, and he recalled looking down the street and saw an individual leaning out of a pick-up truck. He stated this individual had a handgun in his hand, and fired a single shot into the air.

[redacted]

[redacted] advised that just prior to that incident, the group that he was with had been chanting, Death to the Klan, however, he, himself, did not see any disturbance prior to this incident where the shot was fired. He stated following that shot, some people in the crowd did hit one or two of the vehicles with sticks or their feet.

[redacted] advised shortly after that, there was more gunfire and all the people were running up Carver Street. [redacted] advised that he ran back up Carver Street, and across the street and sought cover near one of the buildings.

[redacted] advised that all this happened in a matter of a few seconds, and therefore, he cannot be specifically detailed as to exactly what happened in each instance. He stated that all he could recall was the volume of gunfire, and the fact that he ran across Carver Street and then stood against the buildings on the opposite side of the street.

[redacted] advised the next thing he recalled was he remembered CESAR CAUCE on the lawn section near where he was standing and there were five or six people around him beating him. He recalls one hit him with a very large stick, and at approximately this time, he began to run towards CAUCE to assist him. [redacted] advised that at this time, he did have a placard in his hand but nothing else and as he was moving to assist CAUCE, something hit him and knocked him off his feet.

[redacted] advised at that time he did not know CAUCE had already been shot, but later learned from watching the films of the shooting incident.

[redacted] advised that after he was knocked off his feet, he tried to but he could not get up. He stated that he heard shooting around him, but could not recall anybody being nearby or around him. He stated that he learned afterwards that WALLER [redacted]

[redacted] advised that he recalls hearing a tremendous amount of gunfire, and when it stopped, he kept thinking that he wanted to get up and help. He stated that

[redacted]

he heard people [redacted]
he wanted to help the others but initially could not understand why he could not get up to assist them. He stated at that time, he began to realize that he may have been shot but did not know the extent of his injuries. NC [redacted]

He stated he heard conversations^{OR YELLING} around him clearly to the effect that JIM was dead, that SANDY was dead, and then he recalled [redacted] and began talking to him. [redacted] advised that after a period of time his vision became blurred because of the swelling around his eyes from the injury he received, and he could no longer see what was taking place. [redacted] described his injuries as being a [redacted]

[redacted] also displayed
to the interviewers the area of another gunshot wound to his [redacted]

[redacted] advised that while he was laying on the ground, during the large volume of firing, he did see and hear [redacted] fire some shots towards the KKK who had shot down CAUCE and the others. He stated that he did not know how many shots she had fired, however, did know she fired with a handgun. [redacted] advised that also from conversation he recalls that [redacted] also fired some shot from a Derringer and then the gun jammed. It was his understanding from their conversation that he was across the street near one of the TV cameramen when he fired that one shot in the direction of the KKK vehicles that were then fleeing the area.

[redacted] advised that while he was at the assembly, neither he [redacted] had any weapons in their possession. He advised that he did own a weapon, a .12 gauge shotgun and also a .38 caliber revolver but these were at his residence in Durham, North Carolina, and that he did not bring them with him to this assembly.

[redacted] advised that to his knowledge, Dr. WALLER, with whom he went to this assembly area at Fveritt and Carver Street, also had no weapons. He stated that he was not aware that anybody at this assembly had weapons, either opened or concealed. He stated that he did not see any shotgun in [redacted] pickup truck and did not know that [redacted] had brought a weapon with him until after this incident had occurred.



[redacted] advised that he also became aware of the fact after the shooting incident that WILLIAM SAMPSON had fired in the direction of the KKK and that he was shot in the chest when he was standing near the Channel 12 News truck. According to statements he had heard, WILLIAM SAMPSON was firing at the KKK at the time he was struck, and understood that [redacted] had taken the gun after SAMPSON was struck. He stated he did not know whether or not [redacted] had fired.

In examining the possible number of gunshots fired by members of his group, [redacted] advised that if the three individuals who had fired a weapon, [redacted] and [redacted] could not have fired more than 13 shots. [redacted] advised that at no time did he see any members of his group in possession of a shotgun or rifle, and at no time in conversation after the shooting incident did anybody in their group ever discuss firing a shotgun or a rifle in the direction of the KKK.

In reviewing the films with [redacted] [redacted] advised that he had no recollection whatsoever of the street fight which occurred in the intersection of Everitt and Carver Street. In reviewing the films, [redacted] advised that the white male with the dark hair which appears on the slow motion films in the center of Carver Street, does appear from the coloring to be him, however, he does not recall that incident whatsoever and cannot be sure whether that is him or not. [redacted] also advised in reviewing the films with the interviewers, that he did not recall the incident nor did he observe the incident where demonstrators struck vehicles of the KKK after passing by in the caravan. He stated his first recollection of that was after the first shot was fired by the individual who leaned out of the pickup truck.

[redacted] in viewing the films, identified himself standing adjacent to the building on Carver Street in the vicinity where CAUCF was involved in a fight with three or four members of the KKK. [redacted] advised that this was the incident that he recalled and it was at this time that he was attempting to come to CAUCF's assistance when he got shot. [redacted] advised that he does not know who shot him, nor can he recall any incident prior to it where a man was running by him with a shotgun pointed in his direction.

[redacted]

3. The cover-up where a portion of the statement furnished by [redacted] to the FBI and police was erased by the agents interviewing him.

4. The fact that MIKE SCHLOSSER, District Attorney, Guilford County, did not aggressively pursue the prosecution of these Klan members and also that an FBI Task Force leader, who had come from Washington, D.C., to control the task force initially had recommended the dismissal of all conspiracy charges against the KKK. [redacted] could not be specific as to what task force from the FBI he was discussing, but he indicated he understood that the head of the task force which had come from Washington had recommended to the local authorities that the conspiracy charges charging first degree murder against members of the KKK be dismissed.



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I have reviewed this eleven (11) page report, have initialed all corrections, and concur with the information contained in the report.



"WITNESS":



S.A. FBI. N.Y.

N.Y. 2/19/82

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/23/81 & 12/16/81

[redacted] as interviewed at the Manhattan Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 26 Federal Plaza, New York City, New York. [redacted] was accompanied by her attorneys, [redacted] of Chicago, Illinois, and [redacted] of New York City, New York. Also present during the interview, in addition to the two interviewing Special Agents of the FBI, was Attorney [redacted] of the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Washington, D. C.

At the initiation of the interview [redacted] was advised of the identity of the two interviewing Agents as Special Agents of the FBI and [redacted] advised that the purpose of the interview was to obtain from [redacted] any information, knowledge, and observations she had as it relates to the shooting incident at Everitt and Carver Streets on November 3, 1979, at Greensboro, North Carolina.

[redacted] advised that prior to the China Grove incident, which occurred on July 8, 1979, to her knowledge, there had been no prior confrontation between representatives of her group, the Worker's Viewpoint Organization (WVO); and members of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and Nazi Party. [redacted] advised that she and [redacted] did not demonstrate at the China Grove incident on July 8, 1979, as they were attending the [redacted]

[redacted] advised that from her personal efforts in Union organizing at the White Oak Plant, during the Spring of 1979, she knew the KKK was against their efforts to unionize the employees of that firm. She stated that the KKK attempted to disrupt their Union organizing efforts and that she had heard that Klan leaflets had been passed out in the plant but she, herself, had not seen any.

[redacted] described her efforts and her committee's efforts in the White Oak Plant as being an effort to build rank and file democracy in the existing Union and that she knew historically that the KKK was against Union activity. [redacted] advised that the Union organizing efforts were associated with the WVO, an organization she was associated with at that time.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

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DATE 6-13-84 BY SP2 TR/lee

ENCLOSURE

44-81521-216

[redacted] advised that sometime after the incident, which occurred at China Grove, the WVO began planning for a rally to be sponsored at Greensboro, North Carolina, with the theme to be anti-Klan. During the month of October, 1979, she was involved in passing out leaflets and in posterings which were calling for the support of the WVO's effort to do educational work in exposing the nature of the Klan, and its links with the government and corporations. Through this education and the demonstration, it was hoped that the Klan as an organization would not be able to organize in the State of North Carolina and elsewhere. [redacted] advised that the leaflets being passed out to the community during this period were calling for a march by the people at Greensboro, North Carolina, on November 3, 1979, to show the people's opposition to the KKK.

[redacted] also advised that during this period, October, 1979, she went throughout the Morning Side Neighborhood, and adjacent neighborhoods, and discussed with the residents of that community the forthcoming rally and march to be held in Greensboro on November 3, 1979. In the discussions with the residents of these neighborhoods, she discussed the purpose of the march and that the KKK was a racist organization that was anti-black, anti-Semitic, and that the Klan as an organization was increasing in its activity not only in North Carolina but throughout the United States. The march, which was to be held in Greensboro, North Carolina, on November 3, 1979, was to be a demonstration of popular support against Klan activity and also later to be an education and discussion session of those attending the rally and march. [redacted] advised that in these efforts, she talked both to black and white members of the community and that the purpose of selecting the Morning Side District, as well as other adjacent districts, was that these individuals and communities have historically been attacked by the Klan, and represented the working people in various industries around Greensboro, North Carolina.

[redacted] advised that she estimates that in talking with the people in these neighborhoods, she talked with approximately a 60 percent black ratio and a 40 percent white ratio. In addition to talking about the reasons for the march, she also consulted with these people in these neighborhoods as to not only their participation but also security which would be provided for them or which they could help in during this demonstration.

[redacted]

[redacted] advised that she did not directly become involved in the plan for the parade nor in planning the route for the parade. She advised that the people who handled this segment of the demonstration were the people who were killed on November 3, 1979, and they included but were not limited to WILLIAM SAMPSON, [redacted] JIM WALLER, and others. [redacted] identified [redacted] as also having been involved in the planning for and the route for the march.

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[redacted] advised that on November 2, 1979, in the evening, there was a planning meeting conducted at the home of JIM WALLER and that this meeting was basically related to the necessary preparations for the sound truck, planning of the singing, the assembly area, and the parade route, and the parade permit. All these matters were discussed by those attending the meeting, and it was basically a final organization effort prior to November 3, 1979, planned march.

[redacted] advised that as of that date, it was known that the assembly area for this march would be at the intersection of Everitt and Carver Street in Greensboro, North Carolina, and that some public announcements had been made that the assembly area would be at Windsor Center. The purpose for these announcements that it would be Windsor Center as the original starting point was mainly one for security to prevent an incident like what happened from occurring, and also to have a location for out-of-towners to meet. It was also planned that the group at Everitt and Carver Street, which would be the main assembly area, would march by and pickup the groups at Windsor Center and therefore avoid having the groups at Windsor Center march over to Everitt and Carver Street and then back again past the Windsor Center. [redacted] advised that it was her understanding from this planning meeting and from the statements of [redacted] that the parade route and the parade permit properly identified the assembly area as being Everitt and Carver Street in Greensboro, North Carolina.

[redacted] advised that on November 2, 1979, she does not recall nor did she participate in any of the press conferences that were called just prior to the November 3, 1979, planned rally.

In regard to the slogan "Death to the Klan," [redacted] advised that it was her understanding that this was a strong statement denouncing the KKK's racism, anti-Semitic attitude, and their anti-Union stance.

[redacted]

[] advised that she understood "Death to the Klan" to mean a destruction of the KKK as an organization and this demise would come through the people knowing what the Klan was really about and through this knowledge and public pressure, the KKK as an organization would cease to exist.

[] advised that the Morning Side Community and similar communities, the Hampton Homes and Smith Homes, were selected in part because of the fact that they had been areas of anti-racist organizing work in the past and areas where work against police brutality had taken place.

[] advised that the planned rally after the march was originally scheduled to be at the Pentecostal Church; however, due to external pressures, [] and the Board of the Church denied them the right to use the church for their gathering. [] advised that she understood from conversations with [] that [] members of the Board of the Church, had complained that the church had received threatening telephone calls and that if the church was used as a meeting place for their organization, it would be blown up. In addition, other telephone calls exerting pressure on the church finally convinced its board members not to allow the church to be used for the gathering. [] advised that the members of the church made a statement that they supported the WVO's anti-Klan rally but because of external pressures could not permit the WVO to use their church as their facility. [] also advised that these telephone calls were anonymous telephone calls and no one was identified as having made them, and there was also allegedly some pressure brought upon the church by the police, but she knew no specifics. [] advised that she was not present at this meeting where the church denied the use of their facilities and indicated [] was.

[] *all she believed*
On November 3, 1979, [] advised that she [] arrived in the vicinity of the Cosmos Club in Greensboro, North Carolina, at approximately 9:30 A.M. It was their responsibility to set up the building to be used for the conference and that she [] with others, worked upon setting the chairs up, and bringing in the food.

En route to Everitt and Carver Street, [] advised that she [] picked up a young girl, who lived at Smith Homes, and then drove directly to Everitt and Carver Street. [] advised that they went to that location in their car which she described as a [] with North Carolina license [] [] advised this vehicle was parked along Everitt Street and stated that they did not bring in the vehicle any equipment for the planned march.

[]

[] advised that when they arrived at the location, she recalled that JIM WALLER, [] MIKE NATHAN, and about 50 other people were present. [] advised that [] to her understanding was at the Windsor Center in the morning.

[] advised that when they arrived at Everitt and Carver Street that people were singing with children and that others were working putting up posters and working on the sound truck. [] identified [] as working on the sound truck and CAESAR CAUCE was taking posters out of the truck.

[] advised that Mr. CAUCE and [] were not from the Greensboro area but had come over from Durham, North Carolina.

[] advised that between 10:30 A.M. and 11:15 A.M., most of their time was spent in preparing for the march and that they worked on the sound truck, and preparing placards, and passing out leaflets.

[] advised that several members of the WVO had been selected to be marshals to help with the security in the parade and to help keep it orderly and identified [] as being one of the individuals which had been selected to be a parade marshal. [] later when viewing newsreel footage taken on November 3, 1979, identified those individuals wearing the blue or white construction type helmets as being designated marshals.

[] advised that neither she, nor members of her group, were mainly concerned or fearful that their rally, march, and demonstration would be disrupted by the KKK, or Nazis. She advised they were more concerned about harassment by the police because in the past, their organization had been harassed by the police, and other demonstrations in North Carolina were often harassed by the police.

[] advised that she did not have any personal knowledge of the contents of a letter which was afforded to the leadership of the Nazi and Klan organizations but did know of it through the release from public media. She advised that it was her interpretation that that was not a letter invitation for a confrontation between the opposing groups in Greensboro on November 3, 1979, but viewed it as a public denouncement of the Klan through the news and television media.


[] advised that prior to the shooting incident at Everitt and Carver Street, she had only seen one police cruiser in the vicinity between 10:30 and 11:15 A.M. on November 3, 1979. She stated that it was her understanding from [], that [] was to be met at the Morning Side Homes by a Police Captain who was to coordinate with [] prior to the assembly and the march. She stated that it was her understanding that this Police Captain never showed up.

[] advised that she had no personal knowledge nor did she observe any police cruiser come into the area and officer making inquiries to locate [] prior to 11:15 A.M. on November 3, 1979.

[] advised that it was her understanding that police protection would be afforded and would start at approximately 11:00 A.M. on November 3, 1979, and that the people would assemble and start their march at approximately 11:30 A.M.

[] advised that shortly after 11:15 A.M., on November 3, 1979, she [] of Carver and Everitt Street and were near [] who had been singing with several of the neighborhood children. [] advised that her first attention to a caravan of cars which was driving by on Everitt Street came when she heard shouts from the rear of one of the vehicles and the person was yelling, "Niggers, Commies, Kikes." [] advised that she thought this vehicle was a large vehicle, green in color, and that the back window was open and there was a man shouting out the window. She advised that at that time she did not know who this individual was but as a result of later press coverage and identification of photographs, she knows the person to be RAFFORD CAUDLE. [] advised that the vehicle was a second or third vehicle in this line and that CAUDLE was in the back seat shouting toward the crowd. She stated that she did not recall any reference to China Grove.

[] advised that the first vehicle she could remember passing by that was part of that caravan was a pickup truck.



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[redacted] advised with the shouting from the occupant of this vehicle in the caravan, the people on the street began chanting, "Death to the Klan." She advised that she and SANDY SMITH were looking down Everitt Street where these vehicles were proceeding when she heard the screeching of brakes and a noise which sounded like a car had hit another car. She stated prior to this time, she had not seen anybody in the crowd strike or kick at any of the vehicles which were proceeding by her.

As she heard the sound of the screeching vehicle and looked in that direction, she advised that she observed a man leaning out the window of a pickup truck which was in front of this caravan and that he had a large, long barreled pistol in his hand. [redacted] advised it was from this area and it was this individual that she heard the first shot and could see the smoke coming from his weapon. She stated this shot was into the air.

At this time, [redacted] viewed two photographs of the incident which she had described to the interviewers, and she identified [redacted] as being the individual standing with the anti-Klan placard as the caravan began to pass; and the black male directly to his right as being [redacted] who was a supporter of the WVO but not a member who lived in or near the Morning Side Community.

[redacted] advised that after she heard the shot, and almost the same instance, she heard a fight break out behind them in the intersection of Carver and Everitt Street, and saw [redacted] as one of the individuals involved in the street fight. She advised that a number of the Klan and Nazi demonstrators had left their cars and had run up into the intersection and were beating the people with clubs and sticks.

She stated [redacted] the area and were fleeing up Carver Street, when [redacted] ran behind SANDY SMITH and struck SANDY SMITH across the back of the head with a big stick, and she slammed into the ground. [redacted] advised she watched [redacted] strike SMITH across the back of the head with this big stick and that she knew it was [redacted] after he had been identified through the news media. She advised that prior to that, she only knew it was a very large, white male with red hair, wearing a blue jean jacket and blue jeans. Later, he was identified in photographs as being [redacted]

[redacted] advised that SMITH fell to the ground [redacted] the arm and helped her to move back toward the Morning Side Center.

alms

As they were moving back toward the Morning Side Center, she advised most of the Klansmen had left the intersection of Carver Street and were running back to their cars. She stated at this time she had not heard any additional shots other than the one she had described earlier [redacted]

[redacted] Community Center. She heard shots and as they passed the T.V. car, she could observe [redacted] lying in the street and [redacted] were helping to pull her to a safe place [redacted]

[redacted] Ms. SMITH sitting on the walkway of the Community Center, not adjacent to the building, but near the front entrance. She stated that she then continued to run up Carver Street and was attempting to assist the children in front of her to find safety. She stated at this time, she was able to observe several members of the KKK and Nazi group armed with shotguns and pistols, approaching the people remaining in the intersection. She stated that from later identification, she could identify ROLAND WOOD as coming up Everitt Street toward Carver Street with a shotgun and knew he was firing the shotgun from the pump and action and also from the recoil of the weapon. She advised she also saw another individual but she could not recall his name, as running up the street with two pistols, acting like a cowboy, shooting with both hands.

[redacted] advised that neighborhood people then began to pull her, and the children who were running with her, into their houses and brought them to safety. She stated with her was [redacted] and other children who were taken into the homes of the people who offered them shelter.

[redacted] advised that the last time that she saw Ms. SMITH alive, Ms. SMITH was sitting behind the building near the entrance to the Morning Side Community Center entrance.

[redacted] advised that she believes she saw between five or six men with guns coming up Everitt Street shooting into the remaining people who were at the intersection on Carver Street and that after she was taken to safety inside the building, she did not observe anymore of the shooting incident.

[redacted] advised that she did not personally observe any members of her organization or demonstrators with their group in possession of fire a weapon on that date.

[redacted] A.C. [redacted] advised that in conversation with [redacted] whom she described as a friend of herself and [redacted] told her that he was with [redacted]

She stated that [redacted] had kept a .38 caliber revolver [redacted] and that this was a licensed weapon registered [redacted] on November 3, 1979, and that [redacted] did not find this out until later when [redacted] was arrested in possession of [redacted]

[redacted] told her after the shooting incident and after he had been released on bond from his arrest, that [redacted] had given him the weapon after he had been shot. [redacted] had told [redacted] that he and [redacted] were standing behind a T.V. truck and they had observed [redacted] shot down on Craver Street when he was running to assist the people who were helping [redacted]. She stated that [redacted] also advised they had seen JIM WALLER shot down and also [redacted] and it was [redacted]

[redacted] Street who were shooting at the remaining people in the intersection. [redacted] advised that [redacted] was shot during a large volume of fire which came toward the T.V. truck. The truck was parked on Carver Street. [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] did not state to her whether or not he had fired any shots after [redacted] had given him the weapon, and she did not recall whether or not all the rounds in the weapon had been discharged at the time [redacted] had been arrested.

[redacted] advised that she at no time had seen any shotgun in possession of [redacted] nor did she see a shotgun in his vehicle which was parked at the corner of Everitt Street in the intersection of Carver Street.

[redacted] advised that [redacted] after the shooting incident, [redacted] at some of the KKK and Nazis who were on Everitt Street after they had been shooting into the people in the intersection of Carver Street. [redacted] also advised that [redacted] the KKK and Nazis and that was when he was across the street adjacent to and near a T.V. cameraman. She stated he only fired one shot because his weapon, which she believed to be a Darringer had jammed and he could not fire again.

In regards to [redacted] firing her weapon, she stated that [redacted] had told her that JIM WALLER had been shot and [redacted] was on the ground when [redacted] at the direction of the KKK and demonstrators on Everitt Street. [redacted] advised she could not recall any other member of her group acknowledging to her [redacted]

that they had fired a weapon during this shooting incident on November 3, 1979. [] advised she did not know how many shots were fired other than what she [] She acknowledged this could be anywhere from six to ten shots as two of the weapons were revolvers and one was a Darringer.

[] advised that she also did not know nor did she observe or hear about any incident in which JIM WALLER was involved in a fight over possession of a shotgun with members of the KKK or Nazi group.

[] also advised that in her conversations with [] that he had not given her any information as to his observation of this shooting incident. [] advised that she had received information from some person, that they believe SANDY SMITH was struck by a bullet when she had put her head around the corner of the building at the Morning Side Community Center, but she could not recall where this information came from.

From a review of photographs of the scene, [] identified [] as being one of the first individuals who came to the aid of SANDY SMITH after the firing had stopped.

[] reviewed the T.V. films recorded on November 3, 1979, by Channel 11, Channel 12, and Channel 2. [] identified the various individuals she recognized in this film as to their location at the time just prior to and during the shooting incident. [] advised after reviewing these films that she apparently had not run directly on Carver Street in seeking safety in the Morning Side Center area but had apparently cut across the grass. She stated that she did not observe [] Ms. SMITH toward safety. She also stated that she could not observe Ms. SMITH being struck with a stick in the film footage. From the film footage, [] was also able to identify ROLAND WOOD as being the individual she observed walking up Everitt Street, toward Carver, firing a shotgun; and also identified [] who was standing in Everitt Street, firing a rifle as being the individual who struck Ms. SMITH.

After reviewing the film footage, interview of [] came to a conclusion.

Officer [] reviewed this 10 page report, have initiated all connections, and concerned with the information contained in the []

WITNESS

SA, FBI. 10-10
1-19-80

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 10/30/81 & 12/17,

[redacted] was interviewed at the New York Office of the FBI, 26 Federal Plaza, New York City, New York. Present during the interview besides the interviewing Agents were [redacted] Attorney, U. S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, and [redacted] was accompanied by his attorneys [redacted]


At the outset of the interview, Departmental Attorney [redacted] advised [redacted] and his counsel that this interview was being conducted by agreement between [redacted] another attorney of [redacted] and with the understanding that the purpose of the interview was to assist the Department of Justice in its continuing investigation into the shooting incident which occurred on November 3, 1979, at Greensboro, North Carolina. [redacted] was advised that the interviews would be conducted by the Special Agents of the FBI who were identified to [redacted] by name, and that copies of the reports filed from these interviews would be furnished to [redacted] [redacted] through his counsel for review and concurrence.

[redacted] advised that it came to his attention, as well as other members in his organization, that there was an increase in the growth of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), not only in the State of North Carolina, but in other states in the United States. [redacted] stated that through the public news media, he became aware of the fact that a recruiting drive was being contemplated by members of the KKK at China Grove, North Carolina, and that they planned to show their recruiting movie, "The Birth of a Nation," on July 8, 1979, at China Grove.

It became known to members of the Workers Viewpoint Organization (WVO) that the citizens of China Grove and the local community were against the showing of this movie and the recruiting efforts of the KKK, however, the local administration refused to deny a permit to the KKK as they felt this would be a violation of the rights of this organization.

Because of popular support in the community, which was determined by interviews of various people in the local community of China Grove, as well as some of the comments made

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by members of the City Council, [] and members of his organization believed that the people were against this recruiting drive by the KKK and, therefore, they went about rallying popular support from the local community to have a protest at the time of the recruiting drive by the KKK.

[] advised that an ad hoc committee, which was composed of different groups to include members of the WVO and local members of the community of China Grove, gathered together and supported a demonstration to show the KKK the people of this community were against their organization.

[] advised that the resurgence of the KKK in the United States, and in North Carolina, was an effort of the power structure of this country to keep a division between Blacks and whites. Historically, according to [] the KKK was used by the power structure to keep this racial bigotry in existence so that the white and Black working classes of the community could not unite together. It was through this racial antagonism that the power structure obscured the real economic issues and if this poisonous philosophy was allowed to spread, it would further drive a wedge between the Black and white workers of the country.

[] cited an example of the J. P. Stevens Company in which he alleged that racism and anti-Black propaganda which was spread by the KKK, was used to "throw dust in people's eyes," and that whites believed that if unions were accepted, Blacks would be taking the jobs from the whites.

Because of this, [] advised that in July, 1979, the focus of the WVO did center upon the KKK and its resurgence in North Carolina and other states.

It was, therefore, decided by this coalition of various members of the China Grove area that there would be a march or demonstration against the KKK when they had a recruiting drive at China Grove.

[] advised he drove to China Grove on July 8, 1979, by himself after he had finished his duty

[]

[redacted] North Carolina.

He advised that he went to the assembly area where he met with other marchers, but could not recall exactly where this was.

The subject matter of this assembly was to encourage the people in attendance to oppose the KKK.

[redacted] advised that he did not carry a sign or any posters, but others in the march might have. [redacted] advised that he went to where the KKK was having their meeting and recognized some of the KKK participants by the fact that they were wearing uniforms and some were heavily armed. [redacted] could not recall what the uniforms were, but indicated it was his belief that some were wearing the KKK security force uniform, and that later he was able to identify ROLAND WOOD as having attended this meeting although at the time he did not know who ROLAND WOOD was.

[redacted] advised that approximately 10 minutes of chanting started from this group which went to the meeting place of the KKK and the chants were generally in the area of down with the Klan, smash the Klan, and a chant which he had not heard before, "Decease - decease - decease the rotten beast."

After about 10 minutes of chanting, the KKK, which was in front of the building, went inside the community center and at that time, some of the demonstrators in his group seized the Confederate flag and burned it. [redacted] defined the Confederate flag as being the symbol of racism and that is why it was burned by the demonstrators.

[redacted] advised that the size of the crowd at this China Grove Community Center were about 25-50 members of the KKK, and approximately 100 members of their group.

[redacted] advised that he did recall seeing two or three uniformed police officers, believed to be city policemen, at the community center and he understood that possibly there was a State Trooper parked outside the area.

[redacted] advised that he later learned that there was an assembly of policemen somewhere outside the area, but he actually never saw them.

[redacted]

In regard to the police officers being there, [] [] advised that he felt there was some kind of collusion between the police and the KKK that were at the China Grove Community Center because he would periodically see the police officers talking with various members of the KKK.

During this demonstration [] advised the only statements he recalled coming from members of the KKK were statements such as "M.F., Nigger lovers," and obscene gestures by members of the KKK, raising their middle finger to the demonstrators.

[] described the characteristics of the two groups as his group, the WVO, and community demonstrators as being a bi-racial group, that is, a mixture of Black and white citizens, and described the KKK and their sympathizers as being all white.

[] advised that he did not know whether or not EDDIE DAWSON, or [] were present at the China Grove meeting and advised that he did not see them, however, at that time he did not know them or what they looked like.

After this China Grove incident, the local news media in Charlotte, Durham, Salisbury, and [] believes Channel 2 TV from Greensboro, North Carolina, had stories of and articles relative to the protest at China Grove, North Carolina, on July 8, 1979. Also following that, leaflets published by the WVO did stress the theme of Death to the Klan in North Carolina.

[] was asked whether or not he observed in addition to the weapons being carried by the members of the KKK, any weapons being carried by any members of their group, and he acknowledged that some people in their group were carrying weapons which were visible.

[] advised that after the China Grove incident, a great deal of interest was gathered by the public into the WVO's anti-Klan campaign. [] advised that there were numerous incidents which showed there was a lot of interest in the public for an anti-Klan movement.

[]

It was because of this public interest, that a November 3 rally in Greensboro, North Carolina, was planned and the theme of it would be "Death to the Klan."

[redacted] was asked to describe what was meant by the theme, "Death to the Klan," and he advised that "Death to the Klan" was meant to be the destruction of the KKK as a racist organization in the United States and that through public knowledge of what the KKK was really like, that there would not be popular support for such an organization, and therefore, the Klan as an organization would cease to exist.

[redacted] also alleged that the KKK was, in fact, a political arm of various groups to include the police and the FBI and that these organizations used the KKK and their racist activity for their own purposes.


In regard to the meetings for the November 3, 1979, rally at Greensboro, North Carolina, [redacted] advised that there was no broad open meeting. [redacted] advised that various organizations were highly supportive of their plans to have a rally in Greensboro, North Carolina, but he did not recall any coalition type group being organized for the planning purpose of this rally.

In regard to the November 3, 1979, rally at Greensboro, North Carolina, [redacted] advised that this was not to be a confrontation between the KKK and the WVO. If anything, [redacted] advised they were more concerned about police and FBI tactics than they were over the KKK. [redacted] advised that at that time, he did not know what extent people would go to silence those opposing them.

[redacted] advised that the first time he saw [redacted] was at a press conference in Greensboro, North Carolina.

[redacted] advised that the KKK and Nazis worked with and were used by the police, and further stated that the KKK was a terrorist organization which acts as a surrogate for the powers to be.

[redacted] advised that the first press conference relative to the November 3rd rally and march at Greensboro occurred at Kannapolis, at Cannon Mills, in mid



[redacted] advised [redacted] [redacted] were present, and approximately 6 to 8 media representatives were also there. At this conference, various literature was distributed to the people of Cannon Mills and [redacted] advised that he did not know whether or not he had any of these documents left at this time or who did. [redacted] lawyers advised that they would check to determine whether or not any of this literature which was distributed at this meeting was available and copies would be furnished to the Department of Justice.

[redacted] advised the next press conference was held on November 1, 1979, at Greensboro, North Carolina, in the front of the Greensboro Police Department. The purpose of the press conference was to draw attention to the public of the November 3rd march and also to bring out to the public's attention the obstruction by the police of their efforts to have this march and rally. [redacted] advised that the police had torn down their posters which advertised the march, they had intentionally stalled on the granting of a permit however, after the press conference. [redacted]

[redacted] advised that it normally takes 72 hours for the process to obtain a parade permit and in this instance it had taken over two weeks. [redacted] was questioned as to whether or not he knew the names of these individuals who were attempting to disrupt the organization for the march, and he said he did not, but thought [redacted] might know.

[redacted] advised that [redacted] was the [redacted] at the press conference and that this press conference at Greensboro on November 1, 1979, had between 20 and 25 reporters and approximately two TV stations covering it.

[redacted] at the press conference accused the police of attempting to inhibit this march against the KKK and reiterated that the theme of the march would be "Death to the Klan." [redacted]

[redacted] advised that "Death to the Klan" meant that the Klan would cease to exist as a political organization and that through a combination of public pressure, self defense, knowledge, and that the Klan does not serve the interest of the people, the Klan as a political organization would cease to exist.



7

At this press conference, literature and pamphlets were also distributed, expressing the purpose of the rally and furnishing information to the public about the march and subsequent meeting afterwards.

Again, [] advised that he did not believe he had any of these pamphlets or leaflets in his possession at this time, and that if there were any such leaflets still available, the attorneys for [] would make them available to the Department of Justice.

[] advised this was the last public meeting before the November 3, 1979 march and following the meeting the information regarding the march and rally was passed through individuals speaking to individuals.

[] advised that it was his understanding at first that the march would be concluded at the All Nations Penecostal Church and it was there that they would have their rally. However, the [] had advised [] that this facility could not be used, and that other arrangements would have to be made. [] advised that [] would know the reasons why the church was not available.

[] advised that after the shooting incident, he had heard that Lieutenant [] had stated that he did not know the assembly area was at Everitt and Carver Street, and that to him this was shocking information. [] advised the parade permit had specified the assembly area as being Everitt and Carver Street, and that the public announcements as to a gathering area at the Windsor Community Center was for the purpose of permitting people who were coming in from out of town to have access to an area easily identifiable. He stated that there was a complete understanding between the police and [] that the group would follow the parade permit in detail, and the parade permit specified the assembly area would be Everitt and Carver Street. Despite the public announcements which was made about the assembly area being at the Windsor Community Center, [] advised that [] had told him that he had been naively honest with the Police Department and that the Police Department fully understood that the assembly area would be Everitt and Carver Street and this was the location from where the group would begin their march on November 3, 1979.

I have reviewed this seven (7) page report, have initialed all corrections and concurred with the information contained in the report.

"WITNESSED"

SA, FBI

NY0141 1250505Z

PP HQ CE

DE NY 064

P 042300Z MAY 82

FM NEW YORK (44-314) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (44-81521) PRIORITY

ATTN: [REDACTED] ROOM 5131

CHARLOTTE (44-3527) PRIORITY

BT

U N C L A S

GREENKIL; CIVIL RIGHTS; OO: CHARLOTTE.

RENYTELCALL TO THE BUREAU, MAY 4, 1982.

ON MAY 4, 1982, THE OFFICE OF [REDACTED] SKYLIGHT PICTURES,
330 WEST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK, NEW YORK, WAS ADVISED TO FORWARD
COPY OF FILM TO FBIHQ ATTENTION [REDACTED] PERSONNEL ADVISED
THAT FILM WOULD BE SHIPPED THIS DATE.

THIS MATTER IS BEING CONSIDERED RUC IN THE NEW YORK DIVISION.

BT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-12-84 BY SP2TJ/ci

16 MAY 6 1982

Exec. AD-Adm.	
Exec. AD-Inv.	
Exec. AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
5 MAY 82 05 01
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

64 MAY 25 1982

CE0002 0611652Z

RR HI

DE CE

R 021653Z MAR82

RECEIVED
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92
2 MAR 82 17 01

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

Exec. AD-Adm.	_____
Exec. AD-Inv.	_____
Exec. AD-LES	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Servs.	_____
Crim. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	_____
Rec. Mgnt.	_____
Tech. Servs.	_____
Training	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

FM CHARLOTTE (44A-3527) (P)

TO DIRECTOR (44-81521) ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6-13-84 BY SP2T/MLC

ATTENTION TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, SUPERVISOR [REDACTED]

AND

CIVIL RIGHTS UNIT, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

GREENKIL

Civil Rights &
Spec. Inv. Sect.

Engineering &
Lab. [REDACTED]

b3
b6
b7C

RE FBIHQ TELETYPE TO CHARLOTTE, FEBRUARY 27, 1982; AND
BUREAU TELCALL TO GREENSBORO RA.

FOR INFORMATION OF TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, ON [REDACTED]
1982, A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY (FGJ) WILL
CONVENE AT [REDACTED] NC, TO BE PRESENTED EVIDENCE ON
CAPTIONED MATTER.

IT IS ESTIMATED THE FGJ WILL SIT APPROXIMATELY FOUR DAYS A
WEEK AND WILL RUN FOR A PERIOD OF THREE TO FOUR MONTHS.

A MAJOR PORTION OF THE INVESTIGATION AND EVIDENCE TO BE
PRESENTED TO THIS FGJ ARE THE T.V. VIDEO TAPES RECORDED OF THE
VIOLENCE OF NOVEMBER 3, 1979, AT GREENSBORO, NC, AND THEREFORE,

64-1111
Pulse 3/22/82
by Div 6 on 3/22/82
cec

EXBROW
JUN 10 1982

logged in
3/10/82
1cc -
efwng

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Unrecorded Copy File
20-8206

PAGE TWO CE 44A-3527 UNCLAS

THE CHARLOTTE DIVISION REQUIRES THE FOLLOWING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM FBIHQ:

ONE 19-INCH COLOR TELEVISION SET; ONE TV VIDEO RECORDER-PLAYER WITH THE CAPABILITY OF STOP ACTION/STOPPING THE TV VIDEO FILM DURING CERTAIN SEQUENCES; AND ONE TV AND TV RECORDER-PLAYER STAND, PREFERABLY ON WHEELS TO BE MOVED FROM USA'S OFFICE TO FGJ ROOM.

IT IS ESTIMATED THIS EQUIPMENT WILL BE NEEDED FOR A PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY THREE MONTHS FROM [REDACTED] 1982.

IF A TRUE BILL OF INDICTMENT IS RETURNED AGAINST ANY INDIVIDUALS AS A RESULT OF THIS FGJ INDICTMENT, ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT WOULD BE NEEDED FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT TRIAL, HOWEVER, THAT WOULD BE DETERMINED AT A LATER DATE.

SAC, CHARLOTTE, HAS INQUIRED RELATIVE TO RENTAL OF SUCH EQUIPMENT, AND HAS DETERMINED THAT A 19-INCH COLOR TV WOULD COST \$22.00 PER WEEK; A TV RECORDER-PLAYER WOULD COST \$28.00 PER WEEK; AND THEREFORE, DUE TO THE AMOUNT OF FUNDS INVOLVED, FBIHQ IS REQUESTED TO FURNISH THIS EQUIPMENT IF POSSIBLE.

BT

*Total 50/wk
x 12 wk
\$600*

what kind?

b3

CC — ~~Orig. Inv. Div.~~
Civil Rights &
Spec Inv. Sect

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: 13 APR 1982

FROM : Wm. Bradford Reynolds
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

WBR:LKD:MDJ:bbg
DJ 144-54M-351

SUBJECT: Greenkil
CIVIL RIGHTS

20422014 - EOE

Reference is made to your memorandum dated October 23, 1980,
and previous memoranda.

Please make a [redacted] and make necessary
arrangements for transcription of the tapes. Once copied, the
original tapes of interview should be sent to Special Agent
[redacted] in Greensboro.

38 APR 15 1982
EXP. PROC.

SEE ADDENDUM, CID, PAGE 2.

1 cc and enclosures
detached Div. 8

44-81521-2177
29
12 APR 15 1982

3 JUL 14 1982

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Form OBD-197
5-79

ADDENDUM: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, 4/22/82, EEH/mst ^{MST}
~~64~~

[redacted]
[redacted] therefore, expedite copying of these tapes is requested in order that a typed transcript may be prepared. Furnish copied tapes and originals to SA Supervisor [redacted] Civil Rights Unit, FBIHQ, Room 5131, Ext. 4272, as expeditiously as possible.

b3
b6
b7C

Technical Services Division also note that interview [redacted] begin on side 2, Tape 4, of the interview of [redacted] [redacted] If possible, record the interview of [redacted] separately from the interview of [redacted] The interview of [redacted] begins on side 2 of Tape 3 containing interview of [redacted] Record the [redacted] interview separately from the [redacted] interview.

b6
b7C

Make all recordings on audio cassettes, reel to reel is not needed. If possible utilize 90 or 120 minute cassettes rather than 60 minute tapes to reduce the number of cassettes. If possible record all of one interview on one tape.

Chain of custody has been maintained by SA [redacted] [redacted] who recorded interviews and who has maintained custody of audio cassettes since they were recorded.

b6
b7C

TAPE LOG

SA
SA

✓ 4/7/82

[REDACTED]

TAPE 1 Side 1

@ GREENSBORO, N.C.

Side 2

TAPE 2 Side 1

Side 2 (?)

✓ 4/7/82

[REDACTED]

TAPE 1 Side 1

@ GREENSBORO, N.C.

Side 2

TAPE 2 Side 1

Side 2

TAPE 3 Side 1

Side 2 (?)

✓

4/8/82

[REDACTED]

TAPE 1 Side 1

@ GREENSBORO, N.C.

Side 2

TAPE 2 Side 1

Side 2

✓

4/8/82

[REDACTED]

TAPE 1 Side 1

@ GREENSBORO, N.C.

Side 2

TAPE 2 Side 1

Side 2

✓

4/8/82

[REDACTED]

TAPE 1 Side 1

@ GREENSBORO, N.C.

Side 2

TAPE 2 Side 1

Side 2

✓

4/8/82

[REDACTED]

TAPE 1 Side 1

@ GREENSBORO, N.C.

Side 2

TAPE 2 Side 1

Side 2

TAPE 3 Side 1

Side 2 (?)

* (?) indicates possible no recording on this side of TAPE.

✓ 4/12/82

[REDACTED]

TAPE 1 Side 1

@ Washington, D.C.

Side 2

TAPE 2 Side 3

Side 4

✓ 4/13/82

[REDACTED]

TAPE 1 Side 1

@ New York City, N.Y.

Side 2 (?)

✓ 4/13/82

[REDACTED]

TAPE 1 Side 1

@ New York City, N.Y.

Side 2

TAPE 2 Side 1

Side 2

TAPE 3 Side 1

Side 2

✓ 4/15/82

[REDACTED]

TAPE 1 Side 1

@ Durham, N.C.

Side 2

TAPE 2 Side 1

Side 2

TAPE 3 Side 1

Side 2

TAPE 4 Side 1 (ONLY)

✓ 4/15/82

[REDACTED]

BEGIN ON Side 2 OF TAPE 4

@ Durham, N.C.

INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]

TAPE 2 Side 1

Side 2

✓ 4/15/82

[REDACTED]

TAPE 1 Side 1

@ Durham, N.C.

Side 2

TAPE 2 Side 1

Side 2

TAPE 3 Side 1 (ONLY)

✓ 4/15/82

[REDACTED]

BEGIN ON Side 2 OF TAPE 3 INTERVIEW

@ Durham, N.C.

OF [REDACTED]

TAPE 2 Side 1

Side 2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

WBR
Memorandum*exp*
TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation**DATE: 14 APR 1982****FROM : Wm. Bradford Reynolds**
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division**WBR:LKD:MDJ:bbg**
DJ 144-54M-351**SUBJECT: Greenkil**
CIVIL RIGHTS**20422013** - *EQE**exp*
Reference is made to your memorandum dated October 25, 1981, and previous memoranda.

Please make a copy of all tapes in your possession and repair the original of any tapes which require it.

Q457-Q472
4/22/82
TSD Report
3/3/83
NH: jmm
6 tapes
6
SEE ADDENDUM, CID, PAGE 2*38 APR 16 1982*
#38
EXP-PROC.*FS6*
1 cc and enclosures
detached Div. 8
44-81521-218/8
5-3
12 APR 16 1982
scate

ADDENDUM: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, 4/22/82, EPH/mst

Technical Services Division should note this matter is [redacted] to a Federal Grand Jury at [redacted] North Carolina. The FGJ will hear testimony from the persons interviewed, whose interviews are contained on the enclosed tapes, within the next two weeks, therefore, expedite copying of these tapes is requested. Furnish copied tapes and originals to SA Supervisor [redacted] Civil Rights Unit, FBIHQ, Room 5131, Ext. 4272, as expeditiously as possible.

b3
b6
b7C

Make all recordings on audio cassettes, reel to reel is not needed.

Chain of custody has been maintained by SA [redacted] [redacted] who received audio tapes from Departmental Attorney [redacted] on 4/8/82, and who has maintained custody of audio cassettes since they were received.

b6
b7C

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

1 OF 2

4/28/82

UNCLAS

PRECEDENCE
IMMEDIATE

*F057000 CE NYDE HQ H0057 %*H4U0 R 281726Z APR 82

12 CONTINUE

FM DIRECTOR FBI (44-81521)

TO TO FBI NEW YORK (44-3149) IMMEDIATE

FBI CHARLOTTE (44-3527) ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-13-84 BY SP8 TEP/c

GREENKIL; CIVIL RIGHTS; 00: CHARLOTTE

NEW YORK CONTACT SKYLIGHT PICTURES, 330 W. 42 STREET,

NEW YORK CITY, TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED] AND ATTEMPT TO

SECURE VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION OF A FILM ENTITLED "RESURGENCE -

THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY VS. THE KU KLUX KLAN," FOR SHOWING

BEFORE A FEDERAL GRAND JURY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] N.C., WHICH IS HEARING EVIDENCE IN GREENKIL.

ABOVE FILM CONTAINS MATERIAL CONCERNING THE VIOLENCE AT

GREENSBORO, N.C., WHICH OCCURRED NOVEMBER 3, 1979, AS WELL

AS RELATED KU KLUX KLAN MATERIAL.

IF SKYLINE PICTURES WILL NOT VOLUNTARILY FURNISH A COPY OF

THE FILM, OBTAIN NAME AND TITLE OF PERSON TO WHOM A SUBPOENA

DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE

APPROVED BY
15/4

DRAFTED BY

EEH:DJW(2)

DATE

4/28/82

ROOM

5131/6

TELE EXT.

4272

PLEASE RETURN TO [REDACTED] ROOM 5131

44-81521-219

APR 30 1982

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

1855Z
APR 28 1982

57 MAY 18 1982

DO NOT FILE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS STAMP

FBI/DOJ

b3
b6
b7C

DO NOT TYPE PAST THIS LINE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

PAGE 2

CONTINUATION SHEET

PAGE TWO DE HQ 0057 UNCLAS

MAY BE DIRECTED.

20 BT

18 |

16 |

14 |

12 |

10 |

8 |

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4 |

2 |

DO NOT TYPE PAST THIS LINE

END OF MESSAGE (UNCLAS THIS LINE)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 4/30/82

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (44A-81521)
(ATTN: FBI LABORATORY
FIREARMS IDENTIFICATION AND METALLURGY)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6-13-84 BY SP2 TAP/cj

FROM: SAC, CHARLOTTE (44A-3527) (P)

GREENKILL

20503019

Re Charlotte telcall to Supervisor Civil Rights Section
4/29/82.

Being forwarded to FBI Laboratory, Firearms Identification
and Metallurgy by courier, SA [redacted] Charlotte
Division, are two firearms; one .38 caliber Charter Undercover
5 shot, SN 380232 and one Charter .38 caliber Undercover, 5 shot
handgun, SN 288986.

The first weapon, SN 380232, is a weapon [redacted]
[redacted] JAMES WALLER, who was
killed on 11/3/79, at Greensboro, N.C.

44-81521-220

The second weapon, SN 288986, was seized from [redacted]
[redacted] of Greensboro, N.C., as he attempted to board
an Eastern Airline flight to Washington, D.C. This weapons has
been traced by ATF records to belong to SANDRA SMITH, who was
also killed on 11/3/79 at Greensboro, N.C. [redacted] has not been
interviewed relative to his explanation of how he came in possession
of this weapon and will not be done until ballistic tests are
completed on the weapon.

③-Bureau (44A-81521) (Enc. 3)
(1-Package)
2-Charlotte (44A-3527)
TJB/jmg
(5)

Approved: [Signature] Transmitted _____ Per _____
(Number) (Time)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ _____

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

CE 44A-3527

Date _____

b3
b6
b7C

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU

The FBI Laboratory, Firearms Identification is requested to test fire the above two .38 caliber weapons and to compare them with known projectiles recovered from the crime scene of 11/3/79.

Metallurgy is requested to conduct a neutron analysis examination on the shotgun shell and to compare it with other shotgun shell pellets also being forwarded to FBI Laboratory with SA [redacted] for a comparison of elementary composition.

b6
b7C

It is further expected that on Monday, 5/3/82, [redacted] of Richmond, Va. will also surrender to FBI Agents another .38 caliber handgun which she now acknowledges firing on 11/3/79 and this is also requested to be examined by Firearms Identification Bullistics for similar examination as the two weapons requested above.

2*

Approved: _____

Transmitted _____

(Number)

(Time)

Per _____

Please Furnish Complete Information

Agency submitting evidence

SAC Charlotte

☒ FBI
☐ Federal
☐ Local or State

Date

5/4/82

Laboratory #

20504049

Delivered by

Accepted by

BU

44-3527

b6
b7C

Susp

Victim(s)

GREENKILL

Offense

CR

Place and date of offense

Greensboro, N.C.

Agency case #

Date of hearing, grand jury, trial, or reason why expeditious handling is necessary

Prev. exams this case

☒ Yes ☐ No

Evid. located

Room # 3287

Report to be directed to

Copies to

Evidence to be returned to

Brief Facts covering case

Description of evidence

1 - Smith & Wesson Revolver

Exams requested

44-81521-2211

16 MAY 11 1982

(This space for blocking)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 4/30/82

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHARLOTTE (164C- NEW) (P)

[REDACTED]
 EASTERN AIRLINE FLIGHT 396
 APRIL 24, 1982 AND PIEDMONT
 FLIGHT 50, APRIL 24, 1982
 CAA-CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON
 (00: CHARLOTTE)

ADMINISTRATIVE

For the information of the Bureau [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] in Charlotte investigation, "GREENKIL",
 CE file 44A-3527 and is also a plaintiff in a forty-eight million
 dollar lawsuit filed against U.S. Department of Justice and the
 FBI as a result of the 11/3/79 shooting incident between the
 Ku Klux Klan/Nazi and Communist Workers Party (CWP) at Greensboro,
 N.C.

On 4/24/82, Deputy Sheriff [REDACTED] Guilford Co.
 Sheriff's Dept., Greensboro, N.C.; Airport Security, Greensboro-
 Winston-Salem-High Point Regional Airport, advised that subject,
 [REDACTED] black male, DOB [REDACTED] who resides at
 [REDACTED] Greensboro, N.C., was detained for
 carrying a concealed weapon on his person, that is, a Charter
 Undercover .38, 5 shot special, SN 288986. This weapon was loaded
 with five rounds of .38 caliber ammunition.

Investigation determined that [REDACTED] was a ticketed
 passenger on Eastern Airlines (EAL) flight 396 which departs
 Greensboro at 7:25 a.m. and goes to Washington, D.C. [REDACTED]
 had connecting tickets to continue from National Airport in
 Washington, D.C. on National Airline flight 132 to Syracuse, NY.

③-Bureau (2-164C-NEW)
 (1-44A-81521)
 3-Charlotte (2-164C-)
 (1-44A-3527)

TJB/jmg
 (6)

CARBON COPY

NOT RECORDED
 11 MAY 10 1982

Approved: _____

Transmitted _____

(Number)

(Time)

Per _____

ORIGINAL FILED IN

164-5132-1

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ _____

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

CE 164C- NEW

Date _____

[redacted] however, had two boarding ticket passes on his person when questioned by the FBI. One boarding pass was on EAL flight 396 and [redacted] was assigned seat #17A and the other boarding pass was on Piedmont flight 50 for seat #23F. Piedmont flight 50 also originates at Greensboro, N.C. and departs at 7:30 a.m. for National Airport, Washington, D.C.

The weapon on [redacted] person was first discovered when [redacted] passed through the security gate and the weapon was observed in his briefcase by x-ray examination. Deputy [redacted] after being notified by security guards of the weapon being in the briefcase, examined [redacted] briefcase, however, was unable to locate the weapon. [redacted] suspecting that it was another briefcase, passed [redacted] through the security area and examined another passenger's carryon baggage.

[redacted] then proceeded through security to Piedmont Airlines where he obtained a boarding pass for flight 50, although he was already ticketed and had received a boarding pass on EAL flight 396.

Deputy [redacted] became further suspicious, and went to the EAL boarding area where he again confronted [redacted] and asked [redacted] whether or not he had a weapon on him. [redacted] denied having a weapon on him and [redacted] again searched his briefcase, but did not find a weapon. During a body search, Deputy [redacted] found the above described weapon, .38 caliber handgun, in [redacted] coat pocket.

[redacted] was interviewed by FBI Agents at the Regional Airport and admitted that this was his weapon, and that he had inadvertently carried the weapon with him in his briefcase when he came to the airport. [redacted] stated after being first checked by security, he became suspicious of the fact that he could have the weapon with him and located it in his briefcase and had placed it in his pocket and was in the process of leaving the airport to attempt to find a friend to take the weapon back to his residence and [redacted] advised he had no intention of flying with the weapon. [redacted] explanation for the two boarding passes was that he had become confused as to which airline he was flying

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ _____

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

CE 164C- NEW

Date _____

on, and which flight was going to Washington, D.C. and had inadvertently obtained two boarding passes.

[] was issued a citation by Deputy [] for violation of North Carolina General Statute 14-269, which is carrying a concealed weapon, which is a misdemeanor offense in the State of North Carolina. USA, MDNC, was telephonically notified and advised he would review investigation after receipt of a report before making final determination as to whether or not charges should be filed for violation of Title 49, USC, Section 1479 Ll.

Investigation continuing.

b6
b7c

3*

Approved: _____

Transmitted _____

(Number)

(Time)

Per _____

027

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

PAGE 1 OF 2

DATE 4/6/82 CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

FM DIRECTOR FBI {44-81521}

TO NEW YORK {44-3149} PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS

GREENKIL; CIVIL RIGHTS; OO: CHARLOTTE

RE NEW YORK AIRTEL TO FBIHQ DATED FEBRUARY 26, 1982, AND BUTELCALLS TO NEW YORK, APRIL 5 AND 6, 1982.

THIS CONFIRMS RETELCALLS IN WHICH NEW YORK WAS REQUESTED TO HAVE AVAILABLE A SUITABLE INTERVIEW ROOM WITH TELEVISION SET AND TAPE PLAYER TO BE UTILIZED ON FRIDAY, APRIL 16, 1982, DURING INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] A CWP MEMBER, IN CONJUNCTION WITH CAPTIONED INVESTIGATION.

INTERVIEW WILL BE CONDUCTED BY SA'S [REDACTED] CHARLOTTE DIVISION, AND [REDACTED] FBIHQ. ALSO PRESENT WILL BE ATTORNEYS FROM THE GREENSBORO DEFENSE FUND AND U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATTORNEY [REDACTED]

INTERVIEW ROOM AND TELEVISION EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE

DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE

APPROVED BY JS/A	DEPARTED BY EEH:DJW{2}	DATE 4/6/82	ROOM 5131/6	TELE EXT. 4272
------------------	------------------------	-------------	-------------	----------------

PLEASE RETURN TO [REDACTED] ROOM 5131

10 APR 12 1982

66 MAY 18 1982

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

APR 6 1982

DO NOT FILE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS STAMP

FBI/DOJ

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

PAGE

2

CONTINUATION SHEET

PAGE TWO DE HQ 0027 UNCLAS

✓
AVAILABLE FROM 9:00 AM ON. EXACT TIME OF INTERVIEW HAS NOT
BEEN ESTABLISHED.

BT

|

DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE

DO NOT TYPE PAST THIS LINE

Memorandum



Exec AD Inv. _____
 Exec AD Adm. _____
 Exec AD LES _____
 Asst. Dir.:
 Adm. Servs. _____
 Crim. Inv. _____
 Ident. _____
 Intell. _____
 Laboratory _____
 Legal Coun. _____
 Plan. & Insp. _____
 Rec. Mgnt. _____ b6
 Tech. Servs. _____ b7C
 Training _____
 Public Affs. Off. _____
 Telephone Rm. _____
 Director's Sec'y _____

To : [Redacted]
 From : [Redacted]
 Subject: GREENKIL
 CIVIL RIGHTS
 OO: CHARLOTTE

Date 4/5/82

PURPOSE: To request travel authorization for Supervisory Special Agent [Redacted] Civil Rights Unit, FBIHQ, to assist DOJ Attorney and Case Agent in conducting interviews of 13 Communist Worker's Party (CWP) members in Greensboro, North Carolina, Durham, North Carolina, Washington, D. C., and New York City in connection with continuing investigation and ongoing Federal Grand Jury. This request from the CRD is due to the sensitivity of the CWP interviews, the complexity of the case, SA [Redacted] knowledge of the Ku Klux Klan background in this matter, and to maintain continuity of the investigation between interviews. b6 b7C

RECOMMENDATION: 1. That travel and per diem be authorized for travel to Greensboro, North Carolina to conduct interviews of six CWP members on 4/7,8,9/82.

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
 Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
 Director _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
 Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
 Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Inspection _____ Tech. Servs. _____
 Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____ Training _____

2. That travel and per diem be authorized for travel to Durham, N. C. to conduct interviews of four CWP members on 4/13-14/82.

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
 Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
 Director _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
 Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Ident. _____ Rec. Mgnt. _____
 Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Inspection _____ Tech. Servs. _____
 Exec. AD-LES _____ Intell. _____ Training _____

1 - [Redacted]
 1 - Mr. Castonquay
 1 - [Redacted]
 1 - [Redacted]
 1 - Mr. Hatfield

44-81521-223

10 APR 22 1982

EEH/mst (7)

(CONTINUED-OVER)

APR 21 1982

PERS. REQUEST 4/4/82
 44-81521

Memorandum from [redacted] to [redacted]
RE: GREENKIL, CIVIL RIGHTS, OO: CHARLOTTE

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3. That interview of one CWP member at Washington, D. C. on 4/15/82 be approved.

APPROVED: [redacted] Adm. Serv. [redacted] Laboratory [redacted]
Director [redacted] Legal Coun. [redacted]
Exec. AD-Adm. [redacted] Ident. [redacted] Insp. [redacted]
Exec. AD-Inv. [redacted] Intell. [redacted] Lab. [redacted]
Exec. AD-LES [redacted] Training [redacted]

4. That travel and per diem be authorized for travel to New York City to conduct interviews of two CWP members on 4/16/82.

APPROVED: [redacted] Adm. Serv. [redacted] Laboratory [redacted]
Director [redacted] Legal Coun. [redacted]
Exec. AD-Adm. [redacted] Ident. [redacted] Insp. [redacted]
Exec. AD-Inv. [redacted] Intell. [redacted] Lab. [redacted]
Exec. AD-LES [redacted] Training [redacted]

DETAILS: On 4/2/82 Civil Rights Division Attorney [redacted] requested Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] FBIHQ, assist him and Case Agent in conducting interviews of 13 CWP members in connection with captioned investigation. CWP members to be interviewed are located in Greensboro and Durham, North Carolina, Washington, D. C., and New York City. [redacted] advised the CWP members have agreed to interviews through their attorney after refusing to be interviewed since the November 3, 1979, Greensboro, North Carolina shoot out between a Klan-Nazi group and the CWP in which 5 CWP members were killed. Federal Grand Jury is presently sitting in [redacted] North Carolina and interviews are of the utmost timeliness and importance to the Department's presentation of all aspects of this matter. Scheduled interview dates are: 4/7 through 9, 1982 in Greensboro, North Carolina, during which 6 CWP members will be interviewed; 4/13/82 and 4/14/82 at Durham, North Carolina, in which 4 CWP members will be interviewed; 4/15/82 at Washington, D. C., at which time one CWP member will be interviewed, and 4/16/82 in New York City, at which time 2 CWP members will be interviewed.

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The presence of SA [redacted] was requested by Attorney [redacted] due to the sensitivity of the CWP interviews, the complexity of the case, SA [redacted] knowledge of the Ku Klux Klan background in this matter, to maintain continuity of the investigation between interviews and to ensure the FBI's interests are protected. Attorneys representing the CWP members will be present as well as Attorney [redacted] SAC Charlotte and Criminal ASAC's New York City and WFO interpose no objections.

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b7C



CITY OF GREENSBORO

NORTH CAROLINA

DRAWER W-2
GREENSBORO, N.C. 27402

b6
b7c

April 26, 1982

Dear



Enclosed please find the two rolls of exposed 120 film in reference to our conversation last week. I used a camera that I was unfamiliar with and I am not sure of the quality of the photographs. If you would please have these printed 5"x7". This will allow examination for detail before chart size prints are attempted. The final size needed will be approximately 24" x 30" or large enough for court displays.

Another problem encountered was not being able to photograph the desired charts in a consistent format. This will require cropping during printing if that is possible.

Thank you for your assistance. If this process is successful, I will continue with current procedures. If not, please advise so necessary changes can be made.

Thank you




JRB/smt

Enclosure *detached in case*

dh

44-81521-223XX



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PP HQ CE

DE NY 045

P 292100Z APR 82

FM NEW YORK (44-3149) (P) (M-11)

TO DIRECTOR (44-81521) PRIORITY

CHARLOTTE (44-3527) PRIORITY

BT

U N C L A S

GREENKIL; CIVIL RIGHTS; OO: CHARLOTTE.

REBUREAUTEL TO NEW YORK, APRIL 28, 1982 AND NYTELCAL TO

SUPERVISOR [REDACTED] APRIL 28, 1982.

FOR INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU, ON APRIL 29, 1982,

[REDACTED] SKY-LIGHT PICTURES, 330 WEST 42ND STREET,

NEW YORK, NEW YORK, AND [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT SHE

WOULD BE MORE THAN HAPPY IN COOPERATING WITH THE FBI IN OBTAINING

A COPY OF THE FILM FOR DISPLAY TO THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY. [REDACTED]

ADVISED THAT SHE SHOULD BE ABLE TO NOTIFY THE FBI BY MONDAY,

MAY 3, 1982, OF THE LOCATION OF A FILM THAT COULD BE PICKED UP.

[REDACTED] WAS ADVISED THAT, A FIELD OFFICE IN THE AREA OF THE

VICINITY WHERE THE FILM IS LOCATED, WOULD BE DIRECTED TO PICK

UP THE FILM.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6-13-84 BY SP2TJ/c

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100-300000

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Exec. AD-Adm.	_____
Exec. AD-Inv.	_____
Exec. AD-LES	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Adm. Servs.	_____
Crim. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	_____
Rec. Mgnt.	_____
Tech. Servs.	_____
Training	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

MAY 04 1982

Jam

5 MAY 8 1982

20 MAY 21 1982

2244

Please Furnish Complete Information

Agency submitting evidence FBI Charlotte		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FBI <input type="checkbox"/> Federal <input type="checkbox"/> Local or State	Date 5/10/82
Delivered by SA	Accepted by	BUFILE # 20511072	S-QY
Suspect(s) Gnewki I	Victim(s)	44-81521	b6 b7C
Offense CR	Place and date of offense		
Agency case #			
Date of hearing, grand jury, trial, or reason why expeditious handling is necessary			
Prev. exams this case <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Evid. located Room # _____	Report to be directed to	
Copies to	Evidence to be returned to		
Brief Facts covering case			

Description of evidence

Exams requested

1-bullet (Rusub)

**7-16
GFW, POW
6-17-82**

44-81521-2255

10 MAY 13 1982

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SECRET

5-13

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b6
b7C

Please Furnish Complete Information

Agency submitting evidence Div. 6 FBIHQ		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FBI <input type="checkbox"/> Federal <input type="checkbox"/> Local or State	Date 5/12/82
Delivered by SA	Accepted by AA	BuFile # 20513033	E OE
Suspect(s) GREENKIN CIVIL RIGHTS COVOC		Victim(s)	
Offense		Place and date of offense November 3, 1979	
Agency case #			

Date of hearing, grand jury, trial, or reason why expeditious handling is necessary

FGJ PRESENTLY IN SESSION AT

Prey. exams this case <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Evid. located Room # EW-Engineering	Report to be directed to FBI - CHARLOTTE
Copies to SA	Room 5191 KHSHO	Evidence SA

Brief Facts covering case

INTERVIEW OF **[REDACTED]** **WATF, conducted**
AT KHSHQ 5/11-12/82 re events PRIOR to, DURING and
AFTER GREENSBORO, N.C. VIOLENCE 11/3/79.

Description of evidence

Exams requested

3 Audio cassettes
AV C90

TSD Report
3/2/83
NH:jmr

Make 3 direct copies
OF TAPES

44-81521-2260

MAY 18 1982

1 cc and enclosures
detached Div. 8

59 MAR 24 1983

(Use reverse side if necessary for additional evidence)

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CE 0005 1251844Z

Q) HQ

DE CE

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FM CHARLOTTE (44A-3527) (P)

TO DIRECTOR IMMEDIATE

BT

UNCLAS

GREENKIL

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
5 MAY 82 19 21Z
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-13-84 BY 212T/KC

RE CHARLOTTE TELCALL TO FBIHQ, MAY 5, 1982.

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATTORNEY [REDACTED] HAS

ADVISED THAT HE DESIRES TO INTERVIEW SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ALCOHOL TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, PRESENTLY ASSIGNED TO
CLEVELAND OFFICE, CLEVELAND, OHIO, RELATIVE TO HIS UNDERCOVER
ASSIGNMENT WITHIN THE NAZI PARTY OF FORSYTHE COUNTY, WINSTON
SALEM, NORTH CAROLINA, DURING THE PERIOD OF THE FALL OF 1979.

THIS INTERVIEW IS A PRELIMINARY INTERVIEW PRIOR TO


[REDACTED] APPEARANCE BEFORE FEDERAL GRAND JURY, WHICH IS
CONDUCTING INQUIRY INTO CAPTIONED INVESTIGATION. [REDACTED]

HAS PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED STATEMENT TO THE FBI RELATIVE TO HIS [REDACTED] MAY 10 1982
ASSIGNMENT; HOWEVER, USDJ FEELS A MORE DETAILED INTERVIEW IS [REDACTED]

b6 Per FBI
b7C
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Rec. Mgmt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

150
MAY 20 1982
Hawthorne
DIN 6
5/11/82
H

44-81521-227



[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ALSO DESIRES THAT THE IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR OF
[REDACTED] WHO SUPERVISED THE INVESTIGATION OF THE FORSYTHE
COUNTY UNIT OF THE NAZI PARTY, BE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW; AS
WELL AS THE OFFICIAL FROM ATF HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, D. C.
WHO AUTHORIZED THE UC OPERATION.

IN ADDITION, INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS FILED BY [REDACTED]
DURING THE PERIOD OF THE UC OPERATION SHOULD ALSO BE AVAILABLE
FOR REVIEW BY USDJ, AND IF DEEMED APPROPRIATE, THEY WILL ALSO
BE SUBPOENAED TO FEDERAL GRAND JURY.

b6 Per FBI
b7C

IT IS REQUESTED THAT FBIHQ COORDINATE WITH HEADQUARTERS
ATF WASHINGTON, D. C., THE APPEARANCE OF [REDACTED] AND HIS
SUPERIOR IN THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA DURING THE UC OPERATION;
AND THE SUPERVISOR IN WASHINGTON, D. C., APPROVING THIS
OPERATION FOR INTERVIEW AT FBIHQ DURING THE PERIOD OF MAY 3 AND
MAY 9, 1962.

[REDACTED] AND HIS SUPERIORS ARE EXPECTED TO BE SUBPOENAED
FOR TESTIMONY FOR FEDERAL GRAND JURY DURING THE EARLY WEEKS OF
[REDACTED] NORTH CAROLINA.

b3 Per FBI
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WASHINGTON AT FBIHQ WILL COORDINATE THE APPEARANCE OF

b3 Per FBI
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b7C

PAGE THREE CE 44A-3527 UNCLAS

[REDACTED] AND HIS SUPERIORS FOR INTERVIEW BY USDJ AND FEI
AGENTS AT WASHINGTON, D. C., FOR MAY 9 AND MAY 10, 1982.

ADMINISTRATIVE

INFORMATION COPY BEING FURNISHED TO CLEVELAND IN CASE A
COORDINATION HAS TO BE CONDUCTED WITH FBI CLEVELAND AND ATF
CLEVELAND FOR THE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
IN THE FUTURE.

ET

ATO004 1221319Z

RR HQ CE

DE AT

1241319Z MAY 82

FM ATLANTA (157-7463) (P) (SQ 3)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI ROUTINE

CHARLOTTE (44A-3527) ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

GREENKIL, CR (A), OO: CHARLOTTE.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6-12-84 BY SP2TAP/ci

RECEIVED
MAY 10 1982
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

Exec AD Adm.	
Exec AD Inv.	
Exec AD LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Insp.	
Intell.	
Lab.	
Legal Coun.	
Plan. & Insp.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Serv.	
Training	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Telephone Rm.	

ON MAY 3, 1932, [REDACTED] WHITE MALE, AGE 31, [REDACTED]
UNEMPLOYED, [REDACTED] GEORGIA, APPEARED AT [REDACTED]
THE COLUMBUS, GEORGIA, RESIDENT AGENCY (RA), AND FURNISHED THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

HE WAS FORMERLY EMPLOYED AS [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] RALIEGH, NORTH CAROLINA, AND
ALSO EMPLOYED WAS [REDACTED] BLACK MALE, APPROXIMATELY 45
YEARS OF AGE.

AFTER CAPTIONED MATTER, HE AND [REDACTED] GOT INTOXICATED AT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] RESIDENCE AND [REDACTED] SAID THAT HE WENT TO FLORIDA WHERE
[REDACTED] FOR USE BY KKK IN THE GREENSBORO

44-81501-228

16 MAY 6 1982

68 MAY 27 1982

PAGE TWO (AT 157-7463) UNCLAS

INCIDENT. [REDACTED] ALSO TOLD HIM THAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN THAT AREA OF NORTH CAROLINA.

[REDACTED] IS A WHITE MALE, APPROXIMATELY 43, FIVE FEET NINE, 160 POUNDS, BROWN HAIR, HANDSOME APPEARANCE, MARRIED AND HAS TWO CHILDREN. [REDACTED] SUPPOSEDLY WENT INTO BANKRUPTCY ABOUT A YEAR AFTER CAPTIONED MATTER AND WAS LAST KNOWN TO BE RESIDING IN

[REDACTED] NORTH CAROLINA.

[REDACTED] IS A NEGRO MALE, 45, FIVE FEET FOUR, 200 POUNDS, KNOWN BOOTLEGGER, RESIDES IN [REDACTED] MOBILE HOMES, RALIEGH, NORTH CAROLINA. [REDACTED] NAME UNKNOWN, ALSO RESIDES IN THE SAME TRAILER PARK.

[REDACTED] DOES NOT KNOW IF THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS RELIABLE. HE IS WILLING TO TESTIFY REGARDING ABOVE.

CHARLOTTE IS REQUESTED TO EVALUATE ABOVE INFORMATION AND ADVISE IF USA OR STRIKE FORCE DESIRES PERSONAL INTERVIEW WITH

[REDACTED] ATLANTA WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH [REDACTED] TO ADVISE IF SUCH CONTACT IF DEEMED NECESSARY.

BT

CE0009 1262146Z

RR HQ

DE CE

R 062147Z MAY 82

FM CHARLOTTE (44A-3527)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

GREENKIL; OO: CHARLOTTE.

RE CHARLOTTE TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU DATED MAY 5, 1982, AND
CHARLOTTE TELCALL TO FBIHQ ON MAY 6, 1982.

DURING THE COURSE OF GRAND JURY

THE TESTIMONY OF

WAS EXPECTED TO BE CONCERNING HIS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-12-84 BY 5127

68 MAY 27 1982

Exec. AD-Adm.	
Exec. AD-Inv.	
Exec. AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	
Crim.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Serv.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

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229

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b7D

[REDACTED]
DURING CONVERSATION WITH SUPERVISOR [REDACTED]

A PROBLEM EXISTED IN [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ADVISED THAT THIS SOURCE IS HIGHLY SENSITIVE, AND WELL PLACED, AND ANY TESTIMONY BY [REDACTED] IDENTIFYING HER, COULD JEOPARDIZE THIS SOURCE'S POSITION IF DISCLOSED PUBLICLY.

ON MAY 6, 1982, A FURTHER CONFERENCE WAS HELD WITH SUPERVISOR [REDACTED] AND HE ADVISED THAT, AFTER CONFERRING WITH HIS SUPERIORS, THE SBI DID DESIRE TO FULLY COOPERATE WITH THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY, AND WOULD COOPERATE BY TESTIFYING; HOWEVER, DESIRED FBI AND USDJ TO REALIZE THAT THEIR INVESTIGATION IS STILL HIGHLY SENSITIVE, AND THEY DID NOT DESIRE TO HAVE THEIR SOURCE JEOPARDIZED THROUGH ANY PUBLIC TESTIMONY.

ADDITIONAL PROBLEM HAS DEVELOPED IN THAT FBI, CHARLOTTE, IS NOT AWARE OF THE IDENTITY OF SOURCE, HOWEVER, HAS DETERMINED THAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THESE FACTS WERE FURTHER DISCUSSED WITH [REDACTED]

AND

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[REDACTED]

SUPERVISOR [REDACTED] IS TO ATTEMPT TO ARRANGE A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, SBI EXECUTIVE OFFICERS FROM THE DIRECTOR'S OFFICE OF SBI, AND WITH USDJ ATTORNEY [REDACTED] AND SA [REDACTED] OF THE FBI, AT RALEIGH, N. C., SOMETIME BETWEEN MAY 12, 1982, AND MAY 13, 1982, SO THIS MATTER CAN BE FURTHER DISCUSSED AND AN APPROPRIATE PRESENTATION CAN BE MADE TO FEDERAL GRAND JURY.

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FBIHQ WILL BE IMMEDIATELY ADVISED OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS RELATIVE

[REDACTED]

b7D

BT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Director

TO : Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: 5 MAY 1982

FROM : Wm. Bradford Reynolds

Assistant Attorney General

Civil Rights Division



WBR:LKD:MDJ:bbg
DJ 144-54M-351

SUBJECT: Greenkil
CIVIL RIGHTS

Please provide a suitable studio, four television monitors and four video cassette players at FBI headquarters on May 10, 1982 at 9:30 a.m. to simultaneously view the four video tapes of the November 3, 1979 Greensboro, North Carolina shootings.

Also please provide an appropriate camera and film to photograph pertinent photographs directly from the television monitors.

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12 MAY 20 1982

59 JUN 10 1982



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Form OBD-197
5-79

AIRTEL

6/1/82

Director, FBI (44-81521)

1 - [REDACTED]

SAC, Oklahoma City

GREENKIL
CIVIL RIGHTS
OO: CHARLOTTE

b6
b7C

Re Oklahoma City teletype to FBIHQ, dated 5/28/82.

Enclosed are 8 audio tapes comprising interviews of [REDACTED] (2 tapes), [REDACTED] (2 tapes), [REDACTED] (2 tapes), and [REDACTED] (2 tapes).

Transcribe the interviews contained on the tapes and return to FBIHQ, Attention: Civil Rights Unit, by COB 6/15/82.

For your information enclosed tapes contain interviews of witnesses associated with the Workers Viewpoint Organization/Communist Workers Party (WVO/CWP), who were survivors of the shootout between a coalition of the Ku Klux Klan/Nazi organizations and the WVO/CWP which occurred November 3, 1979, at Greensboro, North Carolina, during a "Death to the Klan" rally. This matter is presently being heard by a Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) at [REDACTED] N. C., and it is of utmost importance that these interviews be transcribed expeditiously for use during the FGJ. 44-81521-231

b3

The voices heard on the tapes will be the person being interviewed and one or more of the following persons:

SA [REDACTED] Greensboro, N.C.
[REDACTED] Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice
SA [REDACTED] FBIHQ
[REDACTED] Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice
[REDACTED] Attorney, Greensboro Defense Fund
[REDACTED] Attorney, Greensboro Defense Fund
Kenneth McCallister, United States Attorney, Middle District,
N.C.


b6
b7C

Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

Enclosures 8

EPH/mst (4)

MAIL ROOM ☐



JUN 2 1982

AIRTEL

6/1/82

Director, FBI (44-81521)

1 - [REDACTED]

SAC, Memphis

GREENKIL
CIVIL RIGHTS
OO: CHARLOTTE

Re Memphis teletype to FBIHQ, dated 5/29/82.

b6
b7C

Enclosed are 7 audio tapes comprising interviews of [REDACTED] (2 tapes), [REDACTED] (2 tapes), and [REDACTED] (3 tapes).

Transcribe the interviews contained on the tapes and return to FBIHQ, Attention: Civil Rights Unit, by COB 6/15/82.

For your information enclosed tapes contain interviews of witnesses associated with the Workers Viewpoint Organization/Communist Workers Party (WVO/CWP), who were survivors of the shootout between a coalition of the Ku Klux Klan/Nazi organizations and the WVO/CWP which occurred November 3, 1979, at Greensboro, North Carolina, during a "Death to the Klan" rally. This matter is presently being heard by a Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) at [REDACTED] N. C., and it is of utmost importance that these interviews be transcribed expeditiously for use during the FGJ.

b3

The voices heard on the tapes will be the person being interviewed and one or more of the following persons:

SA [REDACTED] Greensboro, N.C.
[REDACTED] Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice
SA [REDACTED] FBIHQ
[REDACTED] Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice
[REDACTED] Attorney, Greensboro Defense Fund
[REDACTED] Attorney, Greensboro Defense Fund
Kenneth McCallister, United States Attorney, Middle District,
N.C.

b6
b7C

Exec AD Adm. ____
Exec AD Inv. ____
Exec AD LES ____
Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Servs. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Insp. ____
Intell. ____
Lab. ____
Legal Coun. ____
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

Enclosures 7

JUN 11 1982

EEH/mst (4)

MAIL ROOM []

44-81521-232

JUN 3 1982

AIRTEL

6/1/82

Director, FBI (44-81521)

SAC, Louisville

GREENKIL
CIVIL RIGHTS
OO: CHARLOTTE

1 - [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Re Louisville teletype to FBIHQ, dated 5/27/82.

Enclosed are 5 audio tapes comprising interviews of [REDACTED] (3 tapes plus side one of a 4th tape), and [REDACTED] (begin on reverse of [REDACTED]).

Transcribe the interviews contained on the tapes and return to FBIHQ, Attention: Civil Rights Unit, by COB 6/15/82.

For your information enclosed tapes contain interviews of witnesses associated with the Workers Viewpoint Organization/Communist Workers Party (WVO/CWP), who were survivors of the shootout between a coalition of the Ku Klux Klan/Nazi organizations and the WVO/CWP which occurred November 3, 1979, at Greensboro, North Carolina, during a "Death to the Klan" rally. This matter is presently being heard by a Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) at [REDACTED] N. C., and it is of utmost importance that these interviews be transcribed expeditiously for use during the FGJ.

b3

The voices heard on the tapes will be the person being interviewed and one or more of the following persons:

SA [REDACTED] Greensboro, N.C.

[REDACTED] Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice

SA [REDACTED] FBIHQ

[REDACTED] U.S. Department of Justice

[REDACTED] Attorney, Greensboro Defense Fund

[REDACTED] Attorney, Greensboro Defense Fund

Kenneth McCallister, United States Attorney, Middle District, N.C.

b6
b7C

MAILED 7
JUN 1 1982
FBI

Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. & _____
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM ☐

44-81521-233

JUN 3 1982

AIRTEL

6/1/82

Director, FBI (44-81521)

SAC, San Antonio

b6
b7C

GREENKIL
CIVIL RIGHTS
OO: CHARLOTTE

Re San Antonio telcall to FBIHQ, 5/28/82.

Enclosed are 5 audio tapes comprising interviews of [redacted] (1 tape), [redacted] 2 tapes), and [redacted] (2 tapes).

Transcribe the interviews contained on the tapes and return to FBIHQ, Attention: Civil Rights Unit, by COB 6/15/82.

For your information enclosed tapes contain interviews of witnesses associated with the Workers Viewpoint Organization/Communist Workers Party (WVO/CWP), who were survivors of the shootout between a coalition of the Ku Klux Klan/Nazi organizations and the WVO/CWP which occurred November 3, 1979, at Greensboro, North Carolina, during a "Death to the Klan" rally. This matter is presently being heard by a Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) at [redacted] N. C. and it is of utmost importance that these interviews be transcribed expeditiously for use during the FGJ.

b3

The voices heard on the tapes will be the person being interviewed and one or more of the following persons:

SA [redacted] Greensboro, N.C.
[redacted] Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice
SA [redacted] FBIHQ
[redacted] Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice
[redacted] Attorney, Greensboro Defense Fund
[redacted] Attorney, Greensboro Defense Fund
Kenneth McCallister, United States Attorney, Middle District,
N.C.

b6
b7C

Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. & _____
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgmt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

Enclosures 5

EPH/mst

(4)

JUN 1, 1982

16 JUN 2 1982

MAIL ROOM

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 5/28/82

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 (ATTENTION TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, [redacted])

FROM: SAC, CHARLOTTE (44A-3527)

20528036

GREENKIL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6-12-84 BY SP-10 JBL/CL

Re telephone call from [redacted] to SA [redacted]
 dated 5/19/82.

Being forwarded to FBIHQ, Technical Services Division,
 Attention: [redacted] are the following list of TV video tapes
 which are requested to be copied by Technical Services Division per
 request of Departmental Attorney [redacted] in his communication
 dated 5/19/82.

The following TV tapes will be brought to Technical
 Services Division by SA [redacted] on 5/28/82;

- 1) TV-11 Durham, North Carolina
- 2) TV-2 Greensboro, North Carolina
- 3) TV-8 High Point, North Carolina and
- 4) TV-12 Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

Also being forwarded are two cassette tapes which contain
 the conversation recording of SA [redacted] Bureau of
 Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, of investigation he had with members
 of the Nazi party on 9/27/79 at Lewisburg, N.C. These tapes were
 recorded in a moving motor vehicle and have a substantial amount of
 background noises which make it extremely difficult to make an
 accurate transcription and as it relates to these two cassette tapes
 the TSD is requested to enhance the quality of these tapes and also
 make one additional copy for the FBI files. In regards to the TV JUN 9 1982
 video tapes being forwarded, TSD is requested to make one additional
 copy each of each TV channel being forwarded with time counter, and
 also obtain the still photographs from each channel as previously
 requested in memorandum dated 5/19/82.

2 - Bureau (Encs. 6)
 2 - Charlotte
 TJB/mst (4)

2 AUDIO CASSETTES
 7 (SEVEN) VIDEO CASSETTES, BY
 ONE 16MM FILM REEL BY
 SA [redacted] ON 5/28/82

Approved: [redacted]

Transmitted

3/13/83

(Time)

Per [redacted]

59 APR 15 1983

TSD Report
 3/13/83
 WIT: [redacted]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: 19 MAY 1982

FROM : Wm. Bradford Reynolds
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

WBR:LKD:MDJ:bbg
DJ 144-54M-351

SUBJECT: Greenkil

Reference is made to my request dated May 7, 1982 and previous memorandum in this matter.

b3
b6
b7C

EXP PROC
MAY 21 1982

CH

44-81521-236

MAY 20 1982

b6
b7C



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Form OBD-197
5-79

Memorandum



WBR:LKD:MDJ:jec
DJ 144-54M-351

Subject

Greenkil, CIVIL RIGHTS

Date

1 9 MAY 1982

~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~

To

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From

WBR/LKD
Wm. Bradford Reynolds
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

Reference is made to my request dated May 7, 1982 and previous memoranda in this matter.

Attached is a list of video tape times from which we would like still photographs. Please have the photo laboratory locate the pertinent video frame and produce a still photograph from the original video tape or film. Additionally, please make another copy of the video tape or film with a time code counter in anticipation of use at trial. The present copies have become somewhat worn through extensive use.

Thirdly, please have the laboratory enhance the enclosed audio tapes which were obtained from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

EXP PROC
38 MAY 25 1982

b6
b7C

TV tapes handed over to
TSD - Exp sec 5/28/82
BY SA [redacted]
Chancery Div. #

59 JUN 18 1982

144-81521-237

12 MAY 25 1982

Channel 11 (46)

11:37:12
11:38:02
11:39:01
11:57:04
12:00:03
12:01:22
12:05:23
12:11:14
12:13:15
12:16:24
12:18:00
12:18:18
12:19:06
12:20:16
12:21:02
12:21:21
12:22:11
12:23:00
12:25:08
12:26:11
12:26:16
12:26:23
12:26:28
12:27:07

12:27:24
12:28:08
12:29:00
12:30:07
12:31:00
12:31:17
12:31:28
12:33:13
12:33:20
12:33:26
12:35:00
12:35:06
12:36:03
12:42:02
12:45:06
12:47:18
12:49:04
12:50:05
12:50:15
12:51:23

Channel 8 (7)

2:21:20
2:29:01
2:29:18
2:30:04
2:31:03
2:39:07
2:40:18

Channel 2 (15)

21:54:02
21:55:26
21:56:14
21:57:17
21:58:15
21:58:23
22:06:00
22:19:10
22:26:25
22:35:12
22:35:18
22:37:05
22:37:29
22:40:03
22:45:15

Channel 12 (7)

6:25:28
6:28:18
6:32:01
6:33:09
6:35:05
6:37:10
6:37:18

MF
Please Furnish Complete Information

Agency submitting evidence <i>Charlotte Div.</i>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FBI <input type="checkbox"/> Federal <input type="checkbox"/> Local or State	Date <i>5-20-82</i>
Delivered by <i>SA</i>			Laboratory <i>20528035</i>
Suspect(s) <i>[Redacted] et</i>		Victim(s) <i>[Redacted] et al</i>	BuFile # <i>[Redacted]</i>
Offense <i>Civil Rights -</i>		Place and date of offense <i>Greensboro NC</i>	
Agency case # <i>FBI</i>			
Date of hearing, grand jury, trial, or reason why expeditious handling is necessary <i>FCJ - [Redacted]</i>			

Prev. exams this case <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	Evid. located Room # <i>[Redacted]</i>	Report to be directed to <i>[Redacted]</i>
--	---	---

Copies to	Evidence to be returned to <i>FBI - CE - Greensboro RA</i>
-----------	---

Brief Facts covering case <i>Consensual recordings to SA [Redacted]</i> <i>ATE re [Redacted] - No [Redacted]</i> <i>Part B - 9-21-82</i>	
---	--

Description of evidence <i>2 cassette tapes</i> <i>TSD Report 2/4/83 NH:jmr</i> <i>1 cc and enclosures detached Div. 8</i> <i>66 MAR 1 1983</i>	Exams requested <i>Process - audio</i> <i>Ex - handwritten</i> <i>44-81521-238</i> <i>(This space for blocking)</i> <i>JUN 9 1982</i>
---	--

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

DATE: 5-25-82

Re: GREENKIL
CIVIL RIGHTS

TO: Wm. Bradford Reynolds
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

Invoice of Contents

FORTY FOUR each CASSETTE TAPE (Q473-Q506)
FORTY FOUR each CASSETTE TAPE (direct
copy of Q473-Q506)

PERSONALLY DELIVERED TO SA [REDACTED]
BY SA [REDACTED]

ON MAY 25, 1982

☒ Return to ~~FBI~~ **ENGINEERING**
Room 1B046 TL 253
FBI File # 44-81521
Case # 20422014 E Q E

☐ Mail Room: 1B327, TL 152
(registered mail)

b6
b7c

☐ PSM - Supply Unit, 1B353
(not registered)

Shipping # _____

Shipping Method _____

JUL 20 1982

AIRTEL

6/1/82

Director, FBI (44-81521)

1 - [redacted]

SAC, Butte

GREENKIL
CIVIL RIGHTS
OO: CHARLOTTE

b6
b7C

Re Butte telcalls to FBIHQ, 5/28 and 6/1/82.

Enclosed are 6 audio tapes comprising interviews of

[redacted] (1 tape), [redacted] (1 tape), [redacted]
(1 tape), and [redacted] (3 tapes).

Transcribe the interviews contained on the tapes and
return to FBIHQ, Attention: Civil Rights Unit, by COB 6/15/82.

For your information enclosed tapes contain interviews of
witnesses associated with the Workers Viewpoint Organization/Communist
Workers Party (WVO/CWP), who were survivors of the shootout between
a coalition of the Ku Klux Klan/Nazi organizations and the WVO/CWP
which occurred November 3, 1979, at Greensboro, North Carolina,
during a "Death to the Klan" rally. This matter is presently being
heard by a Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) at [redacted] N. C., and it
is of utmost importance that these interviews be transcribed ex-
pediently for use during the FGJ.

b3

MAILED 7
JUN 1 1982
FBI

The voices heard on the tapes will be the person being
interviewed and one or more of the following persons:

SA [redacted] Greensboro, N.C.

[redacted] Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice

SA [redacted] FBIHQ

[redacted] Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice

[redacted] Attorney, Greensboro Defense Fund

[redacted] Attorney, Greensboro Defense Fund

Kenneth McCallister, United States Attorney, Middle District,
N.C.

b6
b7C

Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

Enclosures 6

EEH/mst (4)

MAIL ROOM

AIRTEL

6/1/82

Director, FBI (44-81521)

1 - [REDACTED]

SAC, Albany

GREENKIL
CIVIL RIGHTS
OO: CHARLOTTE

b6
b7C

Re Albany teletype to FBIHQ, dated 5/28/82.

Enclosed are 6 audio tapes comprising interviews of
[REDACTED] (1 tape), [REDACTED] (1 tape), [REDACTED]
(2 tapes), and [REDACTED] (2 tapes).

Transcribe the interviews contained on the tapes and
return to FBIHQ, Attention: Civil Rights Unit, by COB 6/15/82.

For your information enclosed tapes contain interviews of
witnesses associated with the Workers Viewpoint Organization/Communist
Workers Party (WVO/CWP), who were survivors of the shootout between
a coalition of the Ku Klux Klan/Nazi organizations and the WVO/CWP
which occurred November 3, 1979, at Greensboro, North Carolina,
during a "Death to the Klan" rally. This matter is presently being
heard by a Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) at [REDACTED] N. C., and it
is of utmost importance that these interviews be transcribed ex-
pediently for use during the FGJ.

b3

The voices heard on the tapes will be the person being
interviewed and one or more of the following persons:

SA [REDACTED] Greensboro, N.C.

[REDACTED] Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice

SA [REDACTED] FBIHQ

[REDACTED] Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice

[REDACTED] Attorney, Greensboro Defense Fund


[REDACTED] Attorney, Greensboro Defense Fund

Kenneth McCallister, United States Attorney, Middle District,
N.C.

Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. &
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

Enclosures 6

EEH/mst (4)



JUN 2 1982

b6
b7C

AIRTEL

6/1/82

Director, FBI (44-81521)

1 - [REDACTED]

SAC, Portland

GREENKIL
CIVIL RIGHTS
OO: CHARLOTTE

Re Portland teletype to FBIHQ, dated 5/27/82.

Enclosed are 7 audio tapes comprising interviews of [REDACTED] (3 tapes), [REDACTED] 2 tapes and first side of a 3rd tape), and [REDACTED] (begin on reverse side of [REDACTED] Tape).

Transcribe the interviews contained on the tapes and return to FBIHQ, Attention: Civil Rights Unit, by COB 6/15/82.

For your information enclosed tapes contain interviews of witnesses associated with the Workers Viewpoint Organization/Communist Workers Party (WVO/CWP), who were survivors of the shootout between a coalition of the Ku Klux Klan/Nazi organizations and the WVO/CWP which occurred November 3, 1979, at Greensboro, North Carolina, during a "Death to the Klan" rally. This matter is presently being heard by a Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) at [REDACTED] N. C., and it is of utmost importance that these interviews be transcribed expeditiously for use during the FGJ.


The voices heard on the tapes will be the person being interviewed and one or more of the following persons:

SA [REDACTED] Greensboro, N.C.
[REDACTED] Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice
SA [REDACTED] FBIHQ
[REDACTED] Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice
[REDACTED] Attorney, Greensboro Defense Fund
[REDACTED] Attorney, Greensboro Defense Fund
Kenneth McCallister, United States Attorney, Middle District,
N.C.

Exec AD Adm. ____
Exec AD Inv. ____
Exec AD LES ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ____
Crim. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Insp. ____
Intell. ____
Lab. ____
Legal Coun. ____
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. ____
Rec. Mgnt. ____
Tech. Servs. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

Enclosures 7

BCH/mst (4)



JUN 2 1982

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 6/2/82

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (44A-81521)
 ATTN: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, LIAISON UNIT,
 CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION,
 CIVIL RIGHTS UNIT

FROM: SAC, CHARLOTTE (44A-3527) (P)

SUBJECT: GREENKIL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6-12-84 BY SP2 TRF/c

Reference SA telecall to FBI
 Headquarters on 5/29/82.

Enclosed for FBI Headquarters are five copies of LHM
 reflecting background information re captioned investigation as
 relates to formerly of Raleigh, N.C., who is now
 believed to be residing in South Africa.

FBI Headquarters, Foreign Liaison Unit, State Department
 Liaison, is requested to attempt to determine through the
 State Department the following information:

1. Verification of passport for
 white male, date of birth former residence -
 Raleigh, N.C., and
 Raleigh, N.C.

2. Dates of entry into South Africa.

3. Present location in South Africa, if it is determined
 is presently in that nation.

- ④ - Bureau (Encls. 5)
 (1 - Unit CI-3A)
 (1 - Legat)
 2 - Charlotte

TJB:pss
 (6)

ENCLOSURE

1-0 ENCLOSURE
100 CI-3A100 RU
100 RD

070-13

6/7/82

RMB-MA

5 JUN 4 1982

Approved

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

SIX

52 JUL 6 1982

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ _____

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date _____

CE 44A-3527

4. Existing agreements between the United States and South Africa as it pertains to extradition and removal of (1) material witness, (2) indicted defendant for violation of United States Criminal Code, Title 18, Section 245 - Civil Rights Act; participating in a conspiracy to cause a civil disturbance resulting in death - life imprisonment.

5. Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, has requested expedite handling of all leads pertaining to this investigation.

Investigation to further determine the whereabouts of
 is continuing at Raleigh, N.C.

b6
b7C

2*

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ Per _____
(Number) (Time)



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Charlotte, North Carolina 28282

June 2, 1982

MEMBERS OF INVISIBLE EMPIRE
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN IN NORTH CAROLINA;
MEMBERS OF NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY OF
AMERICA, AKA, NAZI PARTY;
CAESAR VINCENT CAUCE - VICTIM (DECEASED);
MICHAEL NATHAN - VICTIM (DECEASED);
WILLIAM EVAN SAMSON - VICTIM (DECEASED);
SANDY SMITH - VICTIM (DECEASED);
JAMES MICHAEL WALLER - VICTIM (DECEASED):

[REDACTED] - VICTIM;
[REDACTED] - VICTIM;
[REDACTED] - VICTIM;
[REDACTED] - VICTIM;
[REDACTED] - VICTIM;
[REDACTED] - VICTIM;
[REDACTED] - VICTIM;
[REDACTED] - VICTIM;

WORKERS VIEWPOINT ORGANIZATION (WVO), AKA
Communist Workers Party (CWP),
GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA,
NOVEMBER 3, 1979
CIVIL RIGHTS

For information of the Department of State, on November 3, 1979,
at Greensboro, North Carolina, a rally and conference being sponsored
by the Workers Viewpoint Organization; now known as the Communist
Workers Party was disrupted by a caravan of vehicles occupied by
members of the Ku Klux Klan of North Carolina; and representatives
of the National Socialist Party of America (Nazis) of North Carolina.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER
RECOMMENDATIONS NOR CONCLUSIONS
OF THE FBI. IT IS THE PROPERTY
OF THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO YOUR
AGENCY; IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE
NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE
YOUR AGENCY,

44-81521-242
ENCLOSURE

MEMBERS OF INVISIBLE EMPIRE
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN IN NORTH CAROLINA;
MEMBERS OF NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY OF
AMERICA, AKA, NAZI PARTY

As a result of a street fight, which erupted between these opposing factions, members of the Ku Klux Klan, and Nazi Party, returned to their vehicles and fired into the demonstrators with shotguns; AR 180; and handguns, resulting in the death of five Communist demonstrators, and the wounding of nine other individuals.

[redacted] white male, date of birth - [redacted] b6
[redacted] a resident at [redacted] Raleigh, b7C
North Carolina, on November 3, 1979, was the self-acclaimed
[redacted] National Socialist Party of America, North
Carolina Chapter, and further [redacted]
[redacted] National Socialist Party of America, Headquarters
at Chicago, Illinois. He subsequently became [redacted]

[redacted] in a letter to a representative of the
Revolutionary Communist Party on September 11, 1979, approximately
two months prior to the shooting incident, alleged that members
of the Nazi Party, and Ku Klux Klan, had plans to kill members
of the Communist Workers Party at an assembly in China Grove,
North Carolina, on July 8, 1979, however, due to the interference b6
of police officers, and a desire not to kill a law enforcement b7C
officer, the plan was not executed. In this letter, [redacted]
expresses his desires, and the desires of his associates in the
Nazi Party, to "kill the home-grown version" of Communist sympathizers.

In April of 1980, [redacted] addressed a letter to the
Attorney General of the State of North Carolina, and in this letter,
made statements that he had information concerning names, and dates,
and events which reportedly indicated the involvement of high-ranking
Government officials, both in the State of North Carolina and b6
the Federal Government, in the November 3, 1979, shooting incident b7C
which resulted in the death of the five Communist demonstrators.
The imprints of this letter is that this was a planned execution
of the Communists, and involved officials of the United States
Government, and the State of North Carolina. [redacted] advised
in this letter that if he was to be assassinated, this letter
would be made public to the news media and would result in great
embarrassment to the Governor of North Carolina; the Attorney
General of the State of North Carolina; and other high-ranking
Government officials.

On [redacted] at [redacted] North Carolina, a b3
Federal Grand Jury was convened in [redacted]
Carolina, upon the authority of the Attorney General of the United
States, to investigate the above incident as it relates to possible
violation of the Civil Rights Act, specifically Title 18, Section 245.

MEMBERS OF INVISIBLE EMPIRE
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN IN NORTH CAROLINA;
MEMBERS OF NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY OF
AMERICA, AKA, NAZI PARTY

[REDACTED]

subsequently determined that [REDACTED] in May of 1982, had written a letter from [REDACTED] of Raleigh, North Carolina, which had no return address, but was stamped The Nation of South Africa. Interview of [REDACTED] had determined that [REDACTED] has alleged to him in this letter that he has returned to South Africa to continue his efforts to promote white power in the South African nation, and continue his work with the Nazi Party.

Investigation is being conducted through other known associates of [REDACTED] to determine his exact whereabouts in South Africa, and this inquiry is being furnished to the Department of State, in order to determine the present location of [REDACTED] in South Africa; and what extradition agreements exist between the United States and that nation for the removal of [REDACTED] back to the United States either as a material witness, or a possible defendant, if he should be indicted by the Federal Grand Jury in the Middle District of North Carolina.

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

b6
b7C

Date 6/8/82

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (44-81521)
ATTN: CIVIL RIGHTS UNIT

FROM: SAC, PORTLAND (66-166)

SUBJECT: GREENKIL
CIVIL RIGHTS
(OO: Charlotte)

Re FBIHQ airtel, 6/1/82; and telcal from Civil Rights Unit
to Supv. [redacted] Portland, 6/8/82.


Per instructions received during referenced telcal, tapes
containing interview of [redacted] (two tapes and first side of a
third tape) and [redacted] (beginning on reverse side of [redacted]
taped interview and continuing onto a second tape) are being returned
so they can be sent to another office for transcription in order
to meet the BUDED set out in referenced airtel.

- ③ - Bureau (Enc. 4)
1 - Portland

JAM:LBN
(4)

ENCLOSURE
Forwarded via airtel
6/15/82
to [redacted]

44-81521-243



Approved: [Signature] Transmitted _____ Per _____
(Number) (Time)

59 JUL 2 1982

AIRTEL

6/15/82

Director, FBI (44-81521)

SAC, Albany

GREENKIL
CIVIL RIGHTS
OO: CHARLOTTE

1 - [REDACTED]

Re Butelcal to Albany dated 6/15/82.

[REDACTED] Enclosed are four audio tapes comprising interviews of [REDACTED] (2 tapes and first side of a 3rd tape), and [REDACTED] (begin on reverse side of [REDACTED] tape).

b6
b7C

Transcribe the interviews contained on the tapes and return to FBIHQ, Attention: Civil Rights Unit, by COB 6/25/82.

For your information enclosed tapes contain interviews of witnesses associated with the Workers Viewpoint Organization/Communist Workers Party (WVO/CWP), who were survivors of the shootout between a coalition of the Ku Klux Klan/Nazi organizations and the WVO/CWP which occurred November 3, 1979, at Greensboro, North Carolina, during a "Death to the Klan" rally. This matter is presently being heard by a Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) at [REDACTED] N. C., and it is of utmost importance that these interviews be transcribed expeditiously for the use during the FGJ.

b3

The voices heard on the tapes will be the person being interviewed and one or more of the following persons:

44-81521-244
JUN 16 1982

SA [REDACTED] Greensboro, N.C.

[REDACTED] Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice

SA [REDACTED] FBIHQ

[REDACTED] Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice

[REDACTED] Attorney, Greensboro Defense Fund

[REDACTED] Attorney, Greensboro Defense Fund

Kenneth McCallister, United States Attorney, Middle District, N. C.

b6
b7C

Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____

Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Servs. _____ Enclosures 4

Crim. Inv. _____

Ident. _____

Insp. _____

Intell. _____

Lab. _____

Legal Coun. _____

Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____

Rec. Mgnt. _____

Tech. Servs. _____

Training _____

Telephone Rm. _____

Director's Sec'y _____

EEH/mst

59 JUL 21 1982

MAIL ROOM

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 6/14/82

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (44-81521)
 ATTENTION: GENE HATFIELD,
 CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, ROOM 5131

FROM: SAC, SAN ANTONIO (157-2204) (C)

GREENKIL
 CIVIL RIGHTS
 OO: CHARLOTTE

Re Bureau airtel to San Antonio 6/1/82.

Returned herewith are the transcripts of five
 audiotape interviews of [redacted] and [redacted]

Tapes of [redacted]

Q 490
 Q 507, 508
 Q 509, 510

b6
 b7C

Transcriptions &
 Package
 received
 6/17/82
 EH

TO: DOS 0-70B 6/23/82
 TO CE AIRTEL 6/28/82
 #

44-81521-245

16 JUN 17 1982

3 - Bureau
 (1 package copy)
 1 - San Antonio
 DAW:rv
 (3)

18

Approved: *JWD/hyl*Transmitted *[signature]*

(Number)

(Time)

Per

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 6/15/82

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (44-81521)
 (ATTN: CIVIL RIGHTS UNIT)
 FROM: SAC, LOUISVILLE ((100-6955) (RUC)
 SUBJECT: GREENKIL
 CIVIL RIGHTS
 OO: CHARLOTTE

Re Bureau airtel to Louisville, dated 6/1/82.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five (5) audio tapes comprising interviews of [redacted] and [redacted]. Also enclosed for the Bureau are two (2) transcripts, as requested by FBIHQ.

Tapes of: [redacted] Q 498, 499, 500, side A of Q501
 [redacted] Side B of Q501, 502

TRANSCRIPTIONS &
 Package Received
 6/17/82
 ELL

TACKED 0.70 B 6/20/82
 TO: CE AIRTEL 6/28/82
 *

② - Bureau (Enc. 7) **ENCLOSURE**
 1 - Louisville
 LCB/rdl
 (3)

7 JUN 17 1982

66 JUL 1 1982

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ Per _____
 (Number) (Time)

b6
b7C

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 6/14/82

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (44-81521)
 (ATTN: CIVIL RIGHTS UNIT)

FROM: SAC, PORTLAND (66-166) (RUC)

SUBJECT: GREENKIL
 CIVIL RIGHTS
 (OO: CHARLOTTE)

Re Bureau airtel to Portland, 6/1/82; Portland airtel to FBIHQ, 6/8/82.

Enclosed herewith for FBIHQ is original transcription of interview of [redacted] and three audio tapes containing said interview.

Transcription was made by GS-7 MDE [redacted] Portland Division.

TAPE OF [redacted] 485, 486, 487

TRANSCRIPTIONS &
 Tapes received
 6/12/82
 ELL

TO: CRD 0:70B 6/29/82
 TO: CE AIRTEL 6/29/82
 #

44-81521-248

③ - Bureau (Enc. 4) ENCLOSURE
 1 - Portland
 JAM:ceh
 (4)

12 JUN 14 1982

-1*-

Approved: RS GEF/RAH

Transmitted _____

(Number)

(Time)

Per _____

AIRTEL

6/28/82

Director, FBI (44-81521)

SAC, Charlotte (44A-3527)

1 - SA [redacted]

GREENKIL
CIVIL RIGHTS
OO: CHARLOTTE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6-12-84 BY SP7P/ci

Enclosed for Charlotte are the following:

b6
b7C

1. Two copies of a passport application in the name of [redacted] dated July 8, 1981, at Miami, Florida, bearing passport number [redacted] issued [redacted] at Miami, Florida. (One copy of passport application has been furnished directly to Attorney [redacted] USDJ, CRD, Washington, D. C.)

2. Two copies of polaroid photographs of [redacted] accompanying passport application. (No copies furnished to DOJ.)

3. Two xerox copies of a laboratory report, dated June 17, 1982, concerning the K47, K48, and K49 revolvers. (One copy has been furnished to CRD, USDJ.)


4. Twenty-three original FD-302's and one xerox copy of the FD-302's as follows:

Q NUMBER

NAME

DATE INTERVIEWED

Q 473, 474
Q 475, 476
Q 477, 478
Q 479, 480
Q 481, 482
Q 482, 484
Q 485, 486, 487
Q 488, 489




4/27/82
4/8/82
4/8/82
5/3/82
5/3/82
4/14/82
4/8/82
4/12/82
4/28/82
4/29/82

Exec AD Adm. ☐ 490
Exec AD Inv. ☐ 491
Exec AD LES ☐ 491
Asst. Dir.:

Adm. Servs. ☐
Crim. Inv. ☐
Ident. ☐
Insp. ☐
Intell. ☐
Lab. ☐
Legal Coun. ☐
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. ☐
Rec. Mgnt. ☐
Tech. Servs. ☐
Training ☐
Telephone Rm. ☐
Director's Sec'y ☐

EEH:d (4)



715415

44-81521-249

JUN 29 1982

MAIL ROOM ☒

Airtel from Director, FBI to SAC, Charlotte
RE: GREENKIL

Q 492
Q 493
Q 494
Q 495, 496, 497
Q 498, 499, 500, 501
Q 501, 502
Q 503
Q 504, 505, 506
Q 507, 508
Q 509, 510
Q 511, 512
Q 513, 514, 515
Q 515, 516

4/28/82
4/29/82
4/13/82
4/13/82
4/15/82
4/15/82
4/27/82
4/7/82
4/17/82
4/8/82
4/26/82
4/15/82
4/15/82

b6
b7c

Charlotte will note xerox copies of the above FD-302's were hand carried to [REDACTED] CRD, USDJ, on June 28, 1982.

Charlotte will also note original FD-302's have been initialed by SA [REDACTED], FBIHQ, where appropriate.

Forty-four audio tape copies representing the above interviews were furnished to [REDACTED] CRD, USDJ, for review.

REPORT
of the
FBITECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1

Room 5131

1

1

1

1

1

To: Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

July 6, 1982

FBI FILE NO. 44-81521-

LAB. NO. 20422014 E QE

YOUR NO.

Re: GREENKIL
CIVIL RIGHTS

Examination requested by: Addressee

Reference: Letter dated April 13, 1982

Examination requested: Duplication

Specimens received: April 22, 1982, personally delivered by SA [REDACTED]

The following forty-two (42) specimens are C-60 audio cassettes marked in part:

Q473

Q474

Q475

Q476

Q477

Q478

Q479

Q480

Q481

Q482

One

:jmh (8)

53 JUL 14 1982

MAIL ROOM ☒

Continued Over

Q483

Q484

Q485

Q486

Q487

Q488

Q489

Q490

Q491

Q492

Q493

Q494

Q495

Q496

Q497

Q498

Q499

Q500

Q501

Q502

Q503

Q504

Q505

Q506

Q507

Q508

Q509

Q510

Q511

Q512

Q513

Q514

The following two (2) specimens are C-90 audio cassettes marked in part:

Q515

Q516

Result of examination:

A direct copy of Q473 through Q516 was made, each copy consisting of one cassette tape.

Q473 through Q516 and the forty-four (44) direct copies were personally delivered to SA [REDACTED] on May 25, 1982.

RECORDED

4/27/82

lab

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION:
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Work Sheet

To: Mr. William Bradford Reynolds
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division
Department of Justice

FBI FILE NO.

44-81521-250

LAB. NO.

20422014 E RD

Re: GREENKIL
CIVIL RIGHTS

YOUR NO.

Examination by:

b6
b7C

Examination requested by:

Addressee

Reference:

Letter dated 4/13/82

Examination requested:

Duplication

Specimens received:

4/22/82

Q473 = ~~Q501~~ ~~29 tapes~~
Q516 44 TAPES

USING PENTAGON HIGH SPEED

COPIER - DIRECT COPIES -

44 EACH MAXELL C-60

TSD Report
7/16/82
NH. jmk

20422014E

Q#

b6
b7c

Date	Sub	# Tapes	
4/26/82	Q473/ Mrs. [redacted]	2	C-60
4/8/82	Q475/ [redacted]	2	C-60
4/8/82	Q475 7/8 [redacted]	2	C-60
5/3/82	Q479/ [redacted]	2	C-60
5/3/82	Q479 8/8 [redacted]	2	C-60
4/14/82	Q483/ [redacted]	2	C-60
4/8/82	Q485/6/7 [redacted]	3	C-60
4/12/82	Q485/9 [redacted]	2	C-60
4/28/82	Q490 [redacted]	1	C-60
4/29/82	Q491 [redacted]	1	C-60
4/28/82	Q492 [redacted]	1	C-60
4/28/82	Q493 [redacted]	1	C-60
4/13/82	Q494 [redacted]	1	GMT-68

20422014E-

J82

Date	Q#	Sub	#Tapes	le-
4/13/82	Q495/6/7	[REDACTED]	3	- c-60
4/15/82	Q498/9/500/0/1	[REDACTED]	5	- c-60
4/15/82	- 502	[REDACTED]		
4/27/82	Q503/1	[REDACTED]	1	c-60
4/7/82	Q504/5/6	[REDACTED]	3	c-60
4/7/82	Q507/8	[REDACTED]	2	- c-60
4/8/82	Q509/10	[REDACTED]	2	c-60
	Q 511 /12	[REDACTED]	2	c-60
4/15/82	Q513/4/5/6	[REDACTED]	4	c-60
			44	

AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 204220145-

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q 473

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass

Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 labeled in Past

b6
b7C


Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)

Stereo ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk) Bin ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:



Direct:

Processed:

High Speed Dr. Copies
Safety Tabs Punched.

AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-0

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q 475

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 Cabelled in Part




b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:



Direct:

Processed:

*High Speed Dr. Copies
Safety Tabs Punched*

AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 204220142-05

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q 477

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass

Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 labeled in Post

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

Pentagon

1140

001

001

Direct:

Processed:

High Speed Dr. Copies
Safety Tabs Punched.

b6
b7C

AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-6

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q478

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk ☒ Nagra ☐ Micro Cass ☐
 Multi Chnl ☐ Other ☐ Speed ☐

One Scotch C-60 labeled in Port




b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
 Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
 Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:



Direct:

Processed:

*High Speed Dr. Copies
 Safety Tabs Punched*

AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-05

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q 479

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 Labeled in Part




b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:



Direct:

Processed:

High Speed Dr. Copies
Safety Tabs Punched

AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 204220142-05

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): 0480

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass

Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 Labeled in Part

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

Pentagon

1140

001

001

Direct:

Processed:

High Speed Dr. Copies

Safety Tabs Punched

b6
b7C

AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-05

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q481

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass 8 Trk Nagra ~~Micro Cass~~

Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 labeled in Print

b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (~~1/2~~Trk ~~1/2~~Trk)
Stereo (~~1/2~~Trk ~~1/2~~Trk) Bin (~~1/2~~Trk ~~1/2~~Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

Pentagon

1140

001

001

Direct:

Processed:

High Speed Dr. Copies
Safety Tabs Punched

AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-05

Bufile:

Date: Feb 72

Specimen(s): 0482

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk ~~Regra~~ Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C60 Labeled in Part


b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:



Direct:

Processed:

High Speed Dr. Copies

Safety Tabs Punched

AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-0

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q83

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Amp. C-100 labeled in Part.

b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

Pentagon
1140
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Direct:

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 2042204E-5

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q484

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Ampul C60 Labeled in Part




b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:



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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 204220142-6

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): 0485

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass

Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 labeled in Part

b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No: 20422014E-G

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q486

Tape Format Rcvd: RI Cass 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
 Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 labeled in Part




b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)
 Stereo ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk) Bin ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
 Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-05

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q487

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 Label on Part

b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)
 Stereo ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk) Bin ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
 Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-6

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q488

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Ampex C-60 Labeled in Part

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

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b7C

AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-65

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q489

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Sample C-60 Labelled in List

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-6

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q490

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

(One Scratch C-60 labeled in Part)

b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)
Stereo ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk) Bin ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 2042204E-05

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q491

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 labeled in Port


b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-05

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q492

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass

Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 Labeled in Part




b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:



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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-Q5


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Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): 0493

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60, Labeled "Part"




b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:



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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No: 204220145-05

Bufile:

Date: 5/1/82

Specimen(s): 0494

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Amp out GM-60 labeled in Part

b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No: 20422014E-05

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): 0495

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Ampex 5Ms 60 labeled in Part

b6
b7c

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 204220142-05

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q496

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass

Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Amp set GMI-60 labeled in Part

b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 204220142-05

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): D497

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Ampex GM-60 Labeled in Post

b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-05

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): 0498

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass

Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 - labeled in part

b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 204220142-65

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q489

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 labeled in photo




b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:



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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 204228145-9

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q500

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 labeled in part

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

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b6
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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 204220145-6

File:

Date: 5/4/32

Specimen(s): Q501

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass

Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Audition 60 - Lab. in Part

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)
Stereo ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk) Bin ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-GE

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): 0502

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Ampex SMT-60 labeled in Port




b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-QF

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Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): 11503

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed


One Scotch C-60 Labeled in Part

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-6

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): 0504

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass

Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 labeled in Part

b6
b7c

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 2042204E-QF

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): 505

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 ☒ Cass ☒ 8 Trk ☒ Nagra ☐ Micro Cass
Multi Chnl ☐ Other ☐ Speed ☐

One Scotch C-60 labeled in Part "

b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk ☐ Chnl (Lft ☐ Rt ☐) Mono ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk ☒ $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk ☐)
Stereo ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk ☐ $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk ☐) Bin ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk ☐ $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk ☒)

Analysis: Tones ☐ Dist ☐ N/F Pty ☐ Spd Prob ☐ Conv Prob ☐ Music ☐
Noise (Hi ☐ Lo ☐ Wb ☐) Mod (Over ☐ Under ☐) Sig/Noise ☐

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-QF

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q506

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 labeled in part

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)
 Stereo ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk) Bin ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
 Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-QF

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): 007

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
 Multi Chnl Other Speed

Clue Scotch ew labeled in Part

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk ☒ $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)
 Stereo ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk) Bin ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
 Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-QF

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q08

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed


One Scotch C60 labeled in Part

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:



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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-QF

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): 0309

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass

Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Scotch C-60 labeled in Part

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)
Stereo ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk) Bin ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-QF

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q511

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Ampex C-60 Labeled in Aut.

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-QF

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q512

Tape Format Rcvd: Rl Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass

Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Dictaphone C-60 labeled in Part

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

Pentagon

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-QF

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q513

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Audition 60 labeled in text




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Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

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AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 204220142-QF

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q514

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Ampex. ~~8 Trk~~ Labeled in part.

Trk Config: ^{GMI-60} Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)
Stereo ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk) Bin ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

Pentagon
1140
001 001

Direct:

Processed:

*High Speed Dr. Copies
Safety Tabs Punched.*

b6
b7C

AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-QF

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q 515

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Audition 90 labeled in Port

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk) Stereo ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk) Bin ($\frac{1}{2}$ Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

Pentagon
1140
001 001

Direct:

Processed:

*High Speed Dr. Copies
Safety Tabs Punched.*

b6
b7c

AUDIO ANALYSIS WORK SHEET

Lab. No. 20422014E-QF

Bufile:

Date: 5/4/82

Specimen(s): Q516

Tape Format Rcvd: R1 Cass ☒ 8 Trk Nagra Micro Cass
Multi Chnl Other Speed

One Audition 90 Labels in Part

b6
b7C

Trk Config: Full Trk Chnl (Lft Rt) Mono (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)
Stereo (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk) Bin (1/2 Trk 1/2 Trk)

Analysis: Tones Dist N/F Pty Spd Prob Conv Prob Music
Noise (Hi Lo Wb) Mod (Over Under) Sig/Noise

Investigative Interviews

Set Up:

Pentagon

1140

001

001

Direct:

Processed:

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